Challenges to theology

This bundle of essays presents conversations between Anglo-Saxon philosophers with Christian commitments, a few theologians, and a neuropsychologist on the nature of the human person. Taking their starting point in the widespread conviction that a human being consists of body and soul, the editors have given defenders of monist and dualist positions equal space. The intended academic service is to sample, contribute to, and advance the debate about the existence of the soul. The first purpose expresses the editors' hope to reach nonspecialists, the last two demonstrate the ambition to challenge specialists.

2009

What sets human beings apart from animals? How does ‘‘mind’ ’ fit with soul? Different historical and contemporary views of the mind/soul are considered. A clinical case is used to argue that a strong dualistic position is not compatible with neuro-scientific evidence nor with the expectation of life after death found in the Abrahamic faiths. Reductive physicalism is a widely held view, but risks devaluing human life. Midgely’s ‘‘many maps’ ’ model is suggested to fit better with a faith commitment. Non-reductive physicalism states that mind/soul is an emergent property of the complexity of the brain. Suggesting that there is no separable ‘‘soul’ ’ raises ethical questions, and Singer’s philosophy is given as one consequent reading of the moral standing of human beings. Holistic (weak) dualism and non-reductive physicalism are suggested as possible models of the nature of persons that fits both the scientific data and the teaching of the Abrahamic faiths. It is important for mental ...

Chapter 4: Neurotheological Epistemology and the Narrative Solution 4.1 Epistemological Frameworks for Neurotheology………………………..……213 4.1a The Augustinian-NeoPlatonic Framework………………………..………. 215 4.1a1 Augustine's Platonic and Aristotelian Foundations……………….……221 4.1a2 Faith Seeking Understanding……………………………………………225 4.1a3 Corporeal Knowledge and the Internal Sense…………………………229 4.1a4 Divine Illumination……………………………………………………….. 235 4.1a5 Memory and Time…………………………………………………………237 4.1a6 Trinitarian Epistemological Considerations…………………………….245 4.1b The Thomistic-Aristotelian Framework……………………..………………247 4.1b1 Hylomorphic Cognition………………………………………………….. 251 4.1b2 The Human Soul's Powers………………………………………………253 4.1b3 Passive and Active Intellect…………………………………………….. 255 4.1b4 Corporeal Knowledge and Abstraction……………….…………………257 4.1b5 Thomism: Genuine vs Pseudo Spiritual Experiences…………………261 4.2 The Narrative Solution for Neurotheology………………………..……..…….269 4.2a A Narrative Example: Pieper's "God Speaks"………………………….….273 4.2b Narrative: Quid est Veritas? ……………………………………………..….277 4.2b1 Narrative Truth and its Qualities……………………………………..… 281 4.2c Metaphysical Realism and Narrative…………………………………….…285 4.2c1 Augustine and Aquinas' Narrative Metaphysical Realism……..…..…289 4.2d Narrative Polarity and Transcendence…………………………..…..…….295 4.2d1 The Analogy of Being and Narrative…………………………..…..……299 4.2d2 Narrative Transcendentals and the Beautiful………………..……..….301 4.3 Conclusion: A Narrative for Neurotheology……………………………………307 General Conclusion………………………………………………………………….…309 Appendix……………………………………………………………………………….

What sets human beings apart from animals? How does ‘‘mind’’ fit with soul? Different historical and contemporary views of the mind/soul are considered. A clinical case is used to argue that a strong dualistic position is not compatible with neuro-scientific evidence nor with the expectation of life after death found in the Abrahamic faiths. Reductive physicalism is a widely held view, but risks devaluing human life. Midgely’s ‘‘many maps’’ model is suggested to fit better with a faith commitment. Non-reductive physicalism states that mind/soul is an emergent property of the complexity of the brain. Suggesting that there is no separable ‘‘soul’’ raises ethical questions, and Singer’s philosophy is given as one consequent reading of the moral standing of human beings. Holistic (weak) dualism and non-reductive physicalism are suggested as possible models of the nature of persons that fits both the scientific data and the teaching of the Abrahamic faiths. It is important for mental health professionals to be clear about their own and the service users’ underlying assumptions about human nature to optimise communication and prevent misdiagnosis.

2012

The article provides a critical analysis of some of the most pertinent philosophical problems of neurotheology. Neurotheology is one of the most recent and arguably the most controversial neuro(sub)discipline that purports to account for, or at least shed light on, the phenomenon of religion in neuroscientific terms. Following a very brief overview of the newly emerging field of neurotheology, two major philosophical issues that loom large in most neurotheological accounts are presented: the explanatory vacuity of neurotheological accounts and the inability to reflect upon, and therefore draw appropriate implications from, their epistemological and metaphysical commitments. It will be argued that both issues are at least partially dependant on the so-called modular hypothesis which has been uncritically accepted by most neurotheological authors and still plays a major role in neuroscience as such. At the closing of the article, some very general ideas for an alternative approach to the study of religious experience are put forward, drawing on two complementary and interrelated approaches to consciousness and cognition, namely neurophenomenology and the “4EA models”.

Brain, Mind and Consciousness in the History of Neuroscience

A post-Newtonian understanding of matter includes immaterial forces; thus, the concept of ‘physical’ has lost what usefulness it previously had and Cartesian dualism has, consequently, ceased to support a divide between the mental and the physical. A contemporary scientific understanding of mind that goes back at least as far as Priestley in the 18th century, not only includes immaterial components but identifies brain parts in which these components correlate with neural activity. What are we left with? The challenge is no longer to figure out how a physical brain interacts with a nonphysical mind, but to try to unify theories of mind and theories of brain that to date do not share a single property. The challenge is enormous, but at least we can be quite clear about what its nature is, as there is no reason to be distracted by the idea of two distinct substances. In the present volume, many historical perspectives on the mind-body problem are discussed. In what follows, we follow major currents of thought regarding the mind-body problem so that it can be seen how we arrived at the modern conception that it makes sense only to talk about theory unification.

Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 2009

The relationship between mind and brain has philosophical, scientific, and practical implications. Two separate but related surveys from the University of Edinburgh (University students, n = 250) and the University of Liège (health-care workers, lay public, n = 1858) were performed to probe attitudes toward the mind-brain relationship and the variables that account for differences in views. Four statements were included, each relating to an aspect of the mind-brain relationship. The Edinburgh survey revealed a predominance of dualistic attitudes emphasizing the separateness of mind and brain. In the Liège survey, younger participants, women, and those with religious beliefs were more likely to agree that the mind and brain are separate, that some spiritual part of us survives death, that each of us has a soul that is separate from the body, and to deny the physicality of mind. Religious belief was found to be the best predictor for dualistic attitudes. Although the majority of health-care workers denied the distinction between consciousness and the soma, more than one-third of medical and paramedical professionals regarded mind and brain as separate entities. The findings of the study are in line with previous studies in developmental psychology and with surveys of scientists' attitudes toward the relationship between mind and brain. We suggest that the results are relevant to clinical practice, to the formulation of scientific questions about the nature of consciousness, and to the reception of scientific theories of consciousness by the general public.

The paper discusses a notion that is per se appropriate in order to engage a neuroscientist, a philosopher and a theologian, or somebody concerned with religion, in an interdisciplinary dialogue. It proposes to rediscover the notion of person from a phenomenological standpoint, which is seen as complementary, and not opposed, to metaphysics. The paper pays close attention to the nature of bodily or corporeal feeling, and to the first-person perspective, which conditions the kind of metaphysics we are to choose. Finally, it explores how the concept of person contributes to our understanding of the nature of God.