In behalf of "In behalf of the fool"

The Heythrop Journal, 2014

I produce and defend an argument for the coherence of the concept of a perfect being.

Sophia, 1981

Religious Studies, 1979

In this paper I examine the modal ontological argument based upon possible worlds semantics expounded by Alvin Plantinga (PMOA), and as further developed and defended by William Lane Craig. In part A I set forth the definitions and premises of the PMOA and its conclusions, and disclose its flawed underlying assumptions. In part B, I expound and defend what I call the “Anti - Plantinga Modal Ontological Argument - Argument” (Anti-PMOA-Argument). I thereby rigorously show that despite appearances a maximally great being is not broadly logically possible. In part C I set forth why the Anti-PMOA-Argument is amply confirmed because the procedure followed in the construction of the PMOA plausibly allows the construction of arguments relevantly similar to but inconsistent with it because such rival arguments prove either the existence in all possible worlds of beings relevantly similar to but different from that of god conceived as a maximally excellent being (as defined in the PMOA)–or, what is more striking, the existence in all possible worlds of several conceivable maximally excellent beings that nevertheless constitutively or otherwise differ from each other in some important respects. Part D Is devoted to an examination of the nature of the modality involved in possible world semantics. In so doing, the paper explains why the notion of what is broadly logically possible/necessary ought to be distinguished from the notion of what is metaphysically possible/necessary. Part E considers the plausibility of premise 1 of the PMOA (i.e., It is possible that a maximally great being exists) found in the writings of other scholars. This electronic version, originally published on the Secular Web (Internet Infidels, Inc.) on April 30, 2016, replaces the version that hitherto (i.e., prior to MY 17, 2017) was available on the Academia.edu site. It has, however, been modified by having been paginated and by having changed the endnotes to footnotes.

2013

2013

Philosophia, 2014

In this paper, I shall present and defend an ontological argument for the existence of God. The argument has two premises: (1) possibly, God exists, and (2) necessary existence is a perfection. I then defend, at length, arguments for both of these premises. Finally, I shall address common objections to ontological arguments, such as the Kantian slogan ('existence is not a real predicate'), and Gaunilo-style parodies, and argue that they do not succeed. I conclude that there is at least one extant ontological argument that is plausibly sound.

This paper considers the famous response launched by Gaunilo of Marmoutier in response to Saint Anselm of Canterbury's famous Ontological Argument, and examines the thinkers' epistemic commitments through the lens of virtue epistemology. This analysis reveals two epistemologies in tension: The first such camp is the Epistemology of the Believer (EB), named for its association with a knower predisposed to belief in the possibility of the strictly infinite, insofar as she believes that the notion has a sense or meaning. The second, the Epistemology of the Fool (EF), named for the ‘Fool’ of the Psalms for whom Gaunilo’s objection mounts a defense, characterizes a knower predisposed to doubt that the strictly infinite has a meaning. An analysis of EF and EB in turn reveals not two incompatible epistemologies, but rather a dispositional refusal of the Fool to entertain the sense of the strictly infinite.