Ethics of Meat Eating and Vegetarianism

In Konstantinos Boudouris (Ed.) Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy. Athens: Greek Philosophical Society, 2018

There is a teeth-biting debate between vegetarianism and non-vegetarianism on human obligations towards animals. Vegetarianism appeals for equal and ethical treatment for animals whereas non-vegetarianism simply denies any such treatments considering that animals do not have a sense of morality. Non-vegetarianism seems to be ignoring some obligatory duties towards animals and undermines ethical arguments for animal rights. It does not provide sound reason for why humans should deliberately kill animals, painlessly or with least harm, for their own sake. It also overlooks the world economic situation of global hunger in which the use of the total food resources and distribution in terms of nutrition would be much more equitable if everyone was a vegetarian. This paper argues against non-vegetarianism and defends vegetarianism by making a claim that we do have moral obligations of certain kinds towards animals same as we have moral obligations towards us in terms of natural right to survival.

This paper discusses Peter Singer's strict ethical vegetarianism. I argue that utilitarianism does not provide sufficient grounds for vegetarianism to be presented as an ethical obligation. I argue that the boycott style of vegetarianism advocated by Singer is not an effective means of reducing the suffering experienced by animals and, finally, demonstrate that the proper application of the principle of utility to our dietary choices requires the consumption of both ethically sourced meats and roadkill.

Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 2019

The animal liberation movement, among other goals, seeks an end to the use of animals for food. The philosophers who started the movement agree on the goal but differ in their approach: deontologists argue that rearing animals for food infringes animals’ inherent right to life. Utilitarians claim that ending the use of animals for food will result in the maximization of utility. Virtue-oriented theorists argue that using animals for food is callus, self-indulgent, and unjust, in short, it’s an unvirtuous practice. Despite their different approaches, arguments for vegetarianism or veganism have a common step. They move from the notion of suffering to the conclusion of vegetarianism or veganism. In this paper I suggest that the notion of animal suffering is not necessary in order to condemn the practice of animal farming. I propose the possibility of defending vegetarianism or veganism on the basis of arguments that do not rest on the notion of animal suffering, but rather rely on aesthetic principles, the avoidance of violence, and preservation of the environment, and health.

2018

Human eating habits are widely distinguished between Vegetarianism and Non-Vegetarianism, where former presumes themselves to be holding no moral risk toward nature and animals as they do not eat animal meats. However, if we examine it closely and thoroughly, every eating habits hold some or other moral risk. My paper is an attempt to unfold different arguments made in support and against the moral concern of Vegetarianism. Although it is impalpable to answer ‘What is morally good to eat?’, our discourse helps to bring forth different arguments to understand the moral concern of our eating habits.

Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2009

This paper defends a qualified version of moral vegetarianism. It defends a weak thesis and, more tentatively, a strong thesis, both from a very broad basis that assumes neither that animals have rights nor that they are entitled to equal consideration. The essay's only assumption about moral status, an assumption defended in the analysis of the wrongness of cruelty to animals, is that sentient animals have at least some moral status. One need not be a strong champion of animal protection, then, to embrace moral vegetarianism. One need only assume some reasonable view of animals' moral status.

The purpose of this article, which takes the form of a dialogue between a vegetarian and a meat eater, is twofold. On the one hand, we argue for a general characterisation of moral value in terms of well-being and suffering. On the other hand, on the basis of this characterisation, we argue that, in most cases, the moral value attached to the choice of eating meat is negative; in particular, we defend this claim against a number of objections concerning the nature of animal suffering, its moral value, and the moral responsibility of meat eaters.

Between the Species: An Online Journal for the Study of Philosophy and Animals, 1995

Journal of Animal Behaviour and Biometeorology

The justification for this review article is to understand the position of vegans and those individuals who consume food of animal origin from an unbiased perspective but with a grounding in scientific evidence. This will provide people who eat meat with scientific and ethical arguments to defend their alimentary autonomy in the context of the moral conflict that has emerged in societies regarding the consumption of meat and animal products, which is criticized –sometimes even attacked– by activists, ovolactovegetarians, or vegetarians with alimentary habits that stress ethical and moral respect for animals. These individuals refuse to eat meat and animal products but sometimes show disrespect for those who do. In recent decades, veganism and vegetarianism have reached an apogee in some western societies where they are often considered a healthy option for humans that simultaneously fosters animal and environmental welfare. While those diets may provide numerous benefits, they can a...

2017

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