The 'Arab Spring': Implications for US –Israeli Relations

Master Thesis at the University of Vienna, Department for Political Science

The revolutions and upheavals, which lastingly changed the nations of the Middle East and North Africa in the wake of the Arab Spring, do have a huge impact on the security architecture of the region. This master thesis is concerned with the consequences of the Arab Spring on the security of Israel in the regional system. The Jewish State has a special status in this system, which makes it distinctively affected by these pervasive changes. Therefore, the system and parameters that are dominating in respect to Israel, get briefly analysed. The regional system ante Arab Spring was characterized by autocracies and a power constellation that meant stability for Israel, now all of this has changed dramatically. The thesis will use three countries as examples on how these changes happened and affected Israel and its national security and threat perception. The case of Egypt shows how one of the two nations, with which Israel had agreed on a peace treaty after decades of war, increasingly became a security risk for the Jewish nation after the toppling of the old autocrat in 2011. In Syria, one of Israel's enemy nations and closest ally of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the uprising has escalated into a civil war, and is on the brink of becoming a failed state. The once safest border Israel had is becoming an increasingly “hot” border. The Jihadists that turned the civil war into an sectarian battlefield between Sunna and Shia are a massive threat to Israel's security. Because all Jihadist movements share the ultimate goal of the “liberation of Jerusalem”. The third example, Lebanon, shows how national liberation movements can have a regional impact. The Shiite Hezbollah-militia has actively joined the fighting in Syria alongside the ruling Assad-regime. At the same time, the fight against Israel is still a central agenda for the group. Its war against the Sunni rebels in Syria made it possible for them arm themselves from Syrian stocks and gain experience on the battlefield. As soon as they return to Lebanon, they will become a security problem for Israel. The Arab Spring had implications for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well, although Palestine was not directly affected by the upheavals. Especially the anti-Israeli Hamas had high hopes for the uprisings in their first year. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, the mother-organisation of Hamas, came to power; the security vacuum on the Sinai peninsula made it possible for the organisation to smuggle weapons into Gaza. But the people's movements also showed to the quarrelling Palestinian leadership (Hamas and Fatah), that the pressure from the streets could become a danger for them as well. The agreement between the two factions can be seen in this light. But a unified Palestinian leadership is a radical change on the security level for Israel. A unified leadership means unified positions and a stronger voice on the international stage. And a unity government with Hamas-involvement is unacceptable for the Jewish nation. The Arab Spring also had direct consequences for the Israeli option for action towards Palestine. Before the revolutions, Israel could be sure that its reactions on the rocket fire from Gaza would certainly be criticized by the Arab world, but that no one would take action against Israel. The autocrats that ruled the neighbouring countries could not afford open conflict with Israel for various reasons. Furthermore, they did not need to give in to public sentiment, which often demanded a more aggressive stand on the matter of Israel and Palestine. But now, these autocrats are weakened or toppled, and for Israel, a new situation has emerged: there are now several other actors that have to be considered in its policy towards Palestine. And the old power structures in the region are gone. The Arab Spring has changed the regional system in the Middle East dramatically and incited a struggle for regional hegemony with religious rage. With the revolutions, Israel lost an order that guaranteed a certain form of security and predictability for the Jewish nation. The fall from power of the old order and the anarchy that is now dominating the region has shrunk the Israeli room for manoeuvre considerably and weakened its position in the regional system.

2003

British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2017

Since 2011, geo-strategic interactions have exerted pressure on various political communities. In particular, uncertainty over the foreign policy intentions of new leadership elites and the nature of the unfolding regional security system in the Middle East have impacted the strategic questions Israel must answer: how can Israel rationally assess the new environment? What foreign policy approach would best serve Israel’s distinct national interests? Using insights from the levels-of-analysis framework and from the realist theory of International Relations, this article aims to explore Israel’s reading of recent regional developments and its attitudes and behaviours towards the attendant and emerging strategic challenges. The analysis reveals that the Arab Spring uprisings exacerbated the already anarchic Middle East environment, aggravating mistrust and antagonism in Israel. The urgency of the attraction of protectionism and militarism in Israel was an expression of the realist approach to Israel’s primary strategic consolidation. With time, the regional dynamic has evolved into a more predictable—but still complex—structure than it was during its early phase (2010–2013). Although there have been signs of potential regional political eruptions, other developments have promoted continuity in the Middle East, which plays to Israel’s strategic advantage.

The aim of the article is to evaluate Israel's security perceptions about the Arab Spring. The study argues that The Arab Spring is the reshuffling of the Middle East by realigned U.S.-Turkish common policies. For Israel the devil you know is more acceptable than the unknown future. Bearing in mind all the results of the surveys showing that Arabs can easily fall into radical Islam, Israel prefers not to enter such a dangerous and risky game for toppling down the old dictators and establishing new regimes. Israel could resist such a change and force U.S. to postpone or cancel their new policies if it were a decade ago, but today she is extremely isolated in international arena thanks to Bibi's government. On the other hand, Israel struggles to counter the Turkish offenses in diplomacy, has to avoid the ―Iranian Trap‖ that is being set by Iran slowly and carefully for the past few years, and also domestically facing serious crises. All those dynamics are forcing Israel to remain silent unless it breaks the isolation that it fell, and watch carefully the games played by U.S., Turkey and Iran in the Middle East.

2009

From its advent, Israel had a more skeptical-and in retrospect a much more realistic-view than those of leading Western powers regarding the dynamics and likely trajectories resulting from the "Arab Spring". Israel never bought into the "Spring" idea, viewing the upheavals that erupted in early 2011 across much of North Africa and Middle East as being closer to Tehran 1979 than to Berlin 1989. Israel is today effectively surrounded by a deadly mixture of new Islamist regimes (dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood but also by new Salafist parties), increasing weak states, and chaos. This paper examines this turbulent reality and outlines how Israel has adapted its foreign policy so far to deal with it. [From its advent, Israel had a more skeptical-and in retrospect a much more realistic-view than those of leading Western powers regarding the dynamics and likely trajectories resulting from the "Arab Spring". Israel never bought into the "Spring" i...

The article presents an attempt to describe the new position of Israel during the changes in the Middle East. It outlines three political events which have taken place in the region: the Arab Spring, the war in Syria, and the development of the Iranian issue. Its main purpose is to show how these incidents have affected Israel.

The article analyzes Israel's foreign policy response to the advent of the 'Arab Spring' and its aftermath.

Strategic impact, 2020

The background for this research is represented by the importance of the regional security complex of the Middle East in international relations. In this context, the article approaches the aspects of the United States of America’s security and foreign strategy in the Middle East, between 2016-2020. Through this study we want to highlight the main concepts that guided the foreign policy strategies implemented by Trump administration in the Middle East. Moreover, we want to highlight the characteristics of the strategic partnership between the United States of America and Israel and its importance for the Middle East’s stability. From a methodological point of view, we used the discourse analysis.

2016

This study examines the effect of the United States’ (U.S.) relationship with Israel on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East focusing on the case study of Iran and Syria. Two U.S. national interests were investigated; combating terrorism and non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Each national interest was examined to assess whether the U.S.-Israel relationship positively or negatively affects the accomplishment of that interest in the countries of study. They are some negative consequences resulting from the U.S. relationship with Israel on U.S. national interests. Each of the national interests examined concluded that the U.S.-Israel relationship has to some extent negatively affected the success rate of the highlighted interests and that the U.S.-Israeli relationship is one of the major sources of anti-U.S. sentiments in the Middle East. U.S. interests in the Middle East would be well served if the U.S. balances the interests of its relationship with Israel, non-proliferation of WMD and combating terrorism.

Friends of Israel Initiative 4 Friends of Israel Initiative 5 Foreword The Friends of Israel Initiative (FOII), brought to life in 2010 by former Prime Minister of Spain Jose Maria Aznar and consisting of a board of distinguished statesmen and