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2009, Proceedings of National conference on Evolution of Panini’s Grammar. Shankaracharya University of Sanskrit, Kalady
As we all know that Ablative in Sanskrit is a from-case. In Panini’s terminology it is called apaadaana. When we look at the definition of this term then we find separation as the main sense in apaadaana. But when we come across the example baalakah vyaaghraat bibheti, ‘the boy is afraid of the tiger’, then we see that it is not separation but the meeting or union that generates the fear. How do we justify this? What was the idea of our ancient Rishis while designing the language in this manner? What was Panini’s intention composing the rule bhiitraarthaanaaam bhayahetuh? Where is the separation? This article answers these questions.
Addaiyan Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences , 2019
Early thoughts on language are found in the Vedic literature but formal and rigorous discussions on the philosophy of language were initiated by Sanskrit grammarians in the classical period. Patañjali, author of the monumental work the Mahābhāṣya, (lit. great commentary) stepped beyond the role of a commentator on Pāṇinian metarules of grammar to observe the language in use in contrast to that straightjacketed by prescriptive grammatical rules. However, it was Bhartṛhari (fl. 500 – 700 CE) who proposed a major theory known as the indivisibility thesis (akhaṇḍapakṣavāda) of meaning in his magnum opus the Vākyapadīya in order to present Patañjali's views in a more logical format. Bhartṛhari expertise in Sanskrit grammar bolstered with an applied approach to the language enabled him to establish firmly this theory on the theistic platform of Advaita Vedanta. Some later grammarians in the mainstream Pāṇinian grammatical tradition and a few schools of Indian philosophy also modelled their theories on Bhartṛhari's approach to sentential meaning, while some others criticized him for misusing the Advaita Vedantic theology with the aim of justifying the indivisibility of meaning. This paper briefly examines Bhartṛhari's paraphrase of the line of arguments as raised by upholders of the primacy of word meaning, the Mīmāṃsakas in particular. It prepared him for theorizing the syntactic and semantic indivisibility and the primacy of sentential meaning. Keywords: Word Meaning, Bhartṛhari, Indivisibility thesis (akhaṇḍapakṣavāda), Sanskrit grammar, Indian philosophy of language
APA Newsletter on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers, 2018
This paper in an elementary level expresses the inevitable relation between the word and meaning from the prominent Indian philosophical trends by giving stress on Vyakti-śakti-vāda and Jāti-śakti-vāda, the two contender doctrines. The first one puts emphasis on the semantic value of a predicate whereas the latter draws attention to the generic uses of nouns. The second part of the writing underpins Navya Nyāya and Kumārila’s positions on the word-meaning reliance and the debate initiate when we look back to the question whether the word-meaning relation sounds conventional or eternal. I propose a position (śabda-vivarta-vāda) on these issues derived from the works of Patan᷈jali and Bhartṛharị, two grammarians of classical Indian tradition. They defend eternal verbum as the material cause of the word and objects. This doctrine advocates uniforism by giving up bifurcation between the word and the world.
TRANSLATION Part 1 [0 Introduction] [Jayanta:] Surely Bhaṭṭa [Kumārila] has [already] rained down an immense shower of criticisms on to the [Buddhist] view that apoha is the meaning of a word. 3 i [1 The Support of Apoha] For to explain further: This thing called apoha is taught [by you Buddhists] to be an exclusion, [i.e.] an absence. 4 Now an absence cannot be known as something 3 The whole of the rest of Part 1 is a summary, with some small changes of details, of a few of the arguments in the apoha chapter of Kumārila's Ślokavārttika. Our understanding of that chapter has been shaped by the translation of it being prepared by John Taber and Kei Kataoka. 4 Dignāga did not, to our knowledge, explicitly assert that apoha is an absence (abhāva). He was interpreted that way, though, by Siṃhasūri (Nyāyāgmānusāriṇī 733,17-18, cited and translated by PIND 2009: 268, note 451): nāpi bhedānavasthānād anabhidhanadoṣaḥ. kasmāt? abhedāt. na hy arthāntarāpoho bhedeṣu bhidyate, abhāvāt. tanmātraṃ ca śabdenocyate, na bhedāḥ . 'Nor does the fact that particulars are infinite lead to the problem that [words] would be incapable of denoting. Why? Because [exclusion] is not divided. For exclusion of other referents (arthāntarāpoha) is not divided among the particulars, because it is non-existence (abhāva); and this [exclusion] alone -not the particulars -is denoted by a word.' What Dignāga does state is that apoha is adravya (insubstantial, not really existent): avyāpakatvāc cāsāmānyadoṣo 'pi nāsti, arthāntarāpohamātrasyābhinnatvāt, adravyatvāc ca (Pramāṇasamuccayavrṛtti ad 5:36c, PIND 2009: A14). 'And the fault that [apoha] is not [capable of functioning as] a universal, which might [be thought to] follow from it not being 4 independent, in the way that pots and the like [can be perceived as independent things]. 5 Therefore, this [apoha] must be grasped as being supported by something else. 6 And what this support is of the [apoha] needs to be considered.
Studi e Saggi Linguistici, 2023
This paper aims to provide some preliminary findings on the so-called āmreḍita compounds by considering evidence from Vedic Prose, here represented by the Brāhmaṇas. So far studies have focused on āmreḍitas in the R̥gveda, while a systematic investigation of those in the later Vedic Prose language has not been undertaken yet. Vedic Prose exhibits the emergence of new forms, almost absent in earlier texts but taught in the Aṣṭādhyāyī: I will focus on verbal āmreḍitas, in particular on those formed with imperatives and gerunds. According to the Indian grammarians, verbal āmreḍitas encode the same values as the intensive category, i.e., kriyāsamabhihāra “repetitious or intense action” and nitya (= abhīkṣṇya) “reiteration”. The equivalence in meaning between repeated verbal forms and intensive verbs – already identified by Pāṇini and his commentators (cf. Kāśikā ad A 3.4.2; Kāśikā ad A 8.1.4) – explains why verbal āmreḍitas are present in Vedic Prose. Indeed, I will demonstrate that the first cases of verbal āmreḍitas are found in Vedic Prose when the intensive category was recessive.
Syntactical questions, generally, are not the major area of concern of Sanskrit grammarians and it is well known that Pāṇini has not given even a formal definition of a sentence. There have indeed been ingenious attempts by several scholars to explore the syntactical predilections of Pāṇini Mahavir 1984;. However, there can be no denying of the fact that Pāṇinian grammar is prominently focused on word formation. H. Kern states that Indian grammar which is virtually the same as saying Pāṇini's grammar, superior as it is in many respects to anything of the kind produced among other civilized nations of antiquity, is professedly deficient in its treatment of syntax (Kern 1886: v). Among syntactical problems treated by Pāṇini, word order regulations are mainly confined to compound structures, as sūtras like upasarjanam pūrvam (2.2.30) and te prāgdhātoḥ (1.4.80) would indicate. Otherwise, Pāṇinian (and other) grammars do not have anything particular to enjoin in syntactical issues like word order in a sentence, or selection between a compound and a semantically equivalent cluster of regular inflected words. We have to look into the writings of Mīmāmsaka philosophers and poeticians to find out the valuable traditional insights in relation to Sanskrit syntax.
Saṁskṛta-sādhutā; Goodness of Sanskrit: Studies in Honour of Professor Ashok N. Aklujkar, 2012
Asian journal of multidisciplinary studies, 2019
A doyen of profound discussions on the Indian philosophy of language, Bhartṛhari (fl. 500 – 700 CE) introduced in the light of the Advaita Vedanta system of philosophy a major theory known as the indivisibility thesis ( akhaṇḍapakṣavāda ) of meaning. His expertise in Sanskrit grammar rooted in the time-honored tradition bolstered with applied approach to the language in use enabled him to establish firmly this theory. Some later grammarians in the mainstream Pāṇinian grammatical tradition and Vedantic philosophers modelled their theories on Bhartṛhari's approach to sentential meaning, while some others criticized him for misusing the Advaita Vedantic theology and its standard line of arguments in order to justify the indivisibility of meaning, whereas primacy of words cannot be ascertained in any context of language use. This paper examines the background of Bhartṛhari's arguments for the legitimacy of his claim that sentence meaning is the primary entity, which is divisible...
Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 70, no. 3, 2022
It is well known that the TJ, a commentary on Bhāviveka’s MHK, gives a grammatical explanation of the term madhyamaka to derive the term madhyamakahṛdaya ‘the heart (hṛdaya) of the madhyamaka’. Regrettably, the commentary is now extant only in Tibetan translation, which causes great difficulty in understanding properly the explanation as intended by the original. The TJ tells us that the term madhyamaka can be interpreted in two ways: as an upapada tatpuruṣa and as a derivate ending in a taddhita affix; and that the term refers to a śāstra ‘teaching, treatise, system’ or a siddhānta ‘established view’ relative to it. The aim of this paper is thus to bring out grammatical points so that the derivation of the term in question may be convincingly accounted for from the point of view of Pāṇini’s grammar.
Annali (Università degli Studi di Napoli “L’Orientale”) , 2002
Acta Orientalia Vilnensia 4, 2003
Journal of International Philosophy, 2022
The article deals with specific textual features of the Āpastamba-dharmasūtra and Āpastamba-gṛhyasūtra. The basic characteristic of their compositional structure is double parallel arrangement — the division of the texts into paṭalas and kaṇḍikās/khaṇḍas. The article demonstrated a unique feature of the Sūtras’ composition — topics and subtopics and often even single sentences do not match the division on kaṇḍikās/khaṇḍas, coinciding only with paṭalas. The author makes an assumption that the division into paṭalas appears when the texts are already written, and the division into kaṇḍikās/khaṇḍas reflects the oral existence of the texts and is associated with the process of learning — the memorization of the text by heart. A large number of repetitions and clichés in the texts also facilitate the process of memorizing. It can be assumed that the composition of the ĀpDhS and ĀpGS have been influenced by the necessity of oral transmission of the texts. This is reflected in both the formal division into paṭalas and kaṇḍikās and also in the organization of the Sūtra’s content.
1997
Jan E.M. Houben, “The Sanskrit Tradition.” In: The Emergence of Semantics in Four Linguistic Tradition (W. van Bekkum, Jan E.M. Houben, Ineke Sluiter, Kees Versteegh), pp. 49-145. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1997. At an early stage the Sanskrit religious, philosophical and scientific tradition was confronted with problems of meaning, especially with regard to the sacred texts at its root: the Vedas. Here we take 'Semantics' in the general sense of "the study and representation of the meaning of language expressions, and the relationships of meaning among them" (Allan. 1992:394). We identify a number of landmarks in the history of Indian semantic thought: remarkable and significant “watersheds” after which thought is no more the same as before. On some points our study needs to be updated, for instance regarding the relationship between Sanskrit, its several varieties, interrelated dialects and other languages: "Linguistic Paradox and Diglossia: the emergence of Sanskrit and Sanskritic language in Ancient India" www.degruyter.com/view/j/opli.2018.4.issue-1/opli-2018-0001/opli-2018-0001.xml?format=INT DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/opli-2018-0001
History of Linguistics 2021. Selected papers from the 15th International Conference on the History of the Language Sciences (ICHoLS 15), Milan, 28 August – 1 September, by Raynaud, Savina, Maria Paola Tenchini and Enrica Galazzi (eds.) [SiHoLS 133], Amsterdam & Philadeplhia: John Benjamins., 2024
In this study I show that the internal order of Sanskrit Noun-Noun endocentric compounds cannot be captured by means of the notion 'head', defined in semantic or morphological terms (§ §1-2). Next, I outline the strategy devised by the Indian grammarian Pāṇini (4 th century B.C.) to handle the internal order of Sanskrit compounds (§3). Finally, I argue that the notion relevant for determining the internal order of Noun-Noun endocentric compounds in Sanskrit can be identified by combining Pāṇini's intuitions with the formalism developed within generative grammar (§4). In this way, this study provides an additional example of how useful the history of linguistics (specifically, the study of Pāṇini's grammar) may be for solving a problem in contemporary linguistics (specifically, the puzzle as to how the internal order of a certain class of compounds is determined).
Pāṇinian grammar of living Sanskrit : features and principles of the Prakriyā-Sarvasva At around 350 B.C.E. Pāṇini composed a grammar of the language of the Vedas and the spoken high-standard language (which we now call Sanskrit) that pushed other grammatical works into oblivion. In the course of the centuries several additions and adaptations have been proposed and variously accepted in the rules and in the lists of roots and other lexical items. This gave rise to different forms and interpretations of Pāṇini’s grammar, and also to grammars that appeared under a new title even if they are largely derived from and inspired by Pāṇini’s grammar. Among the available versions, the little-known Prakriyā-sarvasva by the brilliant and versatile author Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa of Melputtūr (17th century) is at least as comprehensive as the well-known Pāṇinian grammar of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, the Siddhānta-kaumudī, but significantly differs from it in both method and substance, even if both remain within the framework of Pāṇini’s system. The Prakriyā-Sarvasva provides many novel perspectives on theoretical issues in Pāṇinian grammar and represents a much neglected pragmatic approach (in contra-distinction to the exegetic approach of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita). Since its object is Sanskrit as used and acceepted not only by the three sages – Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali – but also by later authors of the Sanskrit tradition, it can be justly regarded as a Pāṇinian grammar of living Sanskrit. Three different dimensions of the Prakriyā-Sarvasva confirm this: the features of the grammar, which, like the Siddhānta-Kaumudī, is a re-ordered version of Pāṇini’s grammar; the principles of the grammar as explained and illustrated in a special section of the grammar; the defence, in a brief treatise, of the basic principles against other grammarians.
The Annals of the Research Project Center for the Comparative Study of Logic, 2005
Chikafumi Watanabe, et.al. (eds.), Saṁskṛta-sādhutā: Goodness of Sanskrit. Studies in Honour of Professor Ashok N. Aklujkar, New Delhi: D. K. Printworld, pp. 552–586, 2012.
This assertion seems to have become a standard view in the Mīmāṁsā school of Kumārila's time because the opponents in the Vākyādhikaraṇa of his Ślokavārttika (ŚV) and in the Bhāvārtha-adhikaraṇa (MmS 2.1.1-4) of the TV equally attack this view when beginning to criticise the theory of bhāvanā. 4 In the Vākyādhikaraṇa, however, Kumārila avoids determining which part of a finite verb is expressive of bhāvanā. 5 In the Bhāvārtha-adhikaraṇa, Kumārila presents a complicated discourse in which he first attempts to refute the standard view, standing by an alternative one that bhāvanā is denoted by a whole finite verb. 6 vidyate). The ākhyātatva denotes the intentional bhāvanā (ārthī bhāvanā) activated by human beings, whereas the liṅtva particular to the optative mood of injunctions denotes the verbal bhāvanā (śābdī bhāvanā) issued by injunctions. Although Kumārila calls a finite verb "ākhyāta" without assuming "ākhyātatva" as a part of it, the idea of the denotation of bhāvanā by ākhyātatva may have been, as Kuroda Why on earth, however, is the meaning called bhāvanā, which is expressed as 'One should bring something into being,' proved to be denoted only by the suffix made separate from [verbal roots] such as √yaj?" (kathaṁ punar yajyādīn pṛthakkṛtya kevalapratyayavācya eva bhāvanārtho labhyate bhāvayed iti.) 5 After having presented three alternatives whereby bhāvanā is denoted either by a verbal suffix (pratyaya), a verbal root or a whole finite verb, Kumārila does not decide which is the most appropriate, noting that it is rewarded only with meager results (ŚV, Vākyādhikaraṇa, vv. 248-250; Kuroda 1980: 440).
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