The Dark Sides of Empathy, chapter 2

Interdisciplinary Science Reviews

Empathy is usually seen as a pro-social and morally positive influence on behaviour. This article provides an overview of cases of negative acts motivated by empathy. The article includes discussions of polarizations that are fueled by side-taking and empathy, selfish forms of empathy (such as sadistic empathy, vampirism, and helicopter parenting), and filtered empathy (using identification with a third person as a medium to have empathy with another). The definition of empathy used is to coexperience the situation of another.

The Lancet, 2009

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2019

After the great enthusiasm about the moral potentialities of empathy of the last thirty years, this phenomenon has been recently called into question, if not openly criticized, by both philosophers and psychologists among whom we find Jesse Prinz or Paul Bloom. This paper aims to show why empathy should not too easily be regarded as useless or even deleterious for morality and to propose a special role for it. In order to reach this goal, I will briefly sketch what I mean with the term empathy and how is this psychological mechanism different from other akin phenomena like compassion. I will then turn my attention to some criticisms that can be made about the role of empathy for morality which show that empathy seems not a necessary element of the three main dimensions of morality, that is moral judgment, moral development and moral conduct. It will be argued that although empathy is not necessary for moral judgment, it has some very important roles to play for the other two moral dimensions. Empathy should be considered as part of the fundamental features of a moral person.

A Short History of Empathy, the book, available on Nov 24, 2014. Please note that the attached doc for download is ONLY the table of contents and preface in preliminary, mark up form. I ask your understanding and respect for copyright. The deep, underground history of empathy is surfaced and reconstructed in Hume, Kant, Lipps, Freud, Scheler, Stein, and Husserl. A Rumor of Empathy is engaged in vicarious feeling, receptivity, empathic understanding, empathic interpretation, and empathic intersubjectivity. A rumor of empathy becomes a scandal of empathy in Lipps' projections and Strachey's mistranslations. Empathy is reconstructed in Hume's many meanings of "sympathy"; in Kant on "the communicability of feelings" and "enlarged thinking" of the other; in Freud's introspection and free association; in Scheler's "vicarious experience" and perception of The Other; in Stein's sensual empathy; and in Husserl's late writing on empathic windows of consciousness accessing other persons as Husserl's empathy moves from the periphery to the foundation of community. Yet when all the philosophical arguments and categories are complete, the phenomenological methods reduced, and hermeneutic circles spun out, in empathy, we are quite simply in the presence of another human being. For those who knew Michael Franz Basch personally, see the tribute to him in the Preface - an empathic moment indeed. The work is also available as a more reasonably priced electronic version. Available to ship as of this date (2014/11/24). Other interesting comments by a well known psychoanalyst and celebrity academic - Review Lou Agosta has written a delightful and much needed book on the evolution and genesis of the idea of empathy. His deep appreciation and understanding of the writings of Hume, Kant, Lipps, Freud, Scheler and Husserl allows him to recognize, explore and ultimately fashion a wonderfully clear and practical notion of empathy, one in which we not only come to know the other as we listen with care, understand with insight, and interpret with feeling, but also one in which we learn to communicate openly and respond with humanity. In bringing together the skills of the philosopher and the experience of the psychotherapist, Lou Agosta helps us to understand the steady rise of empathy and why it informs and inspires so many modern-day disciplines and professional practices. For all those wishing to revel in empathy's rich provenance, this is the book for you. - David Howe, Emeritus Professor, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK and author of Empathy: What It Is and Why It Matters *** A Rumor of Empathy is a masterpiece of philosophical-historical scholarship, presenting a rich and comprehensive account of the explicit and implicit conceptions of empathy that have appeared in the course of Western thinking from Hume through Kant, Lipps, Freud, and contemporary phenomenologists, both philosophical and psychoanalytic. Husserl's rewriting of his own publishing position as empathy shifts to the foundation of intersubjectivity is particularly eye opening. This book will be a valuable resource not only for scholars in philosophy, psychology and the human sciences, but for practitioners of psychoanalytic and humanistic psychotherapy as well. – Robert D. Stolorow, author of World, Affectivity, Trauma: Post-Cartesian Philosophy *** An insightful and provocative exploration of a topic that has only begun to receive the attention it deserves and the conceptual clarity needed for proper understanding. Agosta's study of empathy is rich in historical context and thorough in covering the intersections of philosophy and psychology on the question of empathy. The deep history of a rumor of empathy in Hume, Kant, Lipps, Scheler, Stein, and Husserl is innovative and disruptive, the latter in a positive sense. Agosta rightly, in my view, finds in Husserl a primary vehicle for advancing the discussion, yet he has his own voice and sense of how to think it through. An impressive achievement. - Lawrence J. Hatab, Louis I. Jaffe Professor of Philosophy, Old Dominion University, USA *** The book is also available directly from the publisher, Palgrave Macmillan - A Rumor of Empathy: Rewriting Empathy in the Context of Philosophy http://www.amazon.com/Rumor-Empathy-Rewriting-Context-Philosophy/dp/1137492589/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1416499569&sr=1-1&keywords=a+rumor+of+empathy *** This post and all the processes and contents of this web site (c) Lou Agosta, Ph.D.

Empathy has recently been described as a dark force of immorality by Bloom and Bubandt and Willerslev. In my paper, I contrast their discussion and definition of empathy with the account of empathy found in phenomenology. After highlighting the many differences, I discuss the moral significance of the phenomenological notion of empathy

Empathy and its Limits, 2016

This article examines an aberration of empathy that shows a morally problematic aspect of empathy. The examination focuses on a form of behavior that will be described as empathy for empathy's sake. This empathy for empathy's sake enables many forms of aesthetic experiences, ranging from the sublime to enjoyment of tragedies. It also can be a feature of everyday life in what will be called empathic sadism: when one manipulates others to predict and simulate their (usually negative) inner state, ranging from teasing to actual pain infliction. 1. Empathy as a Moral Practice Jesse Prinz, in a recent article called "Against Empathy," discusses many cases of the "dark side of empathy" that show how empathy may lead to an unfair judgment and may favor some at the expense of others (Prinz 2011). The problem with empathy, Prinz holds, is that empathy interferes with morality due to its ''intrinsic partiality' and 'ineluctable locality.' 2 While I agree with Prinz in this assessment, I disagree with his conclusion. Let's begin with the agreement. An aggravation of these unfair distributions of empathy that Prinz only touches upon can be found in the possibility of the misuse of empathy to justify criminals. Even the criminal would evoke positive feelings when he stands on the gallows, as Adam Smith suggested (The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759). Empathy and side-taking enforce and strengthen each other until any position can seem justified, including those that are morally wrong. One can always have empathy, even with the bad guy, and find reasons to support someone via a feedback loop of side-taking. In these cases, empathy reduces the ambiguity or "grayness" of a conflict and turns it into a black-and-white picture. This does not mean, however, that the one who empathizes will necessarily make the better choice. Empathy can justify either side of a conflict.

A prevailing view in moral psychology holds that empathy and sympathy play key roles in morality and in prosocial and altruistic actions. Recently, Jesse Prinz (2011a, 2011b) has challenged this view and has argued that empathy does not play a foundational or causal role in morality. He suggests that in fact the presence of empathetic emotions is harmful to morality. Prinz rejects all theories that connect empathy and morality as a constitutional, epistemological, developmental, motivational, or normative necessity. I consider two of Prinz’s theses: the thesis that empathy is not necessary for moral development, and the thesis that empathy should be avoided as a guide for morality. Based on recent research in moral psychology, I argue that empathy plays a crucial role in development of moral agency. I also argue that empathy is desirable as a moral emotion.

Abstract: This article challenges the tendency, both academic and popular, to assign empathy the status of a virtue. The widespread inclination to associate empathy with the morally and socially “good”—with compassion, understanding, cultural bonding, and non-violent sociality—ignores what we propose to call the “dark side of empathy”: that is, the multiple ways in which empathy is routinely deployed to manipulate, seduce, deceive, and dehumanize others by means of vicariousness. Two diverse ethnographic cases, of hunting in Siberia and political violence in Indonesia, provide the empirical background for a discussion of the complex relationship of empathy to mimesis, deception, violence, and sociality.