Review of Faith and Humility, by Jonathan Kvanvig

The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility, edited by Mark Alfano, Michael Lynch, and Alessandra Tanesini, 2020

In some circles, faith is said to be one of three theological virtues, along with hope and agape. But not everyone thinks faith is a virtue, theological or otherwise. Indeed, depending on how we understand it, faith may well conflict with the virtues. In this chapter we will focus on the virtue of humility. Does faith conflict with humility, or are they in concord? In what follows, we will do five things. First, we will sketch a theory of the virtue of humility. Second, we will summarize a common view of faith, arguably held by Thomas Aquinas among others, and we will argue that Thomistic faith is not an intellectual virtue and that it conflicts with humility in the domain of inquiry. Third, we will plump for an older view of faith, one that predates Aquinas by at least 1500 years, Markan faith. Fourth, we will argue that Markan faith is an intellectual virtue and it is in concord with humility in the domain of inquiry. Fifth, we will argue that Markan faith, unlike Thomistic faith, is a personal virtue and that it is in concord with humility in the domain of personal relationships, both human-human and human-divine.

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion

In this paper I explore humility as a paradigm, with reference to recent debates over the morality and rationality of emotions, and to the relation between religion and emotion. In Ancient Greek ethics, humility did not yet play a role; with the rise of Christianity, however, it becomes one of the cardinal virtues – only to disappear again with the onset of modernity. Against a culture-pessimistic interpretation of this development, this article begins by characterising the relation between virtue and emotion, before reconstructing the inner rationality of humility and showing how it can be traced through several transformations to a modern ethics of responsibility. Against this background, possible manifestations of the humble attitude in the present are made plausible.

We each stand, phenomenologically speaking, at the center of the universe. This inherent "centered-ness" biases our experience of our own needs, desires, interests, beliefs, goals, and values as being more immediate and urgent than those of others', manifesting in a natural self-orientation that-if left unchecked-can lead us to problematically privilege, prioritize, and favor ourselves. The central thesis presented here is that the interfering and distorting influences that arise from this centeredness are most effectively combated, and ultimately quieted, through the cultivation of humility. And further, that humility (as defined by Nadelhoffer & Wright, 2017) should be considered a foundational virtue, necessary for the full development and exercise of other virtues, and maturely virtuous character.

Faith and Philosophy, 2019

2016

In this paper we first set the stage with a brief overview of the tangled history of humility in theology and philosophy—beginning with its treatment in the Bible and ending with the more recent work that has been done in contemporary philosophy (§ §1-2). Our twofold goal at this early stage of the paper is to explore some of the different accounts of humility that have traditionally been developed and to highlight some of the key debates in the current literature. Next, we present the findings from several studies we recently conducted in an effort to explore people's intuitions and beliefs about humility as well as their experiences with being humble (or failing to be humble) (§3). Finally, we discuss the relevance of our findings to the ongoing philosophical debates about humility—suggesting that while some varieties of humility are problematic, other varieties of humility are certainly worth wanting (§4).

This special issue will consist of six full-length articles by leading and up-and-coming philosophers on the topic of intellectual humility, a topic which has attracted a growing interest in the recent philosophical literature. While it is widely in regarded that intellectual humility is among the intellectual virtues, a cluster of questions demanding increasing attention are: why this is so, what does possessing and exercising intellectual humility consists in, how it should be best understood as advancing our epistemic goals, and how it might connect with an appreciation of how the success of our inquiries depends importantly on features of our social and physical environment beyond our control. This volume will bring together a range of different philosophical perspectives on these and related questions to do with intellectual humility with an aim to contributing importantly to this important and recent debate.

In the past two decades, those who study organization success and the role of leadership have begun to appreciate the importance of humility as a leadership virtue and a quality that enhances the ability of an organization to inspire trust, commitment, and extra-mile performance . In his study of organizations that made the transition from “good to great,” Jim Collins introduced Level 5 Leadership, which he described as the integration of humility and fierce resolve, and the key leadership factor of high performing organizations . Much has been written about the importance of perseverance, personal commitment, and resolve as leadership virtues, but far less has been written about humility . Although humility has been recognized as a character virtue for many years, it has not always been considered to be a condition precedent for enlightened leadership .

Psychological Studies, 2017

The virtue of humility is lauded by most authorities but opinions of what it is, what it includes and what it does not are multifarious. Religious and philosophical traditions in India stress its role in emancipating the ego and providing an understanding for one’s perspective as contrasted against the magnanimity of the Almighty, the Supernatural or the Universe. Most academicians within scientific psychological realm also look upon humility as a virtue. Accredited as a powerful tool for personal, social and organisational well-being, humility, as a moral construct, deserves a thorough and detailed exploration to reveal what it entails, what its corollaries are, and how it can be measured. It is particularly useful in Indian context, as indigenous traditions have always emphasized humility. However, such efforts have remained relatively neglected till recent years. Of course, a few researchers with emphasis on moral and positive psychology have probed and prodded this concept to lay bare its comprising elements and to build tools to measure it. These attempts have been discussed here. Information was culled from surveying the scientific literature of the past four decades from psychological and philosophical journals and handbooks. Its overlap with Indian concept of humility has been discussed, and the unresolved questions about its nuances are put forward for future research endeavor. Keywords: Humility, Positive Psychology, Moral Psychology