Children, Rights, and Powers

2012

The latter part of the twentieth century saw the near-universal recognition of the idea of children’s rights as human rights. At the same time, the conceptual basis for such rights remains largely under-theorized. Part of the aim of this Article is to draw on the insights of the “capabilities approach” developed by Martha Nussbaum in philosophy, and Amartya Sen in economics, in order to provide a fuller theoretical justification of this kind. In addition, this Article investigates the degree to which it will be justifiable, under such an approach, for international human rights law or national constitutions, to give special priority to children’s rights. It begins this task by first considering, and rejecting, potential justifications for such special priority based on the need to ensure the future self-reliance of children as adults and ideas about the special “innocence” of children; and, then, by developing two affirmative justifications for such special priority, based on the sp...

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000

The latter part of the twentieth century saw the near-universal recognition of the idea of children's rights as human rights. At the same time, the conceptual basis for such rights remains largely under-theorized. Part of the aim of this Article is to draw on the insights of the "capabilities approach" developed by Martha Nussbaum in philosophy, and Amartya Sen in economics, in order to provide a fuller theoretical justification of this kind. In addition, this Article investigates the degree to which it will be justifiable, under such an approach, for international human rights law or national constitutions, to give special priority to children's rights. It begins this task by first considering, and rejecting, potential justifications for such special priority based on the need to ensure the future self-reliance of children as adults and ideas about the special "innocence" of children; and, then, by developing two affirmative justifications for such special priority, based on the special vulnerability of children, and the special cost-effectiveness of protecting children's rights. This Article also explores the degree to which these principles may provide a starting point for thinking about more general trade-offs between different rights claims, or claimants, under a capabilities approach.

Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Human Rights, 2024

There is wide agreement that children have human rights, and that their human rights differ from those of adults. What explains this difference which is, at least at first glance, puzzling, given that human rights are meant to be universal? The puzzle can be dispelled by identifying what unites children’s and adults’ rights as human rights. Here I seek to answer the question of children’s human rights – that is, rights they have merely in virtue of being human and of being children – by exploring how children’s interests are different from adults’, and how respect for children’s and adults’ moral status yields different practical requirements. If human rights protect interests, then children have many, but not all, of the human rights of adults, and, in addition, have some human rights that adults lack. I discuss the way in which children’s human rights, as I conceive of them here are, or fail to be, reflected in the law; as an illustration, I use the most important legal document listing children’s rights, namely the 1990 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (henceforth CRC).

Šolsko polje, 2020

A s evident in academic discussions, including in this thematic issue, children's rights are usually understood today as moral rights and also as internationally recognised legal norms that all countries should respect and protect. However, this does not mean that children's rights are no longer unambiguous and uncontroversial. Just the opposite, several problems concerning children's rights remain unresolved. In this paper, I shall discuss-very shortly-only three of them: the relationship between human and children's rights; the controversy over children's liberty rights; and the antinomy of rights, that is, the opposition between the right of the child to freedom of religion and the right of parents to educate their children in conformity with their own religious convictions.

2020

is essay argues that children's rights will adequately transform societies only when the very concept of "human rights" is reimagined in light of childhood. In this case, human rights would be understood as grounded, not in modernist ideas of autonomy, liberty, entitlement, or even agency, but in a postmodern circle of responsibility to one another. is "childist" interpretation of rights is constructed by examining various forms of child-centered ethical theory in Western history; their impacts on major human rights theories of the Enlightenment and today; alternative visions implied in twentieth century international children's rights agreements; new theoretical groundings arising out of postmodern ethics; and the possibility of human rights as truly including all humanity.

Establishing a normative framework for child rights

Transcultural Psychiatry, 1995

Proposition 1. This fact brings about some simplification of Borel's arguments as noted in [1].

Th is essay argues that children's rights will adequately transform societies only when the very concept of "human rights" is reimagined in light of childhood. In this case, human rights would be understood as grounded, not in modernist ideas of autonomy, liberty, entitlement, or even agency, but in a postmodern circle of responsibility to one another. Th is "childist" interpretation of rights is constructed by examining various forms of child-centered ethical theory in Western history; their impacts on major human rights theories of the Enlightenment and today; alternative visions implied in twentieth century international children's rights agreements; new theoretical groundings arising out of postmodern ethics; and the possibility of human rights as truly including all humanity.

2013

This article aims to reinvigorate the debate over the nature and value of the claim that children have children's rights. Whilst the language of rights and children's rights continues to be widely employed, and even relied upon, in many situations involving the legal regulation of children we lack strong child-centred evidence that it is better to regulate children through the lens of children's rights, rather than their 'best interests' or in terms of duties owed to them. My argument proceeds in four stages. Firstly, I distinguish between rights for children and children's rights. Understood in the sense of fundamental human rights, children are plainly rightsholders. The critical debate relates to children's rights. Secondly, I argue that the expressive and procedural reasons for affirming that children hold children's rights are contingent upon improved outcomes. Thirdly, I contend that we do not currently have a child-centred theory of children's rights that improves, or increases the likelihood of improved outcomes in legal practice. This is not a claim that children do not have children's rights. My argument critiques the current potential of both individual children's rights and a rights-based framework of reasoning to improve outcomes for children. Finally, I argue that without a theory of children's rights, we currently have no good evidence that it benefits children to think of them in terms of children's rights in law. This is an optimistic conclusion as it suggests that with greater attention on making decision-making truly childcentred, or explicitly recognizing the inability to do so, the purposes for which we want to believe that children have children's rights might be better achieved than they are at present.

A satisfactory moral theory that purports to be comprehensive must take children seriously. It must be applicable to children in a way that yields credible judgements about morally salient features of childhood.1 It should show how these features ground important moral claims of children and it should illuminate the duties or special responsibilities that adults, whether individually or collectively, have to children. A moral theory will be deficient if it is not suitably sensitive to the distinctive interests of children or if it yields wildly implausible judgements about how children should be treated.2 Given the general normative significance that rights enjoy in both popular discourse and in contemporary moral philosophy, a seemingly natural way to give recognition to at least some of the morally significant facets of childhood is through the attribution of moral 1 Childhood is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. The morally salient interests of children change and evolve as children mature and acquire cognitive, moral and psychological attributes. Moreover, there may be some important differences between cultures and political communities about the way in which childhood is interpreted or how facets of childhood are treated. Although my discussion will not address how such complexities affect the articulation of children's rights, it is reasonable to suppose that the specific moral and legal rights of children may vary with the age and stage of moral development. So even if infants and adolescents are considered children, we can allow that their rights will, in some respects, be different. 2 To the degree that an account of justice is significantly different from a comprehensive moral theory, I assume that a parallel standard of success applies to a theory of justice: it must be suitably attentive to the distinct interests of children and must yield credible judgements about what the justice-based entitlements of children are. It should be able to identify and illuminate ways in which the justice-based entitlements of children should be distinguished from those of adults.