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2018, Computer Law & Security Review
The right to be forgotten and erase, originally introduced in the well-known case of Google Spain, has caused considerable legal debates on both theoretical and procedural issues. The Israeli Supreme Court has also just recently considered the issue when it was asked to enforce the right to be forgotten of an Israeli advocate, Jonathan Miller, and delist harmful information which appeared in a Google search, and was in truth related to a different adv. Jonathan Miller. The plaintiff relied on the Prohibition of Defamation Act. Liability was denied on the basis that the information was indeed true, and thus- justified. We suggest in this article that the court should have imposed liability in negligence, an open ended general tort that mainly applies when particular torts fail to supply a reasonable and just solution in new factual situations due to change in social, economic and technological circumstances.
In: Communication Today, 2015
THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN IN EUROPEAN UNION AND THE US, 2022
In digital era, access to information is very high and easy. Especially, the internet is the unique information pool and search engine operators have offers high opportunity to reach information. Although the access to information sounds good at first glance, some information is bad memory of individuals in theirs past. Especially, search engine operators make easier to access such information from news websites. As a result of this situation, individuals may would like to remove the content of these information from the websites based on the right to be forgotten. However, it is not still recognized universal human rights. The EU law and the US law have opposite approaches related to removal the content and the right to be forgotten. The GDPR(General Data Protection Regulation) recognizes the right to be forgotten in Europe but there is no relevant legislation which recognizes the Right to be Forgotten in the US. While it is possible to remove bad memories from the websites under European Union law as a rule, the US law rejects the right to be forgotten in favour of the freedom of expression. This situation is related to the liability of the websites and search engine operators. The purpose of this paper addresses the comparison of two opposite approaches on the right to be forgotten.
European privacy law currently implements the ‘right to be forgotten’ by positioning commercial search engine operators as the initial site of decision-making regarding its exercise. This is problematic for a number of reasons. First, there are a number of structural flaws in the mode of this decision-making that make it unclear that search engines are capable of (or interested in) incorporating a robust account of competing interests. Second, right to be forgotten requests are not susceptible to the same kind of algorithmic techniques search engines use to deal with other kinds of removal requests, meaning large numbers of decisions must be made rapidly and primarily by staff lacking formal legal qualifications. When compounded with the possibility of heavy penalties for failure to comply with the right under European law, these two issues suggest there is a significant potential for bias toward deletion rather than preservation of borderline links. A third problem is that the simple online forms provided by search engines for European data users making a deletion request mask a complicated legal analysis, meaning those who properly structure their requests in an appropriately technical and legal manner may have a higher chance of success in their claims. This threatens to open up a new digital divide along the axis of reputation. Finally, the massive compliance costs associated with this new right may serve as a form of anti-competitive lock-in, preventing the emergence of innovative new companies in ‘search’. In sum, if the right to be forgotten is to have real meaning in European law, search engines are not the correct vector for its implementation.
Few would argue against a reform on the current European data protection regime as much has changed in the digital world since the implementation of the Directive 95/46/EC (the Directive), in 1995. One of the most contentious issues is the so-called “right to be forgotten” (RTBF) which re-emerged after the delivery of the judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the matter of, the colloquially known as, the Google case in mid 2014. Much of the controversy surrounding this case has focused on the impact of the ruling on freedom of expression and the right of access to information. The essay will attempt in Part I to define and sketch the theoretical scope of the RTBF. Part II will refer to the Google case in order to put some content on the right and describe its repercussions. Part III will examine whether the newly created right substantially interferes with the right to freedom of expression from a more general perspective. Part IV will give a prediction on the applicability of the right in the near future, regionally and globally. Lastly, an answer in the main question will be attempted from a personal perspective.
Conhecimento & Diversidade, 2016
The article discusses the legal basis for establishing the right to be forgotten in Europe: Data Protection Directive, Proposal for General Data Protection Regulation and, Especially, the European case Google v. González, where search results by an individual's name were recognised as personal data, and search engine operators as data controllers, so the right to block such search results were established. The article also compares newly enacted Russian law with the European approach.
SSRN Electronic Journal
In its famous "right to be forgotten" decision, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled in 2014 that search engine operators must, upon request from a data subject, remove links that result from searches for an individual's name when those results are "inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes… carried out by the operator of the search engine." The initial implementation of the right to be forgotten was limited in several ways. First, it was limited in geographical scope to European domains of search engines. Google-the primary search engine affected by the decision-limited delisting to its European domains (such as Google.es and Google.de) and refrained from implementing such delisting within its global Google.com search engine. While Google has consistently sought to limit the geographical reach of the right to be forgotten decision, European data regulators have insisted upon its global implementation. Second, the implementation of the right to be forgotten was limited to search engines and only imposed delisting requirements on the search engines; it did not extend to the underlying content at issue,
Journal of Global Faultlines
The decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Google Spain v AEPD and Mario Costeja González enshrined the “right to forget” in the jurisprudence of the European Union. The judgment caused concern to transparency and open information advocates in terms of pitting a right to forget against the general right of the public to know. This, as this paper will argue, is a false distinction. The Internet is, and has always been, a regulated space. Nor is the right to free expression, even in its American form, absolute. While there are genuine concerns about how the balance is struck, evolving practice is likely to identify what cases deserve deletion, to those that do not. The biggest challenge lies in how, and who, tests that balance as to what is removed from the search engines of the Internet. Finding material is important but forgetting may be just as vital to liberties as well.
Legal Science: Functions, Significance and Future in Legal Systems I, 2019
kopsavilkums Jaunais datu aizsardzības regulējums attiecībā uz tiesībām tikt aizmirstam piedāvā indi vīdiem iespēju bez liekas kavēšanās no datu pārziņa panākt no šiem indivīdiem iegūto personas datu dzēšanu. Šīs tiesības izraisījušas debates, kas saistītas ar datu pārziņa veiktas datu apstrādes pārliecinošiem likumīgiem pamatiem, kas būtu primāri pār datu subjekta interesēm, tiesībām un brīvībām, vai pār tiesisku prasījumu pamatošanu, īstenošanu vai aizstāvēšanu. Tātad tiesības tikt aizmirstam tiek piemērotas ar īpašiem izņēmumiem, jo sevišķi gadījumos, kad personas dati saskaņā ar VDAR tiek apstrādāti nelikumīgi. Šī darba mērķis ir analizēt iemeslus, kuru dēļ datu dzēšanas tiesības var tikt atsauktas atbilstoši VDAR 17. panta 3. punktā noteiktajiem ierobežojumiem-priekšnosacījumu kopumam, kas jāizpilda, lai panāktu pagātnē iegūtās informācijas dzēšanu. Tiks analizēta arī Eiropas Kopienu Tiesas (EKT) un Eiropas Cilvēktiesību tiesas (ECT) lēmumu būtī ba, kuru rezultātā izstrādāts kritēriju kopums, lai atrastu saprātīgus risinājumus, panākot līdzsvaru starp šīm tiesībām un vārda un informācijas brīvību, mūsu tiesībām atcerēties un tiesiskās paļāvības nodrošināšanu. Pētījums apliecina nepieciešamību līdzsvarot paaugstinātu kontroli pār indivīdiem un citas pamattiesības saskaņā ar proporcionalitātes principu. atslēgvārdi: VDAR, tiesības tikt aizmirstam, pārbaude, ierobežojumi, ECT, EKT summary The new regulation of data privacy on the right to be forgotten offers the possibility of the individuals to obtain from the data controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay. This right has conceived a debate related to compelling legitimate grounds, of the controller, for the processing which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject or for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims. Consequently, the exercise of the right to be forgotten is applied under specific exemptions and especially when personal data is processed unlawfully under the GDPR. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the grounds whereby the right of erasure can be invoked from the perspective of restrictions, established by applying paragraph 3 of Article 17 of the GDPR, as a set of conditions, which has to be fulfilled commutatively, to gain the erasure of past information. The article will also provide the analysis of the essence of the decisions of European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which has developed a set of criteria to find the reasonable solutions in
https://content.sciendo.com/view/journals/bjes/10/1/article-p58.xml, 2020
The article focuses on the right to be forgotten, which is at the center of changes in the concept of human rights in the digital age. The origins of the right to be forgotten in European legal doctrine and judicial practice, as well as its relationship with autonomy and identity, are analyzed. The article also examines the signifi cance of the new understanding of "time" and "data" for the adoption of this right, considering the infl uence of two key cases of the Court of Justice of the European union, such as Google v. Spain [2014] and Google v. CNIL [2019] on the concept of the right to be forgotten. The place of this right, its connection with privacy and European data protection law is debated. The article focuses on jurisdictional issues, paying particular attention to both the right to be forgotten and the understanding of the relationship between privacy a nd freedom of expression in the European union and the united States, and possible jurisdictional disputes around the world. The article also addresses the issue of balancing rights and legitimate interests, as well as the proportionality for applying the right to be forgotten, both in the European and global contexts.
The decision of the European Court of Justice on the Google case has re-opened the debate on the importance of remembering and forgetting in the digital age. For this reason, the decision induces to reconsider the provisions of the Article 17 of the EU Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation. The future EU regulation should consider the peculiar nature of search engines and introduce an "ad hoc" legal provision, which excludes the direct enforcement of the right to erasure carried out by data controllers and requires a complaint direct to a court or data protection authority (DPA). At the same time, this provision should also impose to data controllers the temporary removal (e.g. 20-30 days) of the links in dispute, which will be reactivated if the data subject does not take legal action within this time.
The research as described in this document, was done by the first author as noted below. He/she was a student at the Munich University of Applied Sciences (MUAS) in 2014-the topic was given as a student project. It has not been peer reviewed, but has been edited for basic grammar and accuracy. References have been standardized as far as possible according to the Harvard system. Consider this document as a working paper, to be used for basic referencing but not as seminal source for research work. It could be useful for research in the fields of Website Visibility, Information Retrieval and Search Engines. ABSTRACT In the last couple of years the Internet became very popular. With its popularity people began to spread information all over the World Wide Web, even personal Information. After realizing that information cannot be deleted from the Internet easily, people started to sue search engines operators to not show the links to their information. The European Court of Justice came up with the " right to be forgotten " which allows people to request deletion of their information from search engines. However, the right has the potential of censoring the Internet and is still subject to interpretation in many points. For search engine operators an era of resource consuming deletion requests and lawsuits began. This paper provides detail on the origin of the " right to be forgotten " , its controversial content and what the future of search engines could be. In a pilot study the author wants to figure out how Google applies the rule in practice.
The right to be forgotten is a new right that is introduced
Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology
The dynamic development of digital and informational technologies raises the issue of proper and effective protection of human privacy, which, in turn, is gradually turning from a real fundamental right into a kind of illusion. Just a piece of information about an individual distributed on the Internet may leave its negative and often indelible mark on the life and reputation of the addressee of such information, regardless of the legality and reliability of such information. And even if such information is subsequently recognized as false and/or vicious and even removed from public access, the addressee of the information will still be associated with such information in the social consciousness. In this regard, each person is at risk on the Internet, where anyone can potentially become the victim of a single publication or a post of an Internet user. In this context the emergence of the phenomenon of the right to be forgotten in European legal reality may be considered as a step f...
This article, written from the perspective of one of the members of Google Advisory Council, analyses some of the most pressing problems raised by the debate on the so-called “right to be forgotten”. Its main theses are that: (i) the debate about the so-called “right to be forgotten” (delinking) concerns cases in which it is no longer appropriate for a non-local search engine to provide a link to truthful information about a person that a third-party has legally published online; (ii) neither the right to be forgotten nor the right to information are real right, they are proxies for the right to privacy and the right to freedom of speech; (iii) it is privacy and freedom of speech that collide in the debate on the right to be forgotten, and it is a mistake to argue that they cannot be in a genuine and substantial contrast; (iv) the debate should acknowledge that there is a new distinction between available and accessible information online, and that today those who control the map (links) control the territory (contents); (v) publishers should be involved as early and as much as possible in any decision about delinking their contents; (vi) the territoriality issue is due to a misalignment of two different spaces, one physical and the other logical, and a solution should be found by working on the logical space of information, until such a solution is found, an effective compromise is to delink content at a national level only, although doing so a the European level if fine because it makes no significant difference, whereas any global delinking should be resisted until an international agreement is reached; and finally (vii) the definition of “data controller” and “data processor” should be significantly improved.
The term “right to be forgotten” is used today to represent a multitude of rights, and this fact causes difficulties in interpretation, analysis, and comprehension of such rights. These rights have become of utmost importance due to the increased risks to the privacy of individuals on the Internet, where social media, blogs, fora, and other outlets have entered into common use as part of human expression. Search engines, as Internet intermediaries, have been enrolled to assist in the attempt to regulate the Internet, and the rights falling under the moniker of the “right to be forgotten,” without truly knowing the extent of the related rights. In part to alleviate such problems, and focusing on digital technology and media, this paper proposes a taxonomy to identify various rights from different countries, which today are often regrouped under the banner “right to be forgotten,” and to do so in an understandable and coherent way. As an integral part of this exercise, this study aims to measure the extent to which there is a convergence of legal rules internationally in order to regulate private life on the Internet and to elucidate the impact that the important Google Spain “right to be forgotten” ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union has had on law in other jurisdictions on this matter. This paper will first introduce the definition and context of the “right to be forgotten.” Second, it will trace some of the sources of the rights discussed around the world to survey various forms of the “right to be forgotten” internationally and propose a taxonomy. This work will allow for a determination on whether there is a convergence of norms egarding the “right to be forgotten” and, more generally, with respect to privacy and personal data protection laws. Finally, this paper will provide certain criteria for the relevant rights and organize them into a proposed analytical grid to establish more precisely the proposed taxonomy of the “right to be forgotten” for the use of scholars, practitioners, policymakers, and students alike.
2015
Since the beginning of the digital age, the balance between forgetting and remembering changed as Viktor Mayer-Schonberger mentioned. Before the penetration of digital media into the everyday life forgetting was the norm and remembering the exception. Thus, the power of the society belonged to the interest not to be forgotten. Today in the digital age with all the search engines like google and bing there is a shift in the balance between remembering and forgetting. This article reveals the importance of the right to be forgotten and the diffi culties of the legal implementation which is discussed nowadays. In this article, fi rst of all the different kind of privacy should be described in the change of it in the digital age. Afterwards the effect of the change of whoness into a digital whoness and its consequences will be shown.
The article analyses the main findings of the landmark Case Google Spain and Google Inc v Mario Costeja and the Spanish Agency on Data Protection decided in the EJC Judgement of 13 May 2014. The article also explores the different legal cultural approaches in matters of privacy in the US and Europe.
In this article we argue that the European Union directive on "the right to be forgotten" is unrealistic and suggest instead a series of principles that can protect us from the potentially harmful publication of private information. The dissemination of personal information through public and private databases as well as social media is gradually educating humanity about reality: humans are weak; everyone misbehaves; and we need to learn to accept public knowledge of the imperfections of ourselves and others.
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