Emotional dynamics of right-and left-wing political populism
Mikko Salmela
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Abstract
Emotions are prevalent in the rhetoric of populist politicians and among their electorate. We argue that partially dissimilar emotional processes may be driving right-and left-wing populism. Existing research has associated populism with fear and insecurities experienced in contemporary societies on the one hand, and with anger, resentment, and hatred on the other. Yet, there are significant differences in the targets of right-and left-wing resentment: a political and economic establishment deemed responsible for austerity politics (left), and political and cultural elites accused of favoring ethnic, religious, and sexual outgroups at the expense of the neglected ingroup (right). Referring to partially different emotional opportunity structures and distinct political strategies at exploiting these structures, we suggest that right-wing populism is characterized by repressed shame that transforms fear and insecurity into anger, resentment, and hatred against perceived " enemies " of the precarious self. Left-wing populism, in turn, associates more with acknowledged shame that allows individuals to self-identify as aggrieved and humiliated by neoliberal policies and their advocates. The latter type of shame holds emancipatory potential as it allows individuals to establish bonds with others who feel the same, whereas repressors remain in their shame or seek bonds from repression-mediated defensive anger and hatred.
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Two Types of Political Resentment
Forthcoming in: M. Lewis, A. Kauppinen (Eds.). The Moral Psychology of Resentment. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Resentment, a political emotion par excellence, is generally understood as moral anger in response to political or moral injustices or offences, geared at correcting wrongdoings, thus being an emotional gatekeeper for equal respect and democratic order. However, we argue that the complexity of resentment is not sufficiently understood. Not only do targets of resentment vary (e.g., socioeconomic institutions responsible for austerity politics in left populism vs. refugees, minorities or elites in right populism); we suggest that underlying this variety there are two significantly diverse types of resentment with dissimilar a) socio-psychological dynamics, b) different intentional structure, c) ways in which they are epistemically and normatively appropriate, and d) political consequences. We argue, first, that the underexplored type of resentment emerges through the emotional mechanism of Ressentiment, which transforms self-targeting negative emotions and their vulnerable self into otherdirected ones such as resentment and hatred with a morally superior self. We then detail how the targets of such resentment are indeterminate, generic others or scapegoats and how the affective focus of this type of resentment becomes the antagonistically defined allegedly threatened social identity instead of particular wrongs. Moreover, we show how the triggering emotions become epistemically opaque and the outcome emotions normatively inappropriate. Finally, we explore its motivational tendencies, suggesting that it leads to anomic, anti-solidaric or dormant support for violent political action associated with right populism or extremism.
2019 [with Sindre Bangstad and Heiko Henkel] "The politics of affect. Perspectives on the rise of the far-right and right-wing populism in the West". Focaal 83: 98–113. DOI:10.3167/fcl.2019.830110 [OPEN ACCESS]
This article is based on the transcript of a roundtable on the rise of the far-right and right-wing populism held at the AAA Annual Meeting in 2017. The contributors explore this rise in the context of the role of affect in politics, rising socioeconomic inequalities, racism and neoliberalism, and with reference to their own ethnographic research on these phenomena in Germany, Poland, Italy, France, the UK and Hungary.
Economic inequality and the rise of far‐right populism: A social psychological analysis
Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 2019
It is argued that far‐right (FR) populism in the West is fuelled by inequality. In this paper, we argue that three social psychological processes are central to explaining these phenomena. We suggest that these processes are recursive although we do not specify their temporal order. Drawing on the social identity tradition, we first examine how inequality is linked to reduced social trust and cohesion, which has consequences for both low‐ and high‐income groups. We examine the known effects of perceived threat in amplifying tensions between groups and consolidating identity positions. Second, we argue that national identity consolidation is a particularly likely response to inequality, which, in turn, reduces tolerance of cultural diversity as an associated consequence. Finally, we consider the value of these strengthened national identities to those who harness them effectively to gain political ground. In this way, those who offer FR populist rhetoric aligned with nationalism can ...
Perceptions, Resentment, Economic Distress, and Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Europe
Politics and Governance, 2021
Research has demonstrated that resentful emotions toward the politics and perceptions of being culturally and economically threatened by immigration increase support for populist parties in some European countries, and that macro-level economic conditions engender those perceptions and emotions and increase populist support. This article reveals that household-level economic conditions also affect perceptions of cultural and economic threat by immigrants. Low- and middle-income populations are more vulnerable to suffer economic distress due to macro-level factors such as import shock, which can increase their resentment toward democracy, and their perceptions that immigration is a cultural and economic threat, therefore increasing the likelihood to vote for populist parties. A mediation analysis using the European Social Survey data from 2002 to 2018 provides evidence for the argument.
'A threat to us': The interplay of insecurity and enmity narratives in left-wing populism
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 2022
Left-wing populists are understudied in populism research and little is known on how enmity and insecurity narratives interplay in their rhetoric. Using a narrative framework to capture insecurity in the 'enemification' of elites, this article examines left-populist Jean-Luc Mélenchon and La France Insoumise. The analysis reveals a multifaceted construction of national, supranational and international elites as sources of insecurity, based on (a) the threats they pose, (b) the uncertainty they generate and (c) their failure to protect citizens. The article makes two contributions to the populism and International Relations literatures. First, it provides empirical evidence to contest the hypothesis that left populism promotes pluralist agonism rather than antagonism. Second, it shows how populists across the spectrum can use insecurity-centred narratives to delegitimise elites from speaking security and promote an agenda centred on popular sovereignty.
Emotional Dynamics of Populism and Its Non-Populist Alternatives: Discussing the Role of Compassion and Pride
Polish Political Science, 2022
The paper discusses populist appeals to emotions in political communication, considering their role in the proliferation of political polarisation and radicalisation. Revisiting the Emotional Rescue Model of anger, enthusiasm, and fear, we considered pride and compassion low-arousal alternatives to populist storytelling. In the experiments, we tested how participants (n=364) respond to appeals to pride and compassion in their brain activity, emotional expressions, prosocial behaviour, attitude change, and memorisation. In the paper, we primarily discussed the results of the fMRI (neuroimaging) study and compared them with the previous studies on authentic pride, compassion, empathy, and reappraisal. Considering similarities in the activation of the superior and middle temporal gyri, temporal pole, inferior frontal gyrus, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, we argue that compassionate political narratives should be the most effective low-arousal alternative to populist storytelling. Moreover, stimulation of the reappraisal-related network in that group suggests that participants reframed emotional negativity into prosocial acts of caring and helping, also re-evaluating their attitudes.
Review of The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean
Discourse & Communication, 2017
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