Critique of Kant on Beauty in the 'Critique of Judgment'

Kant-Studien, 2024

It is well known that Kant connects judgment and feeling in the third Critique. However, the precise relationship between these two faculties remains virtually unexplored, in large part due to the unpopularity of Kant's faculty psychology. This paper considers why, for Kant, judgment and feeling go together, arguing that he had good philosophical reasons for forging this connection. The discussion begins by situating these faculties within Kant's mature faculty psychology. While the 'power of judgment' [Urteilskraft] is fundamentally reflective, feeling [Gefühl] reveals itself as essentially non-discursive. Their systematic connection emerges through the principle of purposiveness [Zweckmäßigkeit], which the former legislates for the latter. I claim that we must understand this notion in terms of the suitability of the faculties for each other, as displayed in mere reflection. That is, we can only recognize the fitness of two things for each other through feeling, which, in turn, is the only way that we can engage in the activity of merely reflecting judgment. I conclude by gesturing at an even further way in which judgment and feeling are related, based on their mutual role in orienting all of the faculties of the human mind.

This paper aims to analyze the each and every point of Kant concepts i-e:sublime,beauty,Modality,4moments etc.

2009

The Eighteenth Century, 2010

This essay examines how and why something so undefined as to be called the "power of judgment" [Urteilskraft] originates as a way of thinking about the capacity of the intellect in general during a time of fundamental philosophical inquiry named by Immanuel Kant "the Age of Critique" ("Zeitalter der Kritik") (Critique of Pure Reason, first ed., 1781), and that we, unlike Kant, have come to call "the Enlightenment," thereby delimiting the activity that, in his essay on the same ("Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?," 1784), Kant described instead as essential and ongoing: the "right" and "inclination" of humanity at any time to enact its self-constituting "freedom" "to think." 1 Since to think about the twin activities of "enlightenment" and "judgment" is, in Kant's view, to think about what the intellect itself can do rather than to judge a specific object or experience of the mind, any examination of the genesis of judgment in Kant's own thinking must acknowledge frankly that it can rely on no given empirical or contextual use of the term to determine what the mental "power" called "judgment" in Kant's Critique is. We do know that the "power of judgment" is the subject of Kant's Third Critique (Critique of the Power of Judgment, first ed., 1790; second ed., 1793) and that it alone, acting as "meditating link" ("Mittelglied") in Kant's architectonic system, connects the otherwise incommunicable "realms" ("Gebiete") of cognitive or theoretical and noncognitive or moral reason. 2 One can never recall often enough that, by submitting cognition of the world, on the one hand, and action in the world, on the other, to what he called "critique," Kant reversed the conventional definitions of these as, respectively, pure and practical. Pure reason, once submitted to the a priori formal limits of representational knowledge hypothesized in the First Critique,

Manuscrito

This paper presents an elucidation of Kant's notion of judgment, which clearly is a central challenge to the understanding of the Critic of Pure Reason, as well as of the Transcendental Idealism. In contrast to contemporary interpretation, but taking it as starting point, the following theses will be endorsed here: i) the synthesis of judgment expresses a conceptual relation understood as subordination in traditional Aristotelian logical scheme; ii) the logical form of judgment does not comprise intuitions (or singular representations); iii) the relation to intuition is not a judgment concern; iv) the response to the question about the 'x' that grounds the conceptual relation in judgments must be sought in transcendental aspects: 1) on construction in pure form of intuition, 2) in experience and 3) in the requirements to experience, respectively to mathematical, empirical, and philosophical

Kantian Review, 2023

My aim in this article is to provide an account of practical judgement, for Kant, that situates it within his theory of judgement as a whole – particularly, with regards to the distinction between the determining and reflecting use of judgement. I argue that practical judgement is a kind of determining judgement, but also one in which reflecting judgement plays a significant role. More specifically, I claim that practical judgement arises from the cooperation of the reflecting power of judgement with the faculty of reason – the former assisting the latter in the application of its principle. I conclude by considering a possible role for feeling in practical judgement.

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 2021

Kant’s distinction between the determining and reflecting power of judgment in the third Critique is not well understood in the literature. A mainstream view unifies these by making determination the telos of all acts of judgment (Longuenesse 1998). On this view, all reflection is primarily in the business of producing empirical concepts for cognition, and thus has what I call a determinative ideal. I argue that this view fails to take seriously the independence and autonomy of the ‘power of judgment’ [Urteilskraft] as a higher cognitive faculty in its own right with its own a priori principle. Instead of seeing merely reflecting judgments as failed or incomplete acts of judgment, I argue that these are in fact paradigmatic of the activity of the power of judgment. More precisely, the reflecting power of judgment just is the power of judgment. Accordingly, reflecting judgment takes precedence over determining judgment; while the former operates according to a law that it gives itself, the latter requires another higher cognitive faculty to provide its principle. On my view, reflecting judgment should be understood as the capacity for purposive subsumption—most clearly seen in the activity of mere reflection.

Re-Thinking Kant: Vol 7 (ed. Edgar Valdez), 2024