Academia.eduAcademia.edu

Critique as a Political Practice of Freedom

2019, A Time for Critique

Abstract

What does it mean to think about critique as a political practice? The answer to this question may seem at first obvious: insofar as critique aims at exposing forms of unjust power, critique is political. Is critique political, however, if it arises not in public spaces and in relation to different and often conflicting points of view but in private or institutional spaces where opinions tend to converge? Thinking about such questions, I aim not at an analytic definition of critique, as if critique meant one thing or happened in one kind of space. Rather, my goal is to retrieve the origins of critique in the public space as a practice of freedom, that is, of speaking and acting with citizens and strangers about matters of common concern. A political genealogy of critique is all the more important today, when the practice of critique in advanced capitalist liberal democracies such as the United States seems to be mostly restricted to the activity of "professional thinkers" and the space of the academy, which is at once charged with preserving the tradition of critical thought and maligned for harboring an arrogant intellectual elite. But the academy, as both Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt in their different ways will show us, is not the original home of critique; it is the place to which critique retreats when it loses its footing in the political realm. Critique was born not inside the relatively sheltered intellectual spaces of the academy but in this public space, where it took the form of opposition to the tenacious idea of politics as rule, according to which the few have natural governing authority over the many. Grasping this inaugural task of critique can help make sense of our contemporary predicament, in which even the more limited <i>A Time for Critique</i>,