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Rousseau's Critique of the Enlightenment: The Science of Man

Abstract

In this paper, I show that the Enlightenment can be understood as the attempt to harness the predictive power of Newtonian science within the social sphere, and thereby establish a new social science. I then argue that Rousseau criticizes this attempt in his Discours sur les sciences et les arts on two grounds: on the one hand, he holds that the popularization of science, which results in the creation of social science, is fatal to the virtues of a nation; on the other, he maintains that such social science is not science at all, but a vulgarized version of it, what we call scientism. This presentation is composed of three parts. In the first, I explain the philosophical consequences of what Hume calls the Newtonian Revolution. My focus here is to show that Newton’s physics does not refute, for instance, metaphysical or teleological thinking. Rather, Newton simply articulates a method that, on the one hand, can predict the course of nature, and on other hand, neither requires metaphysics nor teleology to achieve this. This is important, for it shows that the Enlightenment that follows is not the consequence of some definitive refutation of, say, first principle philosophy. No, the Enlightenment is mainly inspired by the predictive power of Newtonian physics. Its advocates, notably Voltaire, thus go in search of an epistemology that can be graphed or mapped onto Newton’s physics. In the second part, I explain how this search results in a new, universal conception of man, and a social science that attempts to predict the course of human nature in terms of man’s passions and commerce. Rousseau’s critique, which engages the philosophers of the Enlightenment on precisely these grounds, is then developed in the last part.