The physical mind debate

In a book from 2011 I developed a theoretical framework for discussing theodicy, which was a combination of the philosophy of Lorenz B. Puntel and the theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg. I find the work of Puntel to be the best theoretical framework for doing metaphysics in general. However, I find it especially lacking in its involvement with natural science and physics. This is very different in the book Every Thing Must Go by James Ladyman et al, which is a book about metaphysics which presents an ontology where involvement with physics is of main priority. Interestingly, the ontic structural realism of Ladyman is very similar to the configuration ontology of Puntel. Ladyman has much to add when it comes to natural science, whereas Puntel has several things to add to Ladyman when it comes to the understanding of truth and the relation between language and world. I find such structural ontology to be a theoretical framework very apt for talking seriously about God. But whereas Puntel finds a natural place for God in metaphysics, Ladyman thinks that the topic of God should be excluded, and so my article will end with a discussion of this. My goal in this article is to compare the ontologies of Puntel and Ladyman with the intention of exploring the possibilities of making them both more coherent by letting them complement each other. In part one of the article, I will present Puntel’s ontology. In part two, I will present the ontic structural realism of Ladyman and discuss it in light of Puntel’s ontology. I believe that both positions have some problems, but that they can be combined into a very coherent framework for doing ontology (and for talking seriously about God), and it is my goal in this article to start the process of doing so.

Faith and Philosophy

I argue that the reference for “God” is determined by the definite description “the being that is worthy of our worship.” I describe two desiderata for rival theories of the reference of “God” to meet: accessibility and scope. I explain the deficiencies of a view where God is dubbed “God” and the name passed down by causal chains and a view where “God” picks out the unique satisfier of a traditional definite description. After articulating the “Worship-Worthiness” view, I show how it best satisfies the desiderata. I then respond to some putative counterexamples to the view.

The Clash between the Metaphysical God and the Living God, 2019

2023

Can God be known? I believe that mankind has been endowed with our senses and our intellects that we may recognize the signs of God all around us, that we may come to know Him. It is my view that the world itself is a banner indicating the existence of God and mankind is specially equipped with the proper instruments by which to receive, perceive and decipher these signs. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that man has been endowed with the necessary ability to recognize the existence of God through His signs that permeate the world around us. In essence, this paper is meant to establish clear evidence for the existence of God from reason and observation alone. It is my intention and aim that we will establish certainty, removing any doubt, in His existence and I will seek to do this using three specific evidences: the existence of science, the existence of math and the existence of the Laws of Physics. Still, in achieving this aim, I will say that we need to be prepared to read, ponder, think and reflect. In this way, I am asking the reader to be an active participant in this effort and to “converse” with the paper in their own way.

Faith and Philosophy, 2016

Guy Kahane asks an axiological question: what value would (or does) God's existence bestow on the world? Supposing God's existence is a matter of necessity, this axiological question faces a problem because answering it will require assessing the truth-value of counterpossibles. I argue that Kahane, Paul Moser, and Richard Davis and Paul Franks fail in their attempts to render the axiological question substantive. I then offer my own solution by bringing work in cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind to bear on the possibility of assessing counterpossibles. I argue that humans can engage in counterpossible reasoning by "accepting" or "supposing" that the antecedent is true and "screening out" those beliefs that would result in contradictions when combined in inferences with the acceptance or supposition. These screened out propositions are not treated as false, but are ignored. I offer a three-valued logic for counterpossible reasoning. I conclude by outlining some implications for the axiological question.

International journal for philosophy of religion, 1999

There is a growing realization of the need to promote a constructive dialogue between science and religion both in the scientific and the religious community. Accommodationism based on the concept of nonoverlapping magisteria (NOMA) is arguably the dominant trend in the effort to achieve this goal. Yet despite the fact that accommodationism has many supporters, it has so far failed to promote a productive engagement between science and religion. The article argues that such engagement requires a critical re-examination of the principal tenets, self-evident truths, and intuitions by both the scientific and the religious community. It further argues that despite isolated efforts seeking to promote such re-examination in both domains, neither the scientific nor the religious establishment shows much willingness to pursue this course. Rather they prefer to follow a conservative agenda and impose limits on reason that are designed to protect the status quo.