Russia vs. the West: The Beginning of the End

Unsuccessful attempts by Russia to push Ukraine to join the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union and successful Russian pressure on the country to drop its Association Agreement with the EU led to political protests in Kiev in fall 2013. In spring 2014, while revolution brought pro-European regime change in Ukraine, Russia occupied and annexed Crimea and started a war in Donbas, violating international law, various bilateral and multilateral agreements as well as undermining the foundations of the post-Cold War order in Europe. It led to the most serious crisis in Russian–Western relations since the end of the Cold War, involving mutual sanctions by the United States, the EU and some other Western allies on one side and Russia on the other. However grave the crisis is, these events are yet another in a whole series of crises between Russia and the West over the 25 years since the breakup of the Soviet Union. On the other hand we also witnessed periods of quite positive, pragmatic cooperation between the two during that time. Unfortunately, none of these lasted long, nor was able to create a critical mass allowing for a positive breakthrough in mutual relations. This chapter is a modest attempt to offer some interpretations that may be helpful in answering questions: why it has happened and where we should go from here? In the first part it assesses differences between Russia and the West related to perceptions, political cultures, values and interests. In the second part it provides several conclusions based on analysis of past periods of both cooperation and conflict between the two sides. In the third part it gives recommendations on Western policies toward Russia: what approaches should be avoided and why, as well as what policies should be pursued.

The current crisis in Russia’s relations with the West has more often than not been blamed in the West on Russia itself and the authoritarian policies pursued by Vladimir Putin. As reprehensible as many aspects of Russian policy might be, the West has contributed to the deterioration in the relationship ever since the Soviet collapse in 1991 by ignoring Russian policy concerns and attempting to take advantage of Russian weakness. By acting thus the West has not only created major problems for itself. It has also made any diplomatic solution to the Ukraine tragedy increasingly unlikely.

Christophe Barbier, 2017

Abstract My research will focus on Russia’s relations versus the Western world from the past to the present day. Russia's vision and perception of the West since the end of the Cold War have changed the world substantially, and as a result, the idealism for the West and Russia to be strong allies have rather distanced themselves both diplomatically and politically on the international stage. For viewers to understand the implication of this research analysis, I will examine Russia’s brutal past, the Russian Revolution of 1917, the post-WWII Soviet era, the unending Cold War’s with renewing tensions today and the fall of Communism which precipitated the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. These historical events are thematically linked as early as the Battle of Kulikovo in 1380 in which Russians defeated the Mongols by creating a surprising attack hidden from view. This ideological mechanism of Maskirovka in Russian (Маскировка), meaning ‘masking’ is a deceptive psychological apparatus used in Russian’s technical warfare during previous wars to deceive its enemies from within in a mastery art of wars. This psychological framework of deception is still present today in a series of recent international events about the attempt at reacquiring the former Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia as a sovereign state within the former Soviet Union Republics now known today as Russia. The invasion of Crimea, followed by the annexation of Ukraine in 2014 and the military intervention in Syria in 2015 not only reinserted Russia as a superpower, but also demonstrated these geopolitical moves were carried out to counter-attack NATO aggressive policy of containment toward the Baltic States and along the Russian national borders. Russia also views the West with the propagation of pro-liberalism, the promotion of democracy, human rights, international law, and the global war on Islamic terrorism carrying some significant caveats. The West places Russia on a pedestal of being an antagonist player, nonconformist and rebellious in contradiction with the West’s foreign policy which dictates liberal values and liberties. All of these historical events corroborate with consistency and conformity with the current cold war tensions and frustrations between Russia and the West in a battle of disinformation, cyber warfare attacks and impartial truths. This Russian doctrine also magnifies why Russia does not correlate to the West in a same diplomatic and political manner as the West does. As a result, it creates more geopolitical differences and political divisions. In this Master’s research paper, I will analyze the underlying causes of diplomatic tensions such as the historical, ideological, geopolitical, and political nuances that Russia’s past battles, wars, attacks, and foreign invaders from the West hemisphere have led Russia to be both fearful and defensive toward the Western world. Russia’s tumultuous and dramatic past has cast an overshadowing net over unconstructive ties with the West and deteriorating relations that continue to exacerbate any diplomatic relations from leading to successful outcomes. That has prevented both hemispheres from reaching encouraging and promising mutual footings in world affairs. Is there a way to mollify the renewed tensions between the West and Russia? Yes, and I will demonstrate that both the West and Russia can mend their differences and reset their partnerships. However, the latter is also true that increasing strains during the investigation will bring forth to the readers tangible evidence that Russia and the West will continue for years to come to be suspicious and skeptical of one and another. East-West’s problematic political discourses compounded by distrustful and complicated bilateral relations within the crossfire NATO and the European Union could potentially destabilize peace and security and as a result, reshape the world itself between the East and the West.

2023

Rome, IAI, July 2018, 12 p. (IAI Papers ; 18|12), ISBN 978-88-9368-079-0, 2018

Russia's relations with Europe and the United States are at their worst since the end of the Soviet Union. Russian leaders reject the post-Cold War vision of a Europe whole, free, at peace with itself and its neighbours, view NATO as a threat and increasingly consider the EU as a danger to Russia's political system. This is unlikely to change soon. The anti-Western worldview of Russia's national security establishment, the proximity of the NATO-Russia line of contact to the Russian heartland, and Russia's newly assertive posture in many far-flung regions of the world contribute to an atmosphere of heightened tensions between Russia and Europe and the United States. This, however, may not be the biggest challenge facing the West. In the age of Trump, that challenge may come from within, not outside, the Western alliance.

When he took office in early 2009, President Barack Obama made improvement of the United States’ relations with Russia – the so-called “reset” policy – one of his signature foreign policy initiatives. That hope lies now in tatters, shattered by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of south-eastern Ukraine. The goal of turning US-Russia cooperation – and, by extension, West-Russia cooperation – into a building block of international governance looks now as distant as it was during the Cold War. The best one can hope instead is that relations between Moscow and Western capitals do not further deteriorate to the point of a complete breakdown. The rationale for the “reset” policy was the pragmatic recognition that the recurring tensions with Russia – prompted by issues ranging from Kosovo’s independence to the US plan to install a ballistic missile defence system in Eastern Europe and Georgia’s and Ukraine’s prospective membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – were thwarting US and Western interests in Afghanistan and the management of Iran’s nuclear issue as well as creating new fault lines on the European continent. Tellingly, after reaching a low point in relations in the wake of Russia’s short and victorious war against Georgia in August 2008, both Russia and Western powers took steps to avoid a scenario of full confrontation. Several member states of the European Union (EU), particularly Western European countries with little memory of recent Soviet domination, viewed the new US course as being more in keeping with their interest in establishing a constructive relationship with Russia, a key player on the European stage and the Union’s main energy provider. While some EU member states, particularly in Eastern Europe, felt the United States was too prone to seek cooperation with an unreliable Russian government, the whole European Union eventually signed WEST-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS 12 off on Obama’s policy. The election of Dmitry Medvedev as Russia’s president, who depicted himself as more liberal-minded than his patron and predecessor, Vladimir Putin, had in fact helped create an atmosphere more forthcoming for dialogue and cooperation. The “reset” policy did produce some important results, most notably the US-Russian agreement on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons known as the New START (the only relevant nuclear disarmament agreement struck in twenty years); Russia’s greater cooperation on curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, particularly thanks to its agreeing to tough sanctions against Tehran in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in June 2010; and Russia’s agreement to let key military supplies for the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan transit its airspace, an important development given the growing difficulty NATO was experiencing in keeping open its supply lines through Pakistan. While significant, these achievements did not pave the way for what many had hoped the “reset” policy would eventually produce: a renewed West-Russia relationship based on mutual respect and cooperation on issues of common concern. In fact, relations between the West and Russia continued to be fraught with problems of mistrust, rhetorical competition, and fundamentally different views of how security issues should be managed internationally. In hindsight, the “reset” policy seems to have been just a lull in a process started in the early 2000s which has seen West-Russia relations steadily deteriorate. While none of the “reset” policy achievements has thus far been reversed, a succession of events, including the re-election of Putin as Russia’s president in 2012 and culminating in Russia’s forced takeover of Crimea and destabilisation of Ukraine, have plunged the West-Russia relationship to its lowest point in twenty-five years. For many in the West, the crisis over Ukraine has laid bare the most unsettling features of President Putin’s government: lack of any appreciation for political pluralism; readiness to dispense with opposition forces by de-legitimisation through state-controlled propaganda and possibly forceful repression; and resolve to defend what Putin perceives as Russia’s vital interests with any means, including the use of force, land grabs, and destabilising practices such as fomenting and directing pro-Russian nationalist protests in other countries. INTRODUCTION 13 Ukraine is a special case because influence over Kiev is of paramount importance to Russia’s security strategy and national pride. However, it should not be seen in isolation. It is part of a broader design by President Putin to re-establish as much influence as possible over the former Soviet space. Central to this objective is Putin’s plan for a Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) including most of the former republics of the Soviet Union, be them in East Europe, the Caucasus or Central Asia. The problem with the Eurasian Economic Union is that the Russian president sees it as incompatible with any significant form of integration of its members into Euro-Atlantic frameworks, notably NATO but also the European Union. The crisis in Ukraine has also made it clear that the West is now confronted with the problem of handling the revanchist instincts of a former superpower. The West faces an intractable regime centred on the personal power of President Putin, who has increasingly tied his legitimacy to a pledge to embody and defend an exceptionalist Russian identity, mostly defined in opposition to Western values and norms. In other words, the conflict between the West and Russia is framed by Putin himself not only as a conflict of interests, but of identity too. This narrative has been used by Putin to rebut any sort of criticism coming from the West, be it directed at Russia’s takeover of Crimea or at Putin’s increasingly strict control over Russia’s media and marginalisation and repression of political dissent. Signs of growing competition between the West and Russia were visible long before unrest in Ukraine escalated into a full-blown crisis. The Arab uprisings are a case in point. From the start, Russia and the West have held different views of the cycle of revolutions and counterrevolutions which has engulfed the most part of the Arab world. While the United States and the European Union initially insisted on the antiauthoritarian and pro-democracy nature of popular protests, Russia has consistently seen the so-called Arab Spring as a bearer of instability and, more worryingly, as an opportunity for Islamic fundamentalism to find new ways to gain influence. Moscow opted for a cautious approach in the beginning, even letting the Security Council authorise the use of force to protect endangered civilians in the prolonged conflict between Libya’s longstanding ruler, Muammar Qaddafi, and a West-backed rebel WEST-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS 14 coalition. Russia came to regret its choice in a matter of months if not weeks, as it became clear that NATO’s intervention in defence of civilians rapidly “crept” into what the Russians perceived as an open policy of regime change by force. Bruised by the Libya case, Russia has ever since been adamant in refusing any form of UNSC support for rebels fighting against established rulers in the Arab world, irrespective of how brutal such rulers could be. This has been most evident in Syria, where Russia has steadfastly protected its ally Bashar al-Assad from any form of UN action. West-Russia relations have so dramatically deteriorated that talk of a new Cold War has become routine. NATO’s role in Europe is again in the spotlight, with experts and policymakers alike pondering whether the Alliance needs to go back to its historical roots, re-calibrating itself as an instrument of defence from and containment of Russia. However, it is important to notice that cooperation has not collapsed altogether. Russia has continued to be a committed member of the P5+1, the group of nations (including also the United States, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and China plus the European Union) dealing with Iran’s nuclear dispute. It has also continued to assist NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan. And it has agreed with the United States upon a plan for the removal of all chemical weapons from Syria, forcing the Assad regime to deliver. Thus, while competition has increased in strategic areas – most notably in the former Soviet space and the Middle East – the need for cooperation has not vanished. Clearly, this is far from an ideal scenario. Tensions over Ukraine are so strong that the risk of a breakdown in relations is certainly present. Yet neither party would benefit from it. It was with the goal of exploring ways by which Russia and the West can contain tensions, manage competition, and keep cooperating on issues of mutual concern, that the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome and the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at the Brookings Institution of Washington co-organised an international conference on West-Russia relations. The conference was the seventh edition of the Transatlantic Security Symposium, the IAI-run annual forum in which experts from America, Europe and other countries convene to discuss the main topics in the transatlantic security agenda. The event, sponsored by Italy’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and InternaINTRODUCTION 15 tional Development, NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division, the Compagnia di San Paolo, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Rome Office) and Unicredit Bank, saw the participation of over forty senior experts from think tanks and other institutions from a number of EU member states (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Poland and Bulgaria), the United States, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey and Russia took part. This volume collects a revised version of the papers that were presented at the event as well as a summary of the main points that were discussed. (R.A.)

Unsuccessful attempts by Russia to push Ukraine to join the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union and successful Russian pressure on the country to drop its Association Agreement with the EU led to political protests in Kiev in fall 2013. In spring 2014, while revolution brought pro-European regime change in Ukraine, Russia occupied and annexed Crimea and started a war in Donbas, violating international law, various bilateral and multilateral agreements as well as undermining the foundations of the post-Cold War order in Europe. It led to the most serious crisis in Russian–Western relations since the end of the Cold War, involving mutual sanctions by the United States, the EU and some other Western allies on one side and Russia on the other. However grave the crisis is, these events are yet another in a whole series of crises between Russia and the West over the 25 years since the breakup of the Soviet Union. On the other hand we also witnessed periods of quite positive, pragmatic cooperation between the two during that time. Unfortunately, none of these lasted long, nor was able to create a critical mass allowing for a positive breakthrough in mutual relations. This chapter is a modest attempt to offer some interpretations that may be helpful in answering questions: why it has happened and where we should go from here? In the first part it assesses differences between Russia and the West related to perceptions, political cultures, values and interests. In the second part it provides several conclusions based on analysis of past periods of both cooperation and conflict between the two sides. In the third part it gives recommendations on Western policies toward Russia: what approaches should be avoided and why, as well as what policies should be pursued.

Irish Studies in International Affairs, 2008

As 'Europe' becomes more diverse, the countries that were formerly part of the USSR face new choices.

New Perspectives, 2016

2015

The conventional wisdom of the Cold War era was that, even in times of ultimate tensions, arms control served as a kind of bridge over seemingly intractable differences between two rival alliances ostensibly immune from ideological or geopolitical rows. In the period of the post-Cold War “New World Order” illusions, with their maverick schemes of the “End of History” or the “Clash of Civilizations”, arms control seemed to be eclipsed by wider geopolitical ambitions or hopes that it was just a relic of the Cold War and did not need judicially enforceable mechanisms in the era of collaboration and trust between the West and Russia (predictably, that ended quite soon). The “End of History”, even if it really happened in its initial Hegelian sense, only meant the advent of a new set of crises, competition and conflicts in a new phase of international development.