Review of Knowing Emotions By Rick Furtak

2014

The Editor's invitation to contribute to this volume appeared to license telling more than I know. Accordingly this essay will move quickly from an all too brief survey of what I know to raise some of the increasingly speculative questions that currently preoccupy me. I. What I know On second thought, there's nothing I'm that sure of. II. What I'd like to think I know. 1. Reconstructing Cognitivism. There has been much made in recent decades of the idea that emotions are "cognitive". The term is used in a confusing diversity of senses. Sometimes by 'cognition ' one means merely to insist that emotions are not "merely subjective " phenomena. But that is hardly helpful, since there are by my count at least a dozen different things one can mean by 'subjective ' (de Sousa 2002a). A more contentful thesis is that emotions are genuine representations not just of the inside world of the body but through that of the external world ...

In the epistemological context, two questions have a special relevance: "are emotions knowledge?" and "is a uniform theory of emotions necessary to evaluate the epistemological state of emotions?". A restrictive interpretation of "knowledge" requires theories to have propositional content. In such a case, emotions are usually assimilated to normative beliefs or judgments. More liberal interpretations of "knowledge" also include theories that interpret emotions on the perception model. A minimal definition of cognitive theories of emotions includes the assertion that emotions are intentional. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.11326.72004

2004

The Editor's invitation to contribute to this volume appeared to license telling more than I know. Accordingly this essay will move quickly from an all too brief survey of what I know to raise some of the increasingly speculative questions that currently preoccupy me. I. What I know On second thought, there's nothing I'm that sure of. II. What I'd like to think I know. 1. Reconstructing Cognitivism. There has been much made in recent decades of the idea that emotions are "cognitive". The term is used in a confusing diversity of senses. Sometimes by 'cognition ' one means merely to insist that emotions are not "merely subjective " phenomena. But that is hardly helpful, since there are by my count at least a dozen different things one can mean by 'subjective ' (de Sousa 2002a). A more contentful thesis is that emotions are genuine representations not just of the inside world of the body but through that of the external world ...

European Journal of Philosophy, 2011

On the importance of dialogue between Robert Solomon's cognitive and William James' noncognitive theories of emotions to create a satisfying and applicable theory Rory E. Fairweather Individual theories of the emotions tend to isolate themselves from others and in doing so they necessarily lack the strengths of the other theories. The dogmatic spat between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of the emotions, which I explore here, is symptomatic of this insularity. To have a satisfying understanding of the emotions we must acknowledge the strengths and discard the weaknesses of each theory. As such, I argue that it is only through dialogue between theories that we can achieve a strong conceptualisation of the emotions.

Emotion Review (forthcoming), 2022

This is a commentary (penultimate draft) to J. M. Müller (2019): The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling. On Affect and Intentionality. Palgrave Pivot. Müller's position-taking view of emotions takes issue with the widely endorsed philosophical notion that emotional feelings are a form of consciousness in which we become acquainted with the evaluative properties of objects and events. Müller rejects this perceptual theory of emotions and casts doubt on the idea that it is through emotional feeling that we develop an awareness of value. In so doing, his proposal amounts to a denial of any epistemic function of emotional feeling. Challenging such a radical move, in my commentary, I discuss several affective phenomena in which feelings do seem to serve an epistemic function. These cases pose problems for Müller's version of the position-taking view of emotion, at least in its current form.

International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2019

U. Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness, 2017

This paper explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology so as to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, we focus on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say Sam is angry at Maria’s nasty remark. The first feature relates to the fact that anger is a negative emotion, by contrast with positive emotions such as joy and admiration (valence). The second feature is how anger differs from other emotions such as sadness, fear and joy (individuation). The third concerns the objects of anger and the sense in which anger discloses the significance of Maria’s remark to Sam (intentionality). Finally, there is anger’s relation to behaviour (motivation). Does focussing on emotional phenomenology encourage specific accounts of these features? We shall see that there are reasons to think it does. Still, are these reasons of sufficient import to dispel the scepticism of those who think that nothing of consequence plays out at the personal level of emotional experience? Given the role of emotional experience in our evaluative practices, we shall conclude that they are. Our discussion is structured as follows: section 1 focuses on feeling approaches to phenomenology, section 2 on componential approaches, section 3 on perceptual approaches and section 4 on attitudinal approaches. Section 5 concludes with some observations regarding the significance of emotional phenomenology.

Thinking about feeling: Contemporary …, 2004

The Editor's invitation to contribute to this volume appeared to license telling more than I know. Accordingly this essay will move quickly from an all too brief survey of what I know to raise some of the increasingly speculative questions that currently preoccupy me. I. What I know On second thought, there's nothing I'm that sure of. II. What I'd like to think I know. 1. Reconstructing Cognitivism. There has been much made in recent decades of the idea that emotions are "cognitive". The term is used in a confusing diversity of senses. Sometimes by

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY SUPPLEMENT: 52, 2003

Looking inside oneself for the springs of such passion might make a nice case of soul-searching, but is not necessarily the best means for advancing philosophical inquiry. The papers in this volume arise from an international symposium on emotions, and provide material for a continuing dialogue among researchers with different philosophical itineraries. Each essay addresses, in varying detail, the nature of emotions, their rationality, and their relation to value. Chapters I to VIII map the place of emotion in human nature, through a discussion of the intricate relation between consciousness and the body. Chapters IX to XI analyse the importance of emotion for human agency by pointing to the ways in which practical rationality may be enhanced, as well as hindered, by powerful or persistent emotions. Chapters XII to XIV explore questions of normativity and value in making sense of emotions at a personal, ethical, and political level.