Plato and Food

This paper addresses the question of the sociological and political background of food, cuisine and commensality in Plato ́s philosophy. It argues that the importance of these elements in Plato ́s political thought is related to the increasingly complex gastronomic developments in fourth century Greek world. In the first place, it will analyse the general trends concerning Platonic perceptions on fourth century ́s food habits and cookery. In the second place, it will study the role food and eating habits have in the Platonic utopias of the Republic, Critias and Laws. These two compared analyses will de‐monstrate how the utopian diets and eating habits are key elements in the construction and stabilisation of these imaginary communities.

In David Keyt and Christopher Shields (eds.), Principles and Praxis in Ancient Greek Philosophy - Studies of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in Honor of Fred D. Miller, Jr. Cham: Springer., 2024

In his much-explored argument for the tripartition of the soul in book 4 of the Republic, Socrates makes use of two principles, which I shall call the principle of opposition and the principle of qualification. The aim of the present paper is to explain, in particular, the second of these principles, so as to reveal its role in that argument and in the conception of an appetite and of the appetitive part that is central to the larger argument of the Republic as a whole. Section 1 briefly introduces the principle of opposition, analyzes the principle of qualification, and presents the argument for tripartition. Section 2 uses the analysis of the principle of qualification to interpret a claim Socrates makes about the soul and its relation to the good, which seems at odds with the account of appetites uncovered in section 1. Then, in section 3, the relevance of the principle of qualification to Socratic intellectualism-the view that knowledge is sufficient for virtue-is explored. In section 4, appetites are returned to with the focus now on the varieties of them that Socrates recognizes. In section 5, a view is put forward about the nature of the appetitive part (Appetite), its beliefs, and its ability to be persuaded by the rational part (Reason). In * This paper is a small token of my gratitude to Fred Miller for his inspiring work on Aristotle's Politics, for his translation of De Anima and Parva Naturalia, and for his personal kindness. Readers are encouraged to consult his excellent paper on the parts of the soul, Miller (1999). 2 section 6, it is argued that Appetite and Reason are both souls, capable of working in harmony, but also of being opposed, thereby underwriting an important part of the analogy between the polis and the soul on which much of the Republic relies. 1 1 The Principle of Opposition, the Principle of Qualification, and the Argument for Tripartition Once justice and the other virtues have been found in Kallipolis, the polis Socrates and the others are founding in words (369c9-10), the task of finding them in the soul is taken up, and with it the task of showing that there are parts in the soul corresponding to the three classes-producers, guardians, and philosopher-kings 2 (435b4-c5). Central to it is the principle of opposition, which is formulated as follows: It is clear that the same thing cannot do or undergo opposite things; not, at any rate, in the same respect, in relation to the same thing, at the same time. So, if we ever find that happening here, we will know that we are not dealing with one and the same thing, but with many. (436b9-c2) Though the principle of opposition looks, at least, relatively clear as it stands, Socrates spends some time making it "more exact" (436c9), by going through objections to it. 3 1 I cite and translate the Oxford Classical Texts editions of Plato's and (in one instance) Aristotle's works. Unidentified references are to the Republic. 2 At this point, the latter two are called "auxiliaries" and "complete guardians" (414b1-5), since the philosopher-kings are not introduced until book 7 (535a6-536d1). 3 An excellent discussion of the principle of opposition, and of rival interpretations of what Plato intends it to do, is Christopher Bobonich (2002), pp. 219-35.

Odysseys of Plates and Palates: Food, Society and Sociality, 2015

This study has been prepared within the UNU/WIDER project on The Impact of the WTO Regime on Developing Countries, which is directed by Professor Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis. UNU/WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financial contribution to the project by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.

The Vegetarian Polis: in Plato’s Republic and in Ours, 2013

2013

This dissertation is a study of appetite in Plato's Timaeus, Republic and Phaedrus. In recent research is it often suggested that Plato considers appetite (i) to pertain to the essential needs of the body, (ii) to relate to a distinct set of objects, e.g. food or drink, and (iii) to cause behaviour aiming at sensory pleasure. Exploring how the notion of appetite, directly and indirectly, connects with Plato's other purposes in these dialogues, this dissertation sets out to evaluate these ideas. By asking, and answering, three philosophically and interpretatively crucial questions, individually linked to the arguments of the dialogues, this thesis aims to show (i) that the relationship between appetite and the body is not a matter of survival, and that appetite is better understood in terms of excess; (ii) that appetite is multiform and cannot be defined in terms of a distinct set of objects; and (iii) that appetite, in Plato, can also pertain to non-sensory objects, such as articulated discourse. Chapter one asks what the universe can teach us about embodied life. It argues that Plato, in the Timaeus, works with an important link between the universe and the soul, and that the account of disorder, irrationality and multiformity identifying a pre-cosmic condition of the universe provides a key to understanding the excessive behaviour and condition of a soul dominated by appetite. Chapter two asks why the philosophers of the Republic's Kallipolis return to the cave, and suggests that Plato's notion of the noble lie provides a reasonable account of this. By exploring the Republic's ideas of education, poetry and tradition, it argues that appetite-a multiform and appearance oriented source of motivation-is an essential part of this account. Chapter three asks why Socrates characterizes the speeches of the Phaedrus as deceptive games. It proposes that this question should be understood in the light of two distinctions: one between playful and serious discourse and one between simple and multiform. It argues that the speeches of the Phaedrus are multiform games, and suggests that appetite is the primary source of motivation of the soul addressed, personified by Phaedrus.

A study of Plato's meals in common especially as discussed in The Laws.

Journal of Ancient Philosophy

According to a prevalent developmentalist line of interpretation, Plato’s introduction of the three-part soul in Republic 4 was motivated in part by his desire to acknowledge and account for cases of akratic action, and thereby to repudiate the psychology and the conclusions of the earlier dialogue Protagoras. In this paper I reject this interpretation, arguing that countenancing akrasia was never a major philosophical concern for Plato, and a fortiori that it was not his motivation for introducing the tripartite soul. I argue that his moral psychological focus and concern in the Republic was rather on the notion of psychic rule, and on illuminating various ways in which reasoning is corrupted by non-rational desires (rather than overcome by them through brute psychic ‘force’). I then offer an explanation of Plato’s lack of concern for akrasia by appealing to the Protagoras itself. I conclude with a rejection of sharp developmentalism between the two dialogues.

2014

"Let one open any book of history, from Herodotus to our own day, and he will see that, without even excepting conspiracies, not a single great event has occurred which has not been conceived, prepared, and carried out at a feast," so said Jean Anthelme Brillat-Savarin in the Philosopher in the Kitchen (1981[1825]: 54). Scholars of course know the faculty club and the conference dinner, where many events have been planned. While Plato consistently recommended common meals, syssitia (literally "eating together"), and Aristotle accepted this one feature of Plato's political program, their recommendations of these public meals as political practices have been treated in a perfunctory manner, limited to military purposes (e.g., Finer 1997: 338 and de Mesquita et al., 2004: 174). In later utopian theory and practice, Thomas More, Tomasso Campanella and William Morris, among other utopian theorists, incorporated such meals, as have utopian communities from Oenida to the Kibbutzim, all to little comment. Insofar as the seed for the practice is found in Plato, a close study of his recommendation of common meals enhances our understanding of what such meals can offer. Why in The Laws (780a-d) did Plato recommend meals in common and why did he say that they were "amazing" and "frightening," and perhaps not to be mentioned? 1 To better understand Plato's approach to syssitia this essay summarizes common meals in the context of classical Greece, examines Plato's discussion of political dining, emphasizes the role of women in common meals in Plato's political theory, considers the role of these meals in the second-best ideal commonwealth of the Laws, and draws several conclusions.

Plato is often considered a founder of the humanist tradition, but I question this interpretation of Plato’s humanism via a return to the Neoplatonic/Neopythagorean interpretation of the “healthy city” (372e) of the Republic, which is more frequently (though infelicitously) referred to as the “city of pigs” (372d). Here, in the first city Socrates describes in Book II, we see a “vegetarian republic” in which humans and nonhumans live in mutual concord rather than as predator and prey. Neither hunting nor animal husbandry is practiced in this first regime, and while animals are used for labor-power, Socrates’ detailed description of the diet of the citizens of the huopolis makes it clear that animals are not consumed as food. Plato’s Socrates never retracts his praise of this first regime throughout the remainder of the Republic, which implies that this city and its human/animal comity retain their exemplary status in Plato’s political theory.

Revista Archai, 2020

The preparation of food and nutrition is a pervasive techne in the classical Greek world. Indeed, food technology may be a defining characteristic of humanity (Levi-Strauss, 1964). We begin with a glimpse of a tension in the use of the word techne in relation to the preparation of food in Plato’s Gorgias 462d-e. Turning to the Presocratics, we discern three distinct perspectives on food, those of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the treatise Regimen (Περὶ Διαίτης). In Regimen, we find an anticipation of the distinctions made by Plato in the Gorgias passage, and trace some of the implications in what we may call the “food technology” of this treatise that manages to be both philosophical and technically informative.