New Rationalism - Spiritual Rationalism .pdf

New rationalism -spiritual rationalism. 2-nd half Here are presented 4 last chapters of the book. First Russian edition of the book was in 1992 in Kiev ( "Неорционализм"). 2-nd Russian edition was in 2012 in Moscow ("Неорционализм - духовный рационализм"). English edition of first half of the book was in 2019 (New Rationalism - Spiritual Rationalism. Bulletin de l'Académie Internationale CONCORDE). Classical rationalism, which lies at the basis of the unusually rapid progress of Western society in the recent past, both in the field of science and technology and in the social sphere, faced with difficulties in explaining certain paradoxes in modern physics, entered a phase of crisis. This led to today's global crisis of the most Western society and humanity as a whole. Attempts to correct classical rationalism so far have been unsuccessful. In this book, the author proposes his own concept of revised classical rationalism, which he calls “New rationalism” or “Spiritual rationalism”. The book contains new theories of knowledge, determinism, freedom, ethics and rational theory of the spirit. In the last part of the book, there is an analysis of the causes of the crisis of classical rationalism, the reasons for the failure of previous attempts to correct it and an analysis of the position of philosophers who accepted the impossibility of correcting it

Cet article, comme son titre l'indique, essaie de préciser les similitudes et les différences spécifiques des modes de rationalité des sciences, de la philosophie et de la théologie

Philosophical Papers, 2005

The paper is a critical study of Christopher Peacocke's book _The Realm of Reason_. The content of the paper is both exegetical and critical. In its latter capacity the paper is centrally concerned to correct Peacocke's understanding of Tyler Burge's version of rationalism; and to criticize Peacocke's position from this competing perspective.

2010

This volume draws a balanced picture of the Rationalists by bringing their intellectual contexts, sources and full range of interests into sharper focus, without neglecting their core commitment to the epistemological doctrine that earned them their traditional label. The collection of original essays addresses topics ranging from theodicy and early modern music theory to Spinoza’s anti-humanism, often critically revising important aspects of the received picture of the Rationalists. Another important contribution of the volume is that it brings out aspects of Rationalist philosophers and their legacies that are not ordinarily associated with them, such as the project of a Cartesian ethics. Finally, a strong emphasis is placed on the connection of the Rationalists’ philosophy to their interests in empirical science, to their engagement in the political life of their era, and to the religious background of many of their philosophical commitments.

2020

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the volume “Beyond Faith and Rationality: Essays on Logic, Religion and Philosophy”. We briefly sketch, in a first step, what analytic and logical philosophy are all about, and, in a second step, clarify the particular features of analytic philosophy of religion and logical philosophy of religion. In the last section we then survey the contributions of the volume.

Philosophical Books, 1980

sense perception. Both were informed about science; neither wanted to discourage scientific activity. Where they turn their attention to some account of scientific knowledge, their metaphysics of knowledge does not play much of a role. The subtitle to Professor Radner's book reminds us of Malebranche's Cartesian heritage. She gives a succinct account of "The Cartesian Framework" in her first chapter. Following chapters give us a clear, judicious account of the main features of Malebranche's philosophy : causality, vision in God, ways of knowledge, intelligible extension, ideas, and the will. Professor Radner does not go out of her way to discuss the many commentators on Malebranche, but she does from time to time point out and decide between competing interpretations of a doctrine. One recent study missing from her select bibliography, and from any mention, is the important work by Ferdinand AlquiC, Le CartAsianisme de Malebranche (1974). The contrast between these two works is striking. While AlquiC ranges deeply in doctrine and tradition, Professor Radner stays glued to Malebranche's text. One might have hoped for a bit more of Alquie's approach in Professor Radner's study. Nevertheless, in her compact study we have an accurate, useful gloss on Malebranche. I t is a study meticulous in its references and comprehensive in its coverage of the texts. Perhaps her study will arouse more serious interest in Malebranche among English readers. RUTGERS COLLEGE, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY JOHN W. YOLTON Pre-established Harmony versus Constant Conjunction. O.U.P., for the British Academy, I 978. 25 pp. & I paper.

Some reflections about theology, science and philosophy as modes of rationality I. MULTIPLE RATIONALITIES AND METHODS One thing is as sure as death and taxes: theology, philosophy and sciences are all rational disciplines. They all ask questions and try to answer them; they look for explanations; they forge and use concepts, reasonings and specific languages; they use methods. But each of them is rational in its own way. I would like here to distinguish between two kinds of discourse: first, the discourse of sciences and technology, which is usually formal or can be formalized, and aims at an operation oriented description of the world, i.e. a description which can give rise to acting on it. The second kind deals with art, religions, myths, and so on: it was present at the dawn of humanity and is still there in our technological age. Let's call this kind of discourse " meaningful discourse " because it conveys questions and reflections on the meaning of life, on man's place in the cosmos, and the reasons why things are as they are. Scientific and technological discourse implements its own method, usually called " scientific method " ; it implies scientific objectivity (the individual subject with his emotions and peculiarities is set aside for the sake of universality and axiological neutrality), and the studied object's determinate limits; each science investigates a field of its own and loses its relevance within other fields of reality. Science is also critical in the sense that it uses arguments to sustain its theses, and those arguments may always be contested by others; objections have to be taken into account and answered. Finally, as already mentioned, a science's discourse aims at some kind of action on reality. Contrastingly, meaningful discourse is open to reality as a whole: asking for the meaning of things is to consider reality as a whole and, by the way, include oneself in the issue; scientific objectivity is definitely irrelevant here. There is no need here for critical arguments either: meaningful discourses usually proceed from simple assertions which are alleged to stand on their own and by the light they shed on certain complicated or difficult questions. Their aims are various: creation of art works, justification of rites and ethical habits, elucidation of enigmatic situations, arousing the emotions, and so on. II. ARTICULATION OF BOTH KINDS OF DISCOURSE. THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY Now the question, especially today, is: how to hold together and articulate these two kinds of discourse, because, as we can see, they don't share many properties save the fact of being rational? Since the 18th century, scientific and technological discourse has gone from strength to strength and even now, in one sense, has the upper hand, but 'meaningful discourse' remains very important for man is always seeking answers to urgent existential issues.

These are brief jottings inspired by two interesting philosophical works from the 1990s.

Synthese, 2011

A well known skeptical paradox rests on the claim that we lack warrant to believe that we are not brains in a vat (BIVs). The argument for that claim is the apparent impossibility of any evidence or argument that we are not BIVs. Many contemporary philosophers resist this argument by insisting that we have a sort of warrant for believing that we are not BIVs that does not require having any evidence or argument. I call this view 'New Rationalism'. I argue that New Rationalists are committed to there being some evidence or argument for believing that we are not BIVs anyway. Therefore, New Rationalism, since its appeal is that it purportedly avoids the problematic commitment to such evidence or argument, undermines its own appeal. We cannot avoid the difficult work of coming up with evidence or argument by positing some permissive sort of warrant.