Hegel's Social and Political Philosophy: Recent Debates

Hegel Bulletin, 2015

Hegel's Political Philosophy, 2021

The Jena period (1801-1806) refers to when Hegel worked at the University of Jena. Hegel's view of the community changed significantly during this relatively short period. 1 To summarize: (1) Hegel initially held an ancient view of the "organic" community as influenced by Romanticism; (2) he eventually came to the idea of recognition between free modern individuals influenced by modern natural law theories such as Fichte's; (3) finally, he realized its shortcomings and overcame them to formulate his idea of community based on his own concept of recognition. In this study we focus on the two texts of the period when Hegel began developing his concept of recognition theory and gradually moved away from the influence of Romanticism (from the end of (1) to (2))the Natural Law essay ("Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts") (1802) and System of Ethical Life (System der Sittlichkeit) (1802/ 1803).

Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, 2010

This fresh and original book argues that the central questions in Hegel's practical philosophy are the central questions in modern accounts of freedom: What is freedom, or what would it be to act freely? Is it possible so to act? And how important is leading a free life? Robert Pippin argues that the core of Hegel's answers is a social theory of agency, the view that agency is not exclusively a matter of the self-relation and self-determination of an individual but requires the right sort of engagement with, and recognition by, others. Using a detailed analysis of key Hegelian texts, Pippin develops this interpretation to reveal the bearing of Hegel's claims on many contemporary issues, including much-discussed core problems in the liberal democratic tradition. His important study will be valuable for all readers who are interested in Hegel's philosophy and in the modern problems of agency and freedom.

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2010

The conception of Hegel in this paper builds upon the themes of participation, reciprocity and community. The attempt is made to extract the potentials for participatory public life contained in Hegel’s system of differentiated representation.

G. W. F. Hegel, ed. Knowles, D. , 2010

there is at present, amongst Hegel scholars and in the interpretative discussions of Hegel's social and political theories, the flavour of old-style 'apology' for his liberal credentials, as though there exists a real need to prove he holds basic liberal views palatable to the hegemonic, contemporary political worldview. such an approach is no doubt motivated by the need to reconstruct what is left of the modern moral conscience when Hegel has finished discussing the flaws and contradictions of the Kantian model of moral judgement. the main claim made in the following pages is that the critique of 'subjective' moralities is neither the sole nor even the main reason for the adoption of an immanent doctrine of ethics. this paper will look to Hegel's mature theory of action as motivating the critique of transcendentalism rather than merely filling in the hole left when one rejects Kant and it will discuss what the consequences of this approach are for the role of the moral conscience within the political sphere, arguing that Hegel's own conditions of free action would not be met unless the subjective moral conscience was operative in the rational state.

The paper analyses the logical category of the individual in Hegel's work, argues that it is not a metaphysical simple, but rather it is treated by Hegel as an incomplete term. The paper concludes with an examination of the political implications of Hegel's use of this category.

OGIRISI: a New Journal of African Studies, 2017

The need for reconciliation of individualism and communitarianism in search for an ideal state has been the main preoccupation of social and political philosophers. Unlike other philosophers like Hobbes and Locke that view the individual and the state as being incompatible and therefore seek to achieve some sort of compromise between the two principles, Hegel believes that the individual and the state are mutually independent. For him, individual freedom understood as rational freedom is achieved through the rational institutions of the state. Thus, the state's institutions must harmonise truly the collective interest with the objective good of individuals. The will of the state, the universal will is the good; it is the realisation of freedom and so is unquestionable. This paper discusses how Hegel reconciles individual freedom with the authority of the state. Besides, it argues that the absolutism of the Hegel's state tends to restrict individual right and freedom which, in Hegel's view, must be actualised in the state. Finally, this paper contends that Hegel's reduction of freedom to rationality tends to encourage indiscriminate utilisation of human reason to create things that can erode human dignity and values. It suggests that the recognition of the place of God in human thought and life would make life meaningful and valuable.

Political Science, XXXVIII, (1986) pp. 99 112