Revisiting Spinoza's concept of conatus: Degrees of Autonomy

My contribution to the argument that Spinoza anticipated a strong version and specific theory of Relational Autonomy will be to expand our understanding of the relational character of the cognitive–affective-social life governed by the Imagination. I, first, bring into the discussion several crucial propositions in the Ethics about the transindividual relational origin and ongoing constitution of the individual mind, and, then, I turn to the Theological-Political Treatise to clarify and augment our understanding of the transindividual sociality of the Imagination and the political life of the Imagination as developed in that text in great detail and depth. , I argue here that it is the subservience to group and the local world and the instability of such an imaginative life that engenders the very urge to freedom, and ultimately individuation.

Tópicos, 2024

My aim in this paper is to examine some of the distinctive facets of human action in Spinoza’s philosophy and show their intrinsic connection with each other. By analyzing in detail how Spinoza addresses different aspects of human action in his main work, the Ethics, it is possible to notice that for him free human agency implies two interrelated features: on the one hand, the adequate knowledge of the causes that determine it, and, on the other hand, a growing capacity to impact with greater power the scenarios in which it takes place. Thus, in contrast with quietist and passive readings, I show in the following that the two aforementioned characteristics are part of the Spinozian philosophical conception of agency as such. By pursuing this line of thought, it is also possible to establish a link—not always noticed in the secondary literature—with some of the central lines of thought contained in the Theological-Political Treatise. In discussing these theses, I advance the idea that the Spinozian conception of human agency involves a serious readjustment of the metaphysical vision of the agent, a change in her conduct and ethical practices, and an altogether different conception of politics and religion. Keywords: Spinoza; human agency; metaphysical psychology; ethics; politics; activity; passivity.

Spinoza's notion of freedom confronts us with a paradoxical idea: on the one hand, freedom requires us to act with rational insight into the causally determined order of the natural world. On the other hand, grasping this order seems to leave us with the insight that there is nothing that could be justly termed a human person. As I see it, the key to resolving this tension is to be sought within a special reading of Spinoza's theory of the striving for self-preservation (conatus): I shall argue that Spinoza's conatus doctrine entails an appropriation thesis: according to Spinoza's account, we ought to re-describe our personal histories in terms of a gradual appropriation of the natural order and take supposedly external causes as our own reasons for action. The present paper tries to set out this solution and its difficulties against the background of the contemporary debate on freedom.

Spinoza’s philosophy revolves around a basic set of concepts that he regards as denoting some kind of activity: striving, power, virtue, freedom, perfection, among others. According to a standard view, these kinds of activity are equivalent or, at least, coextensive. Steven Nadler writes, “a number of terms in Spinoza are co-extensive and refer to the same ideal human condition. We can set up the following equation for Spinoza: virtue = knowledge = activity = freedom = power = perfection.” In contrast, this paper’s thesis is that Spinoza employs two basic notions of activity: striving and being an adequate cause. While these notions are related, they are not equivalent or cocoextensive because a thing can strive without being an adequate cause—in other words, the sole cause—of an effect. The paper also examines two consequences of this thesis. Firstly, attending to this distinction shows that Spinoza understands the activity of virtue, perfection and human freedom as striving, rather than being an adequate cause. It follows that these ethical goals do not require being a sole cause and, thus, do not require being causally independent and self-sufficient, contrary to a common reading. Secondly, attending to the distinction broadens our understanding of Spinoza’s conception of activity. In light of Spinoza’s definition of ‘act’ (3D2), scholars sometimes treat Spinozistic activity as equivalent to being an adequate cause and, thus, to being causally independent. Recognizing striving as a kind of activity shows that things can be active while also being causally dependent, since Spinoza holds that things strive when they are passively affected. Thus, activity and passivity, for Spinoza, are not mutually exclusive. Both of these consequences highlight that Spinoza’s ethics leaves an important positive role for human dependence, passivity and cooperation in the activity of a good life. This is a draft of an invited paper for a forthcoming Cambridge anthology on Spinoza and freedom, edited by Noa Naaman and Tom Vinci.

Intended for publication in "Spinoza and Relational Autonomy: Being with Others"--(under contract) PLEASE DO NOT CITE THIS DRAFT. My thanks to Karel D'huyvetters for his careful editing help, especially of quoted Latin texts. This is a draft that makes the corrections Karel indicated. (Thanks, readers, for your patience, and any comments you're inclined to offer.) I argue that Spinoza anticipates a notion of autonomy, but that according to the 'relational' version that Spinoza anticipates, much that qualifies as 'autonomy' under 'procedural' or 'neutralist (about 'the good') views fails to instantiate autonomy, but instead reflects the condition of 'weak spiritedness' or 'weak mindedness' . I also point out that another issue for autonomy is that on Spinoza's view, merely 'phenomenally' 'free' action under this condition can, without individuals' knowledge, be 'highjacked' to support the 'good' or 'ends' of other 'contrary natures' and not an individual's own perseverance or 'good'. So the sort of autonomy that Spinoza anticipates--being sui iuris--cannot be 'good neutral', and is a strong relational conception.

Comparative and Continental Philosophy, 2022

Over the last years, some of Spinoza studies have shifted to a consideration of the relational character of his ethics by focusing on the notion of autonomy. This concept is foreign to Spinoza's vocabulary. Therefore, I will attempt to explain what Spinozan relational autonomy is and its connection with the most important ethical concept in his philosophy: freedom. Following considerations about Spinozan freedom, I claim that it entails a relational character and that, for this reason, it is equal to relational autonomy. We are free when our joint action is based on adequate ideas of what we have in common with others.

This article is a reconstruction of Spinoza’s materialist ontology using Deleuze’s philosophy, towards a revolutionary ethics of desire. In the first part, I discuss the nature of Spinoza’s radical ethics in conjunction with Deleuze’s immanent ethics. Moreover, I elaborate Spinoza’s philosophy of ethology and notion of agency (conatus). In the last part, I explain how these concepts have influenced Deleuze and Guattari’s formulation of an immanent, minortarian, and collective politics of desire. In addition, I explicate how this radical theory of ethics can engender the diagramming of a nomadic politics or a revolution-to-come.

Journal of Spinoza Studies

On a widespread view, Spinoza's metaphysics is a system of principles by means of which all truth about the essences and existence of all beings, including ourselves, is derived. This system, so it is supposed, is more-or-less complete: it represents the universe from the viewpoint of an omniscient intellect, to the effect that the remedy that the Ethics provides against the daily sorrows of human life is an invitation to adopt some kind of divine viewpoint. This is no small promise: once we manage to look at things, in particular our own lives, sub specie aeternitatis, we may find peace and quiet. I must confess, the longer I work on Spinoza the more I find this approach unsatisfying. To be sure, the Ethics does contain a conceptual framework that makes this escape from the human perspective a vivid option, although we may materialize it only step by step. Moreover, it does so in a manner that attracts quite different-minded people. I also do not deny that this outlook is important when it comes to comprehending how Spinoza's metaphysics contributes to a better life. Yet I think there is more wisdom and subtlety in Spinoza's metaphysical thought which, however, only comes to the fore if we begin to pay attention to other aspects that are not tied up with the notion of a system offering cognitive escape from the human perspective. My contention is that Spinoza's metaphysics is also concerned with the many ways in which the human perspective shapes our lives. Spinoza gives us an understanding of human life as it may be derived from the notion of our having our very own viewpoint on the things and aims in our life. To appreciate the value of Spinoza's system, it is not sufficient to reconstruct it in terms of a few guiding principles; we must also show how it accounts for the reality of our human, irreducibly situated, historically embedded life.