American Century of Foreign Policy

Countries within the international political arena are more often than not likely to endure different instances of conflicts among them emanating from their foreign policy practices. Conflict situations were even more likely to happen during the period coming after the end of the Second World War and most importantly during the Cold War period. This is because the international political scene was more polarized during that time with states aligning themselves with either the US or the Soviet Union.

Diplomatic History, 1990

For more than a quarter of a century, there have been two diametrically opposed points of view about why Cuba was a crisis and why it was resolved. The traditional interpretation, enshrined in the writings of Theodore C. Sorensen, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Elie Abel, describes the Cuban missiles as an intolerable pr0vocation.I President John F. Kennedy had to compel the Soviet Union to withdraw the missiles to defend the balance of power, preserve NATO, and convince Nikita S. Khrushchev and the world of American resolve. Sorensen, Schlesinger, and Abel laud the "quarantine" as the optimal strategy, depict the outcome of the crisis as an unqualified American triumph, and attribute it to Kennedy's skill and tenacity. The revisionist interpretation, primarily associated with the writings of I. , contends that Kennedy needlessly risked war for domestic political gain. Revisionists condemn the blockade as irresponsible and explain the resolution of the crisis as the result of Soviet moderation and American good luck?

Journal of History Culture and Art Research, 2018

The Washington and Moscow relations deteriorated culminated to the worst during 1962, on the issue of missiles which is commonly known as the Cuban Missile Crisis (CMC) in history. The crisis culminated to the brink of nuclear war between both superpowers. It can be said that it was the part of the Cold War Doctrine in which Cuba played a vital role. It was the head of the Cuba, Mr Fidel Castro who instigated this event which culminated to the brink of the war (nuclear) between the USA and the United Soviets Socialist Republic (USSR). The USSR aim in engaging in the CMC had multi-purposes. The US believed that it would be simple to remove Mr Castro from the political power through various means. However, all the US efforts to remove Castro from the Cuban government failed utterly. Fidel Castro's popularity became more apparent when he sided with the Soviets Union. His government challenged the US and brought the Soviet Union close to pressurise Washington to get a good political deal. This paper, therefore, is designed to understand the political situation of the three countries and their political leadership role in averting the nuclear disaster in the region. Further, it is investigated that to what extent the installation of the Nuclear Missiles in Cuba succumbed to the political disturbance in Washington.

Cuban Missile Crisis: The Essential Reference Guide

Drawing on revealing new research, this richly informative volume is the definitive concise introduction to the crisis that took the world to the brink of nuclear war. • 73 alphabetically organized entries that offer valuable insights into the leaders, events, and ideas that shaped the Cuban Missile Crisis • More than a dozen expert contributors representing all countries involved in the crisis • Seven primary source documents, including President Kennedy's speech to the American public and letters exchanged between Premier Kruschev and Fidel Castro • Biographies of major figures, including the Kennedys, Nikita Khrushchev, Fidel Castro, Adlai Stevenson, and Valerian Zorin • A thorough chronology outlining all key events before, during, and after the crisis • A comprehensive bibliography on the crisis, including a significant number of recent publications that have brought new understanding of the conflict to light

Latin America and the Global Cold War, eds. Thomas C. Field, Jr., Stella Krepp, and Vanni Pettina, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2020

Journal of Leadership Studies, 2015

International Security, 1985

The Cambridge History of the Cold War, 2010

was undertaken by a monopoly trading ministry, so sales were subject to government-to-government negotiation and had to fit into the requirements of the five-year economic plan or else was regarded as outright aid. The real 'battleground" of the Cold War after the early I960s was thus competition for influence in developing countries through trade, financial and technical aid, and military assistance in the form of equipment and training. Both the USSR and the United States also had programs for bring ing students to their respective universities. The Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatolii Dobrynin, lamented, in his memoirs, published many years later, that "detente was to a certain extent buried in the fields of Soviet-American rivalry in the Third World."'4 Recession and recovery From the perspective of Soviet leaders, the Soviet Union in the mid-1970S was doing very well in its economic competition with the United States. Its aggregate production had risen slowly but steadily relative to US production, and output of products of special interest, such as steel, had come to exceed US production. The major hard-currency exports of the Soviet Union, crude oil and gold, had enjoyed substantial increases in price on the world market. At the same the "capitalist" world economy was in ronnoil, experiencing in 1975 its worst recession since the 1930S. The Bretton Woods system of financial cooperation was in disarray, and the onset of "stagflation" created serious dilemmas of policy in most market-oriented economies. In short, Communists still confidendy expected the ultimate victory of Communism against the ailing capitalist system. This self-satisfaction neglected the fundamental recuperative capacities of market capitalism. Incentives for adaptation, innovation, and private initiative remained strong. To take only one example, the integrated circuit, introduced in the early 1970s, was to revolutionize computation, communication, and much else, including military applications." 5 While the Communist system could dictate heavy investment in traditional products, it did so inefficiently and inflexibly, without extensive innovation. It could not adapt well to changes in technology and to changes in the composition of demand. By the mid-1 980s, Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev would declare, "We cannot go on like this," and inaugurated his ultimately unsuccessful economic reform of the Soviet system of Communism.

National Technical University of Ukraine Journal. Political science. Sociology. Law

The Cuban Missile Crisis, referred to as the Caribbean Crisis in the Soviet Union (Карибский Кризис) and the October Crisis in Cuba, is one of the most famous events of the Cold War. A large number of primary source documents are available for study. The U.S. government has released internal material and much of the official communications between the parties, and the Soviet Union has also released a significant number of documents (mostly during Gorbachev's "Glasnost" ("гласность") program in the 1980's). However, much of the historical analysis that has emerged from this material focuses on: the amount of "blame" that should be assigned to each side, technical discussions regarding the level of risk that there could have been a nuclear war, who "won" and who "lost," and the extent to which President Kennedy's actions may have been mythologized after his assassination. While these themes are important, the event also represents a clear example of the major powers in the Cold War using smaller countries to bear the biggest risks of their global strategies. This paper argues that messages that were sent between the Soviet and Cuban governments at the time show that the Soviets engaged with the Cuban leaders only to the extent that they could control their actions, and that they excluded them from critical decisions. The paper also demonstrates that messages sent between the key Soviet figures in the crisis, later interviews, memoirs and biographies provide insight into the Soviet leadership's justifications for their colonial practices. The United States and the Soviet Union had come to a situation where one believed the other might actually launch a pre-emptive strike if it could gain an advantage. The U.S. and Soviet Union were engaged in constant conflicts throughout the 1940's and 1950's. 1960 was an election year in the United States, so its hostile actions against Cuba escalated throughout the year, with plots to assassinate Fidel Castro and a trade embargo. Late in the year, Cuba and the Soviet Union issued a statement of solidarity and the Soviets began to supply conventional weapons to Cuba. However, there was no move to put Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1961. Khrushchev's reason for this was a belief that the U.S. would invade Cuba immediately if he took such an action. The plan to deploy the missiles could have been publicly announced, as it was legal under international law. The decision to deploy the weapons secretly is more evidence that the Soviets thought it was likely that news of such a plan would trigger an invasion. Castro and his inner circle were agreeable. In an interview he gave to PBS in 1985, Fidel Castro claimed that the Cubans' acceptance of the Soviets' missile plan was based on their belief that American invasion was likely unavoidable. However, he also claimed that he was motivated by a desire to help the Soviet Union achieve balance with the U.S. in the global nuclear competition. This agreement did not guarantee Castro equal partnership with the Soviets. The final deal involved stationing the missiles in Cuba, under full Soviet control. The mistrust between the allies began at this early stage. During a meeting to finalize their agreement, Che Guevara had suggested that the plan be made public and Khrushchev had refused. He even refused to sign his name to the treaty, to preserve the option to deny everything if the Cubans proceeded with a unilateral announcement. Soviet ships with nuclear missiles began to arrive in Cuba. A U.S. plane captured proof of the nuclear missiles in Cuba on October 14 th , and Kennedy announced the crisis to the public on October 22 nd. Tensions rose rapidly, so that four days later Castro wrote a letter to Khrushchev, assuring him that Cuban people will confront the aggressor "heroically". On the same day, Khrushchev sent a secret message to Kennedy offering a resolution to the crisis. By October 27 th the Soviet Union had finalized an agreement with the U.S. for the withdrawal of its missiles from Cuba, including an agreement to allow on-site inspections in Cuba. Most importantly, Castro first became aware of this agreement from the public announcements that were made by Khrushchev and Kennedy on October 28 th. Khrushchev also sent a letter to Castro on the 28 th , and its tone makes it clear that he considered Castro's position to be that of a "little brother" whose emotions and feelings should be soothed, but one who should not expect a decision-making role. Khrushchev's letter goes on to warn Castro against any action that might lead to a reanimation of the crisis. Referring to the shooting down of a U.S. U2 spy plane on the 27 th , Khrushchev states that this episode was the result of "senseless" provocation by militarists in the Pentagon who still hoped for an excuse to invade. In addition to the firm "advice" that Castro should allow U.S. military planes to violate his airspace, it is possible to infer a threat in the letter's subtext. Khrushchev implied that the Soviet Union would not risk a global nuclear war to defend Cuba from invasion if it had the excuse that the invasion had been sparked by unstable elements in the U.S. or in Cuba. The warning in Khrushchev's letter concerning shooting down the U.S. spy plane may have been particularly offensive to Castro. Although, Cuban anti-aircraft personnel had been instructed to fire on American planes to protect the Soviet missile sites, the weapon that had hit the U2 plane was a Soviet-controlled surface-to-air missile. In Castro's response letter to Khrushchev he expresses his rationale. He also refers to the public statement he had issued earlier in that day, in which he had criticized the U.S. promise not to invade Cuba as inadequate. Castro signs off with a notice that he is opposed to inspections. Further messages from October 30 th and 31 st are remarkable because the first captures Khrushchev's early attempts to frame the entire crisis for history and for his communist audiences, and the second presents Castro's view that the entire enterprise had been futile if the Soviet Union was unwilling to stand its ground. Khrushchev's letter is full of paternalism, he writes that he understands the bitterness that "some" Cubans might feel. Khrushchev refers to a conflict between superpowers in "the Caribbean zone," this emphasizes that Cuba's interests were subordinate to the Soviet Union's regional strategy. Castro rebuts several of Khrushchev's excuses by arguing that backing down was not the appropriate reaction to the possibility of an imminent U.S. attack, by clarifying that he was not consulted at all about the decision to withdraw the missiles, and by stating that many (not "some") Cubans were feeling "unspeakable bitterness and sadness" about the sudden Soviet decision. Castro demonstrated that he understood that the only strategic value of putting missiles in Cuba was as a deterrent against a strike against the U.S.S.R. A message from the Soviet Foreign minister Gromyko to Mikoyan on November 1 st detailed how the Cubans should be pressured to soften their "no inspections" position despite the loss of face this would cause them. Even while the Soviet-Cuban negotiations on the inspections were proceeding, the Soviet leaders were keeping new secrets from their allies. Later decision to remove weapons were made before discussing the issue with the Cubans. The frustrations that this created were evident during Mikoyan's conversation with Castro and the rest of the Cuban leadership on November 22 nd. Castro repeated his argument that the Soviets should have kept the strategic missiles in Cuba. The Mikoyan-Castro dialogue serves as evidence of the highly skewed nature of Soviet-Cuban relations and the Soviets' sense that they did not need justification for their colonial practices. Castro had to listen to public statements by Kennedy to acquire up-to-date information about the weapons that remained in his country. After confirming that the tactical missiles were still in Cuba, that they were not technically part of the Soviet's agreement with the U.S. and that the U.S. was not aware of them Mikoyan delivered the news that the Soviets had decided to remove these as well. He explained that there was a law that prevented the transfer control of any nuclear weapons to another country (this was a lie), and that the Soviets intended to withdraw all of their troops from Cuba once the Cuban military had been trained to use the conventional weapons they were leaving behind. Returning to the question of Soviet justifications, the ambassador's interpretation of the situation gives insight into the Soviet colonial discourse. The Cubans were portrayed as wild children, but wellmeaning and smart, and the Soviets were portrayed as patient parents. Ambassador Beck reports that Mikoyan had characterized the Cuban leaders as young, honest people who were true to the revolution and who were deserving of respect, trust, and appreciation. However, a large part of the Ambassador's message is dedicated to a description of the Cubans' unorthodox path to Marxism, and criticism of the slow pace of development of the Cuban Communist party apparatus and the Cubans' belief that their revolution was one of "three great revolutions" (China's for Asia, the Soviets' for Europe, and Cuba for Latin America). In conclusion, for fifty-eight years since the Cuban missile crisis, the world did not experience nuclear wars. This outcome has allowed a self-congratulatory narrative to grow regarding the courageous and pragmatic actions of both the U.S. and Soviet leaders. The implication of this narrative is that only the highly tested, and "serious" leaders of superpowers, can be trusted to be stewards of nuclear weapons. In contrast, this way of thinking concludes that the leaders of smaller countries (who have less to lose-in total, but not in proportion) are more likely to choose "honorable destruction" as long as they...

Russia in Global Affairs

This article conceptualizes the current crises around Ukraine and Taiwan as "a reverse Cuban missile crisis." The Cuban missile crisis was a turning point in the history of the Cold War. The two superpowers found themselves at the brink of mutual annihilation and turned to negotiations to prevent it. Today the transformation of the world order and escalation of the great power competition can culminate in a new crisis like the Cuban one, and with a similar outcome. However, in contrast to the USSR which ultimately recognized the United States' red lines, today the U.S. does not recognize Russia's and China's red lines, denying the very legitimacy of red lines as such. The U.S. plans to retain its hegemony and seeks to achieve it with the help of its regional allies. This strategy of "offshore balancing" has proven to be quite useful for the U.S., which seems to ignore any discontent coming from Russia and China. It appears that the only viable option for the latter RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS 28 A Reverse Cuban Missile Crisis: Fading Red Lines two great powers is to maintain their interests without interacting with the U.S., which fiercely rejects any pleas for negotiations.