" Recollection " (Anamnesis) in the Phaedo

Plato's theory of recollection is a set of three theses about human soul and knowledge: the first one (81b-e) states that human beings acquire knowledge by remembering innate knowledge hidden in their soul. The second one (ibidem) states that soul is immortal and cannot be annihilated. It transmigrates from a body to another when the first dies, after staying sometimes in the Hades, though it forgets -but does not lose-everything it knew in

According to Plato’s theory that learning is recollection, every person possesses complete knowledge of the forms prior to birth, and at least a portion of what we call learning consists in the recollection of that knowledge. Many scholars have argued that Plato intends the theory to explain concept acquisition as well as our ability to gain philosophical knowledge. There is an alternative interpretation that the theory explains only our ability to gain philosophical knowledge. In this thesis, I argue against this narrower interpretation and in favor of the view that the theory that learning is recollection is a broad account of our cognitive development. My primary argument rests on an analysis of the cross-examination method that Plato frequently employs in his dialogues. That analysis allows me to claim that Plato sees concept acquisition and philosophical learning as continuous with one another in ways that the narrower interpretation denies.

Semiotica, 1994

Rhizomata, 2018

Many scholars have denied that Plato’s argument about desire at Philebus 34c10–35d7 is related to his recollection arguments in the Meno and Phaedo, because it is concerned only with postnatal experiences of pleasure. This paper argues against their denial by showing that the desire argument in question is intended to prove the soul’s possession of innate memory of pleasure. This innateness interpretation will be supported by a close analysis of the Timaeus, where Plato suggests that our inborn desires for food and drink derive from the primitive experiences of pleasure that have naturally been incorporated into the appetitive part of the soul.

This essay explores the relevance of Socrates' mythical introduction of recollection in the Meno. I argue that the passage at 81a5-e2 addresses different levels of understanding, a superfi cial and a deeper one, corresponding to a literal and a metaphorical reading respectively. The major themes addressed in this passage-the immortality of the soul, transmigration, rewards and punishments in the after-life, Hades, the kinship of all nature and anamnesis-have distinct meanings depending on whether we approach them with a Platonic or an Orphico-Pythagorean eye. The literal understanding is appealing to Meno and is offered in reply to his challenge in order to persuade him to continue the investigation of virtue. It is, however, the deeper sense that Plato's Socrates intends for a more philosophically attuned audience.

Plato, 2022

At the beginning of the Phaedrus, Socrates distinguishes between two kinds of people: those who are more complex, violent and hybristic than the monster Typhon, and those who are simpler, calmer and tamer (230a). This paper argues that there are also two distinct types of Eros (Love) that correlate to Socrates's two kinds of people. In the first case, lovers cannot attain recollection because their souls are disordered in the absence of self-knowledge. For the latter, the selfknowledge of self-disciplined lovers renders them capable of recollecting the Forms by ordering their souls naturally.

I argue that recollection, in Plato's Meno, should not be taken as a method, and, if it is taken as a myth, it should not be taken as a mere myth. Neither should it be taken as a truth, a priori or metaphorical. In contrast to such views, I argue that recollection ought to be taken as an hypothesis for learning. Thus, the only methods demonstrated in the Meno are the elenchus and the hypothetical, or mathematical, method. What Plato's Meno demonstrates, then, is that we cannot be philosophers if we fail to make use of the mathematician's hypothetical method.

Epoche: a Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2019

I argue that Plato's deployment of the resumptive phrase πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς illuminates the philosophical significance of his art of transition in Socratic dialogues. These explicit calls for a new beginning often appear when a conversation fails to account for two elements of ordinary experience: assumptions about whole-part relations and about the interlocutor's self-conception as a being responsive to basic rational and normative distinctions. Returning to the archē is a form of ἀνάμνησις, reminding us that these assumptions constitute true, but inarticulate, opinions of a fundamental kind. They are the preconditions for discourse that philosophical διαλέγεσθαι must preserve and ground.

Improvement in the failings of human memory is one incontrovertible advantage artificial intelligence has over human intelligence. Yet, all that computers offer humanity are but inputed knowledge. However, the problem of retentive memory continues to account for failures in examinations hence, a disturbing development. Plato in the Symposium makes an invaluable contribution regarding the place of remembrance in epistemic ponderings. This paper therefore, examines Plato's Symposium as a Socratic – Platonic refutation of the doctrine that knowledge is remembrance. We attempted here to extract from the said classic text, instances faulting the idea that knowledge is remembrance. Our aim is to generate critical discussions that will yield a better interpretation of the Symposium. The version of Plato's Symposium used is a translation by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, (Indianopolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989). This text serves as the primary source for our adopted textual analysis method. Though scanty references are made to other relevant texts yet, the circumference of our discourse remains limited to a refutation of the claim that knowledge is remembrance.