The Euro and the Gold Standard: What are the Lessons?
Anders Ögren2012, in Ögren, A. and Øksendal L-F (Eds.) The Gold Standard Peripheries – Monetary policy, adjustment and flexibility in a global setting Palgrave macmillan Publishers London
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Abstract
The comparative advantage of the historical profession is undoubtedly the past. Insights into the past are important for understanding the present, but do not easily translate into well-founded forecasts for the future. At the end of a volume exploring the experience of the gold standard peripheries, we are nevertheless tempted to say something on the present with possible bearings for the future. One reason for this is the timeless character of the objective under scrutiny. The scene-a world of global finance inhabited by sophisticated players and advanced instruments-might seem very different than a century ago. However, the ultimate objectives of monetary policy are much the same, to provide a stable currency and an efficient payments system. Central bankers and monetary authorities of today struggle with the same fundamental issues as their predecessors did before 1914: the maintenance of credibility, the challenges of adjustments and the desire for financial stability. Moreover, the asymmetry between core and periphery are still present: small economies continue to be regime takers with limited influence over the global regime.
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