Changing Conceptions of Rationality

Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 50 Years On, 2015

Many philosophers have thought that Kuhn’s claim that there have been paradigm shifts introduced a problem for the rationality of science, because it appears that in such a change nothing can count as a neutral arbiter; even what you observe depends on which theory you already subscribe to. The history of science challenges its rationality in a different way in the pessimistic induction, where failures of our predecessors to come up with true theories about unobservable entities is taken by many to threaten the rationality of confidence in our own theories. The first problem arises from a perception of too much discontinuity, the second from an unfortunate kind of continuity, in the track record of science. I argue that both problems are only apparent, and due to under-description of the history. The continuing appeal of the pessimistic induction in particular is encouraged by narrow focus on a notion of method that Kuhn was eager to resist.

2013

Many philosophers have thought that Kuhn’s claim that there have been paradigm shifts introduced a problem for the rationality of science, because it appears that in such a change nothing can count as a neutral arbiter; even what you observe depends on which theory you already subscribe to. The history of science challenges its rationality in a different way in the pessimistic induction, where failures of our predecessors to come up with true theories about unobservable entities is taken by many to threaten the rationality of confidence in our own theories. The first problem arises from a perception of too much discontinuity, the second from an unfortunate kind of continuity, in the track record of science. I argue that both problems are only apparent, and due to under-description of the history. The continuing appeal of the pessimistic induction in particular is encouraged by narrow focus on a notion of method that Kuhn was eager to resist.

dialectica, 1978

The clash between rationalism and humanism presupposes a radical and optimistic view of reason, with science taken as the archetype. Popper's theory of reason as critical of tradition seems to offer a new direction. But Kuhn's discovery that scientists normally are uncritical of some basic ideas makes it vacuous. An improvement upon Duhem's analysis of tests gives us a new epistemology, however where viable alternative views which are not believed nevertheless influence the organization of research. The tacit debate can be regarded as an organized escape rather than as progress towards the Truth.

Addaiyan Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences , 2021

In this article, I will explore Kuhn's arguments concerning his claims of "paradigm shift in science is irrational". First, I will do this by looking into Kuhn's opinions about paradigms, normal science, and revolutions by taking reference to his writings. Second, I will try to understand influences and ideas located in "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions". Third, I will look into the scientific examples that related to Kuhn's claims about paradigm changes as irrational. I considered the paramount importance of historical and well-known examples in science. This is as to why and how Kuhn has concluded and understood the stages and effects of paradigm changes are irrational in the collective thinking of the masses in the science world. To get the bottom of Kuhn's claims in the light of wider scientific changes, I will try to demonstrate relationships between Kuhn's specific notions and these scientific examples. To do this, I came up with the main question and two close objectives so that complete the article in a manner that the article focuses on deeper layers of Kuhn's claims how paradigm changes in science are irrational.

Manuscrito, 2019

According to a widespread view, Thomas Kuhn’s model of scientific development would relegate rationality to a second plane, openly flirting with irrationalist positions. The intent of this article is to clarify this aspect of his thinking and refute this common interpretation. I begin by analysing the nature of values in Kuhn’s model and how they are connected to rationality. For Kuhn, a theory is chosen rationally when: i) the evaluation is based on values characteristic of science; ii) a theory is considered better the more it manifests these values; and iii) the scientist chooses the best-evaluated theory. The second part of this article deals with the thesis of the variability of values. According to Kuhn, the examples through which epistemic values are presented vary for each person, and for this reason individuals interpret these criteria differently. Consequently, two scientists, using the same values, can come to a rational disagreement over which theory to choose. Finally, I point out the limitations of this notion of rationality for the explanation of consensus formation, and the corresponding demand for a sociological theory that reconnects individual rationality with convergence of opinions.

2014

Kuhn’s Structure richly displayed the relevance of historical considerations to questions of what it is rational for scientists to believe and why. He did not, as some have, think his interpretation threatened to make scientists ’ beliefs look irrational, but his work did make an approach to this issue via rules of Scientific Method seem cartoonish. One could be forgiven for thinking philosophers have not fully assimilated what was distinctive in Kuhn’s contribution. Philosophers can be forgiven, I think, for not knowing how to imitate it. For good or ill we have not stopped investigating methodological rules and principles of rationality, and though today there are more Bayesians than falsificationists and we tend to avoid that two-word proper name “Scientific Method ” that now seems so naïve, still many philosophers continue to take the relevance of the history of science to be as a pool of cases to be used to test and illustrate our views of the general rules of rationality, whic...

S. Vosniadou, A. Baltas, X. Vamvakoussi (eds.), Reframing the Conceptual Change Approach in Learning and Instruction, 2007

The rationality of science, which faced with a crisis in the late twentieth century, made a challenging problem for both the methodology and the epistemology of science. The problem of the rationality of science induced some revision in these branches of philosophy of science. In this paper, I shall examine the problem of rationality in science, then I choose a new look at the notion of rationality to overthrow its normative implication. I recognize four problems with instrumental rationality to show the difficulties of sustaining a normative account of the rationality of science. Then I suggest that a non-normative approach will be the only alternative to eliminate these difficulties.

Philosophica

According to Thomas Kuhn (1962/1970), science is characterized by two levels, one within and one between paradigms. The problem of Kuhnian rationality concerns the choice between paradigms, for which no rational basis appears to exist because this choice is inevitably circular to some extent. This is the main reason why Kuhn's view is perceived to glorify irrationality. (ibid. 199) I present two interpretations of the problem of Kuhnian rationality, one based on concepts (the neo-positivist interpretation) and one based on values. I also describe two notions of rationality, optimizing and satisficing. Neither interpretation supports the notion of optimizing, but the values-interpretation supports satisficing, suggesting that if Kuhnian scientists are rational, as Kuhn insisted, they are satisficers. An agent-based model demonstrates that aggregating the behaviour of satisficing agents can account for Kuhn's view on the dynamics of scientific change.