Gestalt structures in multi-person intersubjectivity
Sarah Pawlett JacksonSynthese
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Abstract
In this paper I argue that there are gestalt principles underlying intersubjective interactions and that this means that intersubjective ‘units’, can be recognised as unified gestalt wholes. The nub of the claim is that interactions within a ‘plural subject’ can be perceived by others outside this plural subject. Framed from the first-person perspective: I am able to recognise intersubjective interactions between multiple others who are not me. I argue that the terminology of gestalt structures is helpful in framing and understanding the non-reducible make-up of these relational units. I consequently defend the legitimacy of the claim that we can attend to more than one other person at once, holding multiple others as a single focus of attention insofar as we can attend to multiple others as a gestalt whole. I argue that it is therefore legitimate to talk about attending to, perceiving and addressing multiple others at the same time, in the second-person plural. I argue that this can be identified in the phenomenology of such interactions and in an analysis of the core underlying structures of these interactions.
Key takeaways
- Having laid out these presuppositions I make the case that multi-person intersubjectivity, specifically the second-person plural, can be understood to exhibit gestalt structure and gestalt qualities by looking at the phenomenology and the structure of specific interactions.
- My emphasis is that the intersubjective awareness between an other and another other is also something that I can perceive as a gestalt whole.
- My claim that multi-person phenomena, like the second-person plural, exhibit gestalt qualities hence needs to be held to account by these criteria.
- In order to earn this claim, I will need to demonstrate, as above, that (i) gestalt qualities are exhibited in the phenomenology of the perception of intersubjective interactions between others, and (ii) that there is a structure or a form underlying the phenomena in question that produces similar gestalt qualities even if the component parts are changed.
- Different forms of interpersonal reciprocal awareness produce different intersubjective structures, which give different gestalt qualities.
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