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The 1987 Constitution serves as a fundamental legal framework for governance in the Philippines, establishing essential rights and protections for individuals, such as prohibiting torture, ensuring the right to bail, and laying out procedures for due process. It emphasizes the role of various governmental and educational institutions while defining their responsibilities and limitations, including provisions against excessive punishment and the conditions under which habeas corpus may be suspended.
Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 2010
The purpose of the article is to examine the meaning of habeas corpus in the age of the war on terror and the detention camps at Guantanamo Bay. Since the war on terror was declared in 2001, the writ has been invoked from quarters not nor- mally considered within the federal courts’ domain. In this article, I set out to do two things: first, I provide an overview of the writ’s history in the United States, and ex- plain its connection to federalism and unlawful executive detention. I then set out to bridge the two meanings of habeas corpus. Second, then, I examine the cases that came out of Guantanamo Bay, and explain their connection to the writ’s true mean- ing. In conclusion, I find that there is no discrepancy between habeas as a tool of liberty for the guilty and for the detained.
Habeas Corpus after 9/11, 2011
Individual Rights and the Role of the Judiciary during Wartime
Canadian Journal of Human Rights, 2019
In Mission Institution v Khela, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a detainee on an application for habeas corpus may challenge a deprivation of liberty on grounds of substantive unreasonableness. According to some advocates and scholars, Khela completed an unwelcome fusion of habeas corpus and administrative law that threatens to weaken the strength of habeas corpus and, with it, prisoners' rights. The author argues, however, that the fusion of habeas corpus and administrative law has not been the setback that some have suggested. As the cases reviewed in this article show, correctional authorities routinely disregard prisoner representations in the process of making decisions that deprive prisoners of their liberty. Khela's virtue is that it incorporates into the law of habeas corpus a justificatory standard which condemns such disregard in a manner not previously known to the correctional law contex. In short, Khela requires the Correctional Service of Canada to do something seemingly contrary to its ethos: take prisoners' rights seriously. † J.D. (2017), University of British Columbia. I owe special thanks to Professors Efrat Arbel, Debra Parkes, and Michael Jackson, Q.C., for their inspiration and encouragement. I am also grateful to the editorial team at the Canadian Journal of Human Rights for their assistance and to two anonymous reviewers for their insightful feedback.
Fordham Law Review, 2005
American Journal of Criminal Law, 2002
In June 2008, the Supreme Court decided Boumediene v. Bush, holding that Guantanamo detainees have a right to habeas corpus under the Constitution's Suspension Clause. In the more than three years since Boumediene, lower federal courts in Washington D.C., have issued nearly eighty decisions addressing the merits of Guantanamo habeas cases. In the process, they have developed an emerging body of national security detention jurisprudence, with implications that transcend the Guantánamo habeas cases. This Article surveys this post-Boumediene jurisprudence and assesses its implications. Although it is too early to draw any definitive conclusions, the growing body of habeas decisions provides a window into Boumediene’s impact and the legacy of the post-9/11 enemy combatant decisions more generally. In particular, the Article describes the significance and limitations of what Boumediene described as a critical function of habeas: calling the government to account by requiring that it provide a lawful basis for a prisoner’s detention.
The John Marshall law review, 1997
Compulsory Process); U.S. CONST. amend. V (guaranteeing the privilege against self-incrimination and the prohibition against double jeopardy); U.S. CONST. amend. IV (enforcing the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures through the Exclusionary Rule); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting Cruel and Unusual Punishment). 12. 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504
Social & Legal Studies, 2008
The Social History of Crime and Punishment in America: An Encylopedia, 2000
Melbourne University Law Review, 2007
attacks in the United States represent an extraordinary challenge for human rights protection in Australia. The legislative erosion of rights traditionally assumed as being fundamental within common law countries lies at the heart of this challenge. This article focuses on extraordinary measures recently added to the package of anti-terrorism laws: preventative detention orders; prohibited contact orders; and control orders. These measures were added to Part 5.3 of the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) by the Anti-Terrorism Act [No 2] 2005 (Cth), and directly and explicitly remove or interfere with a number of individual rights. In this article we argue that the threat to human rights posed by such measures derives not only from their legislative enactment and form. The threat is heightened by the dominance of a positivistic legalism in the approach of the High Court of Australia-an approach that treats the constitutional text as the foundation of the rule of law in Australia, as opposed to the supreme manifestation of the rule of law that rests on a broader, but less explicit, foundation of constitutionalism. In this respect, the presence of a written Constitution has hindered the protection of rights to the extent that the principle of legality operates within a textual straitjacket. Until such time as Australia adopts a bill of rights at the national level, or there occurs an unlikely shift in the jurisprudential approach of the High Court, the Court will have little room to manoeuvre out of its positivistic corner when faced with other extraordinary legislative measures.]
Cal. WL Rev., 2000
Law <html_ent glyph="@amp;" ascii="&"/> Policy, 2000
Am. Crim. L. Rev., 1977
Rule of Law through Human Rights and International Criminal Justice: Essays in Honour of Adama Dieng, 2015
This article considers the question of deprivation of liberty, particularly on the norms regarding the judicial review of detention. It outlines the relationship between human rights law and international humanitarian law and explores the relationship between the two legal regimes from the perspective of the International Court of Justice and the UN Treaty Bodies, particularly the UN Human Rights Committee. Drafted when General Comment 35 of the Human Rights Committee on arbitrary deprivation of liberty was still in a draft form, it discusses the lawfulness of detention with A focus on article 9(4) of the ICCPR regarding the question of judicial review.
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