Critique of Hume's Immanentism

What is the principle of immanence? Alejandro Llano states that, "according to this principle (the principle of immanence)-which has been given many different expressions-the human mind can attain no other object but its own ideas or representations. It would make no sense, then, to make an effort to apprehend reality in itself. As a result, thought itself becomes radically problematical. What is certain is that one thinks-in the broadest meaning of 'to think': to conceptualize, to feel, to wish, etc.-but it becomes very difficult to be precise about what it is that one knows or if, in general, one really knows anything." (A. LLANO, Gnoseology, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 2001, p. 5). "In base a tale principio, pur espresso in modi diversi, la mente umana non attinge altro oggetto se non le proprie idee o rappresentazioni. Non ha senso, pertanto, l'impegno di cogliere la realtà in se stessa, e così la conoscenza diviene radicalmente problematica. L'unica cosa certa è che si pensa-assumendo il termine «pensare» nella sua accezione più amplia: concettualizzare, sentire, volere, ecc.-ma è difficile precisare che cosa sia ciò che si conosce e se, ancora più in generale, si conosca realmente qualcosa."(A. LLANO, Filosofia della conoscenza, Le Monnier, Florence, 1987, p.5). "The principle of immanence consists in the denial that being transcends consciousness…being is constituted from within the immanence of the thinking subject…A great part of post-Cartesian philosophy basically holds to the principle of immanence (see: C.

The agnosticism of the sensist pan-phenomenalist David Hume (1711-1776) concerning the existence of God is a direct consequence of his gnoseological immanentism (we only know our subjective perceptions, internal states of consciousness, which ends up in an ontological agnosticism concerning the existence of the extra-mental beings of an external reality and a denial of the affirmation that objective metaphysical efficient causality truly operates among the beings of extra-mental reality). Hume writes in A Treatise of Human Nature: "Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are derived from something antecedently present to the mind, it follows that it is impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of anything specifically different from ideas and impressions. Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible; let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can we conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions which have appeared in that narrow compass. This is the universe of the imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there produced." 1 For Hume, "nothing can be present to the mind but an image or perception. We cannot prove that perceptions are caused by external objects entirely different from them, though perhaps resembling them in some way. Experience is silent here, for we have before the mind only perceptions. We observe a relation of cause and effect between two perceptions, but we can never observe it between perceptions and objects; hence we cannot proceed by causal inference from perceptions to objects...For Hume, the objects of all our knowledge are impressions and ideas derived from them. There is no evidence that these are caused by external objects, or an unknown substance, or by God. Impressions and sensations simply appear and reappear in our experience. All we can do, then, is to limit ourselves to the world of our impressions and ideas." 2 Against immanentism and its principle of immanence, and in favor of metaphysical realism, Juan José Sanguineti writes: "In quanto l'essere è fonte d'intelligibilità e prima condizione della conoscenza, l'essere è indipendente dal venir conosciuto e non viceversa (il che non si oppone al fatto che gli enti più nobili conoscono, poiché la conoscenza appartiene alla pienezza dell'essere). Questo principio così ovvio è il cardine del realismo metafisico. Le posizioni non realistiche, invece, in base all'apparente fatto che «non possiamo uscire dal nostro pensare», ritengono che un essere indipendente dal pensiero sarebbe incomprensibile o almeno ignoto (principio di immanenza). Viene bloccata in questo modo la trascendenza metafisica della mente umana. La tesi immanentistica poggia sul falso principio dell'impossibilità di trascendere il nostro intelletto pensante.

International Journal of Arts and Humanities (IJAH), 2019

This work is a critical exposition of the core aspects of Hume's empiricist epistemological views. The epistemological problem of the origin, scope and certainty of knowledge was a subject of fierce debate between the Continental Rationalists and the British Empiricists. While the rationalists argued for the supremacy of reason, the empiricists stood for experience. As an empiricist Hume believed that certain knowledge is only gained through experience which consists of sensations, emotions and passions. Hume reduced the contents of the mind to perception which he divided into impressions and ideas. He also copiously addressed the idea of causality questioning the impressions that provide one with such an idea. This work employing the critical and expository methods surveyed the key points in Hume's discussion on perception and the association of ideas as well as Hume's analysis of the idea of causality. It gave a background of the empiricists project before presenting his epistemological theory of perception. The work further treated Hume's position with regard to the association of ideas and his analysis of causality. In the area of causality, the work critically looked at Hume's consideration of temporal succession, contiguity and necessary connection. In conclusion the work praised Hume's courageous, rigorous and consistent empiricist stance whose intensity led to a skeptic logical conclusion which is a necessary "antidote to dogmatism and fanaticism."

2012

The research is related to David Hume. This philosopher is described as being an empiricist, but it should be noted that the empiricism promoted by Hume represents the development up to the final consequences of this philosophical doctrine that should be subjected to the observability requirement. The core problem for Hume’s philosophy is the difficulty of causality thinking. The Scottish philosopher promotes a moderate and inconsistent skepticism because he does not doubt the permanency of facts. The Humean epistemology is mixed with elements belonging to some naïve ontology of a materialistic nature and with elements of a sensualistic psychology of an associationist type. The causality or the causal connection between events is based on a psychological belief, which has a pragmatic end for people, in that it offers us the psychological comfort of habitual events and the familiar existential. Causality refers to certain events that have already happened in a certain way, but it can...

Herein, I attempt to critically assess a portion of Hume’s attack on the view that the soul is immaterial. Hume volleys this attack in order to supplant the traditional foundation of religious metaphysical beliefs. This foundation consists in, at least, a belief that the soul is immaterial, the soul is immortal, and the Soul just is one’s enduring Self. Furthermore, by means of this critical assessment, I hope to attenuate the force of his attack by demonstrating its flaws. I, however, have no single argument designed to show that Hume has not provided good enough reasons against the view in question. Rather, I plan to provide a series of considerations (i.e., objections, arguments, etc.) that I hope cast doubt on Hume’s views regarding the relevant subject matter.

We can understand epistemic naturalism as the view that there are cases in which we are justified in holding a belief and cases in which we are not so justified, and that we can distinguish cases of one sort from cases of the other with reference to non-normative facts about the mechanisms that produce them. By my lights, Hume is an epistemic naturalist of this sort, and I propose in this paper a novel and detailed account of his epistemic naturalism. On my account, which I call the determinacy account, Hume characterizes epistemic justification in terms of the mind's feeling determined by the relation of cause and effect to move from one impression (or idea) to an(other) idea. I find a statement of this account, which Hume applies initially to what he calls the second system of realities, in Treatise 1.3.9. After rejecting other accounts of Hume's epistemic naturalism, I show how the determinacy account handles the cases Hume considers later in Treatise 1.3.  Epistemic naturalism, as I understand it here, is the view that there are cases in which we are justified in holding a belief and cases in which we are not so justified, and that we can distinguish cases of one sort from cases of the other with reference to non-normative facts about the mechanisms that produce our beliefs. 1 To those familiar with the literature on this subject, it might seem that the issue of Hume's epistemic naturalism has already been approached from every angle. 2 All the same, I think there is an as yet unnoticed and better angle from which to approach the issue, one that brings out the central role of feeling in Hume's account of epistemic justification. 3 On my account, Hume characterizes justification in terms of the mind's feeling determined to move by a relation that feels unchangeable.

2022

In this paper, I argue that Hume's commitment to mindindependent objects is based on two types of realism or system of realities: (a) a naïve realism based on an unjustified vulgar belief which identifies perceptions and objects, and (b) a representational realism or philosophical system of doubleexistence. Firstly, I emphasize that the philosophical question "Whether there be body or not" cannot be considered a full case of unmitigated skepticism, because Hume accepts a mitigated skepticism compatible with both vulgar and representational realism. Furthermore, I argue that, while the vulgar belief in bodies is based on an unjustified assent, the double-existence theory is based on both an unjustified assent and a rationally justified assent (that corrects the former). Considering all these points, I conclude that Hume's mitigated skepticism allows and requires a belief in or supposition of continued and distinct existences, and that this must, as a practical matter, take vulgar and philosophical forms at different times.

In this paper, a novel interpretation of one of the problems of Hume scholarship is defended: his view of Metaphysical Realism or the belief in an external world (that there are ontologically and causally perception-independent, absolutely external and continued, i.e. Real entities). According to this interpretation, Hume’s attitude in the domain of philosophy should be distinguished from his view in the domain of everyday life: Hume the philosopher suspends his judgement on Realism, whereas Hume the common man firmly believes in the existence of Real entities. The defended reading is thus a sceptical and Realist interpretation of Hume. As such, it belongs to the class of what can be called no-single-Hume interpretations (Richard H. Popkin, Robert J. Fogelin, Donald L.M. Baxter), by contrast to single-Hume readings, which include Realist (naturalist, New Humean) and the traditional Reid-Green interpretation (i.e. Hume believes that there are no Real entities). Hume’s distinction between the domains of philosophy and everyday life, which is argued to be epistemological, is employed in order to reconcile his scepticism with his naturalism and constructive science of human nature. The paper pays special attention to the too much neglected second profound argument against the senses in Part 1, Section 12 of Hume’s first Enquiry and the corresponding argument in Section 4, Part 4, Book 1 of the Treatise.

Hume scholarship has rarely questioned the internal-not necessarily explicit-process of Hume's thought that led him to "the most violent paradox" that it occurred to him to propose, i.e., the denial of any "efficacious" causal power in objects, including God. A reappraisal of Hume's early writings and testimonies suggests that this revolutionary move must be placed at the core of what he later called "a new scene of thought" and that the latter originated in a theological reflection based on a reading of Bayle's works which entailed the reversal of Malebranche's position on God and causality. Hume's thesis marks the definitive breaking of the umbilical cord between man and God and opens the way toward an entirely immanent "science of human nature". Hume's so-called "empiricism" is thus the consequence, and not the source, of the train of thought which would later lead him to write the Treatise.

Hume Studies, 2011

In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume seems to use the term "object" to refer to different things in different contexts, including impressions, ideas, perceptions, and bodies. Does he ever use the term "external bodies" to refer to things in the extra-mental world? I argue that what Hume means by external bodies when he affirms their existence is not externally existing, material objects that are somehow presented to the mind or presented in impressions. Rather, the bodies that Hume affirms are, at bottom, no different from perceptions, but they can be distinguished from merely internal perceptions like pain or pleasure in terms of their "different relations, connexions, and durations" (T 1.2.6.9; SBN 68). I conclude that in order to be consistent, given the various statements he makes throughout Book One of the Treatise, Hume must reject the philosopher's doctrine of double existence of perceptions and objects and affirm only the existence of perceptions, sometimes conceived as internally existing and mind-dependent and sometimes conceived as existing outside and independent of the mind.