Auftragstaktik: The Basis for Modern Military Command?

War in History 2(1), 1995

A thread running through German military history has been the need to achieve victory in the face of potentially overwhelming odds, a consequence of Germany’s geopolitical situation. Following the Wars of Unification, attention became focused upon the threat of a simultaneous war against both France and Russia. As the army’s military elite recognized, such a war had the potential to ’turn into a monster, devouring ever larger masses of people, ever more resources, and, in due course, the military leaders as well’. To avoid such a catastrophe, it was necessary to seek a rapid decision. A strategy of attrition could not promise the necessary speed, so the German Army came to rely on the achievement of a conclusive victory on the battlefield - annihilation. In seeking to gain such a swift decision over a potentially more numerous opponent, the Army identified the requirement to maximize the effectiveness of the forces it had available. In recent years, two contrasting interpretations have been made concerning the means by which the German Army sought to resolve these challenges. These may be classified as the ’traditional manpower-centred approach’, proposed by Michael Geyer, and the ’progressive technology-centred approach’, developed by Arden Bucholz. This article seeks to chart a course between these two arguments. The focus is upon the philosophy of command at the operational level developed within the German General Staff and the means by which this was passed on to each new generation. Central to this philosophy was the concept of the Schwerpunkt.

Initiative Within the Philosophy of Auftragstaktik, Determining Factors of the Understanding of Initiative in the German Army, 1806

Frank Cass & Co, 1995

This is a comparative study of the fighting systems of the British and German armies in The Great War. Taking issue with revisionist historians, Samuels argues that German success in battle can be explained by their superior tactical philosophy. The book provides a fascinating insight into the development of infantry tactics at a seminal point in the history of warfare.

1990

This study recommends changes to the U.S. Army's tactical orders process in order to increase the Army's ability to execute AirLand Battle at the tactical level of war. The thesis exarines the tactical orders process of the Wehrmacht. the Soviet Army and the U.S. Army. The tactical orders process is defined as the process by which a tactical level commander receives or deduces the mission, analyzes the tactical situation, prepares courses of action, makes a decision, issues an order, executes the plan, and adjusts to new situations in order to accomplish the mission. The methodology compared the current U.S. procedures with those of the Wehrmacht and the Soviet Army. The Wehrmacht employed a very decentralized, predominantly verbal, tactical orders process. The Soviet Army employs a very centralized, predominantly graphic, tactical orders process. Both aim at shortening tactical decision cycles and gaining a time advantage through a quick and effective orders process. Research revealed that many units in the U.S. Army do not conduct an effective tactical orders process. Current procedures are "orders intensive" and do not meet the requirements of agility and flexibility demanded by AirLand Battle doctrine. Changes to the orders process, the operations order format and a time linkpri rritpria fnr nrders are suggested , 14. SUBJECT TERMS Combat orders, operation orders, staff planning, 1s. NUMBER OF PAGES synchronization, commander's intent, co-mand and control, troop 227 leading procedures, warning orders, Auftragstaktik, maneuver war-16. PRICE CODE fare. attrition warfare. Soviet Troop Control , decision making.

War &# 38; Society, 2004

Making use of a wide range of previously unknown archival material from Germany and the United States, this article explores the ideas and means by which Alfred von Schlieffen and Helmuth von Moltke the Younger inculcated the generation of General Staff officers who guided the German army on the First World War.

2024

Medievalista, 2021

The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, 1999

Joint Publication 3-56, Command and Control for Joint Operations, seeks to provide a fresh vision of command and control in operations involving more than one branch of the armed services. At the same time, several of the principles articulated in this keystone doctrinal publication are timeless. Instrumental to command and control for modern joint operations is the concept of Auftragstaktik, which is expressed in English by two closely related terms, "directive control" and "mission-type orders," with both suggesting general guidance as opposed to prescriptive oversight. In an analysis appearing more than a decade ago in Parameters, John Nelsen identified significant problems with usual interpretations of the concept.[1] Above all, he suggested, Auftragstaktik means more than the terms usually employed in English, "mission orders" or "mission-oriented tactics." Assuredly, it does. Auftragstaktik subsumes all the following concepts: individual initiative, independent decisionmaking, and thinking leaders reaching tactical decisions on their own accord. In short, a commander would specify to subordinates what to do, not how to do it. The result of an evolutionary process in German doctrine, Auftragstaktik-for our purposes here used interchangeably with "directive control"-can be characterized more fully as follows: Command is based on task (Auftrag) and situation. The task lays down the aims to be achieved, which the commander charged with achieving it must keep in the forefront of his mind. Task and situation give rise to the mission. .. . The mission must be a clearly-defined aim to be pursued with all one's powers. .. . The commander must leave his subordinates freedom of action, to the extent that doing so does not imperil his intention.[2] Past as Prologue Why Auftragstaktik? Useful insights about current operations can be gleaned through inquiry into the employment of directive control of forces in conflicts past. Auftragstaktik represents a capstone command and control doctrine in the German armed forces dating back to the early 19th century. Its origins can be found in the Prussian military reforms beginning in 1808, following Prussia's disastrous defeats by Napoleon.[3] Doctrinal evidence of acknowledgment in Prussia of the need for fresh thinking about the nature of war can be found as far back as 1806: Long-winded orders on dispositions must not be given before a battle. [The commander] looks at as much of the ground as he can,. .. gives his divisional commanders the general idea in a few words, and shows them the general layout of the ground on which the army is to form up. The manner of deployment is left to them; fastest is best. The commander cannot be everywhere. He must always keep the picture as a whole in his mind's eye and shape it, mainly by sound handling of the reserves.[4] Eventually, it would become a key feature in the warfighting philosophy of several nations.[5] Auftragstaktik incorporated facets of leadership, battle tactics, command and control, senior-subordinate relationships, and even war conceptualization. The approach was comprehensive, and it presupposed intuition, initiative, flexibility, and decisive action. Notably, a similar development took place in the early 19th-century British navy. There it would become widely know as the "Nelson touch," serving the British well at sea. In the present century, Auftragstaktik was crucial in many German land campaigns, particularly on the Western Front and in North Africa during the Second World War, often allowing German units to fight outnumbered and win. British and German experiences with directive control bear out Carl von Clausewitz's observation that no hard and fast rules governing the conduct of war ever present themselves; rather, the actions of the commander, for better or worse, decisively influence the course of events in the battlespace.[6] This notion was articulated in Germany's 1933 Field Service Regulations: "Leadership in war is an art, a free creative activity based on a foundation of knowledge. The greatest demands are made on the personality."[7] Directive control became a leading catchword in the US military in the 1980s. This is not to suggest that the adoption of the concept was trendy or faddish. On the contrary, since adoption, the concept has shown considerable staying power. In preparation for 21st-century operations, what is now needed is more extensive doctrinal anchoring and attendant discussion of directive control in the secondary doctrinal literature. These steps will, in turn, foster more instruction of this command and control philosophy at various levels of command. Skillful commanders, guided by doctrine, should be able to develop and exercise suitable tactical moves in an operation on their own initiative, achieving mission objectives in accordance with theater operational and strategic goals.[8] Directive control allows commanders to adapt to changing circumstances, exercise flexibility, demonstrate initiative, anticipate events, and thereby gain tactical and operational advantage. More than a decade ago, the US Army wrestled with the question of whether or not to formally adopt the concept of Auftragstaktik. Field Manual 100-5, Operations (1986), alluded to directive control as a warfighting philosophy without actually according it doctrinal sanction. With the end of the Cold War there has been a transformation of the threat, and with it questions about the utility of power itself in dealing with regional powers, rogue states, and ethnic or extremist forces opposed to US interests. The new contours of 21st-century warfare will effect yet more, presumably profound, changes. Politically delicate situations complicate the fundamentally complex nature of conflict. Uncertain environments pose challenges to all forces, especially to those that are joint or operating in coalition. The United States must be adequately prepared for developing circumstances, for new missions, for evolving threats.

Belvedere meridionale, 2022

The AirLand Battle doctrine is often seen as an epoch-making new concept that changed how the United States approached war and warfare. The doctrine is also referred to as the adaptation of the principles of Auftragstaktik into the American military theory. The Auftragstaktik is the product of the great military theorists of the German school of military science in the 19 th Century-Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, and Moltke. This idea created the highest level of decentralized mission command. But the Auftragstaktik is more than a tactical theory, it is an institutional culture. In contrast, the AirLand Battle doctrine uses a more conservative concept of command and control. Although it gives officers more freedom than before, it seeks to standardize the execution of missions and tasks.