Review of Logical Form by Andrea Iacona

Text of a talk given in 2000 aimed at providing an answer to the question whether there is any track of content in logical form. This paper suggests a positive answer but also that such content can be properly presented if we shift from logical analysis as entertained by analytic philosophers to category-theoretic semantics.

Manuscrito Revista Internacional De Filosofia, 2004

In this paper on Oswaldo Chateaubriand's book Logical Forms I, I am mostly concerned with the critical task of indicating some shortcomings and stressing my disagreements with the distinguished scholar. The most important shortcoming of the book is Chateaubriand's unfamiliarity with Husserl's views on logic and semantics, some of which anticipate views propounded by the former-e.g., the distinction between logical law and logical necessity-, whereas others are more subtle than Chateaubriand's views-e.g., Husserl's views on the referent of statements. One of the most important contributions of Chateaubriand's book is his analysis and rejection of all forms of the so-called "slingshot argument". On the other hand, I disagree with Chateaubriand's rendering of some of Frege's views, though some of these are very common among Fregean scholars. Finally, I assess Chateaubriand's criticism of Kripke's views as well as those of Tarski. I tend to agree with his criticism of Kripke, but disagree with his assessment of Tarskian semantics.

2003

Manuscrito, 2004

Abstract Guillermo Rosado-Haddock: In this paper on Oswaldo Chateaubriand's book Logical Forms I, I am mostly concerned with the critical task of indicating some shortcomings and stressing my disagreements with the distinguished scholar. The most important shortcoming of the book is Chateaubriand's unfamiliarity with Husserl's views on logic and semantics, some of which anticipate views propounded by the former--e.g., the distinction between logical law and logical necessity--, whereas others are more subtle than Chateaubriand's views--e.g. Husserl's views on the referent of statements. One of the most important contributions of Chateaubriand's book is his analysis and rejection of all forms of the so-called "slingshot argument". On the other hand, I disagree with Chateaubriand's rendering of some of Frege's views, though some of these are very common among Frege scholars. Finally, I assess Chateaubriand's criticisms of Kripke's views as well as those of Tarski. I tend to agree with his criticism of Kripke, but disagree with his assessment of Tarskian semantics. Abstract response: In §§1-2 I consider some issues that Guillermo raises in connection with Husserl, especially the distinction between the notion of state of affairs and the more general notion of situation of affairs conceived as a common substratum for different states of affairs. After a few remarks about Church’s slingshot argument in §3, I discuss several objections that Guillermo raises to my interpretation of Frege (§4), to Kripke’s notion of rigid designator (§5) and to my objections to Tarski’s semantic conception of truth (§6).

Manuscrito, 2008

Abstract John Corcoran: The expressions 'form', 'structure', 'schema', 'shape', 'pattern', 'figure', 'mold', and related locutions are used in logic both as technical terms and in metaphors. This paper juxtaposes, distinguishes, and analyses uses of these expressions by logicians. No such project has been attempted previously. After establishing general terminology, we present a variant of traditional usage of the expression 'logical form' followed by a discussion of the usage found in the two-volume Chateaubriand book Logical Forms (2001 and 2005)-the most comprehensive work on the subject ever written and in many ways the focus of this paper. Abstract response: In his paper John Corcoran examines in detail many issues relating to logical form, and raises some questions about my formulations. In my response I emphasize two main distinctions that may clear up some of the issues. One is the distinction between logical forms, in the sense of logical properties of an abstract character, and logical form, in the sense in which we speak of the logical form (or logical structure) of a sentence, or of a proposition. Another is the distinction, emphasized by Boole, between primary propositions (about things), and secondary propositions (about propositions)—which I illustrate through the distinction between predicate negation and sentential negation.

2007

ABSTRACT: The purpose of this essay is to advance and defend a theory on the notion of logical form as a representation of the structure of the meanings of natural language sentences. Central to this defense is an examination of Russell’s 1905 theory of descriptions. Following an investigation of the different ways in which this theory has been applied (for instance, in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophical psychology), it is argued that there is a modified application of this theory that can be defended as a substantive contribution to a general theory on the semantics of natural language. This general theory proposes that linguistic meaning be treated as determined by grammatical form on the supposition that the syntactic compositionality inherent in the forms of sentences involving descriptive phrases is systematically commensurate with the compositionality inherent in the structures associated with their meanings. The result is a theory of descriptions which, while largely abandoning the view that natural language grammatical form is misleading, remains consonant with the general spirit of the Russellian program by proposing to build structure into the language of logic as a way of rendering perspicuous our knowledge of the logical forms of natural language sentences. Following recent developments in linguistics, it is argued that semantic interpretation applies at an abstract level of analysis that linguists call “Logical Form.” A systematic procedure is then articulated for transforming the sentences of natural language into structures that facilitate a direct mapping onto the formulas of a logical grammar. This grammar consists of a non-standard second-order logic with restricted quantifiers, lambda abstracts for complex predicates, and nominalized predicates. In the process of applying this logical grammar to natural language, an inter-linguistic, comparative approach is adopted that looks to other natural languages such as Chinese. It is shown, for instance, how the system here developed yields logical forms for sentences in Chinese involving intensional contexts. Such sentences reveal interesting idiosyncrasies in connection with the semantics of predication and identity, and this forces us to rethink many of our assumptions about the relationship between grammatical form and logical form.

The expressions 'form', 'structure', 'schema', 'shape', 'pattern', 'figure', 'mold', and related locutions are used in logic both as technical terms and in metaphors. This paper juxtaposes, distinguishes, and analyses uses of these expressions by logicians. No such project has been attempted previously. After establishing general terminology, we present a variant of traditional usage of the expression 'logical form' followed by a discussion of the usage found in the two-volume Chateaubriand book Logical Forms (2001 and 2005)—the most comprehensive work on the subject ever written and in many ways the focus of this paper. Resumo: As expressões 'forma', 'estrutura', 'esquema', 'formato', 'modelo', 'figura', 'molde', e termos relacionados são usados em lógica tanto como termos técnicos quanto como em metáforas. O presente artigo justapõe, diferencia e analisa o uso de...

Philosophical Studies, 1975

The last half dozen years have witnessed growing talk about a new synthesis. Linguists and logicians, it is said, are finding common ground in the investigation of the logical form of sentences in natural language. Adverbs, mass terms, proper names, action sentences, belief sentenes, quantitiers, comparatives and more have all come in for scrutiny. Early results have been intriguing. Even more enticing though are the claims that out of the synthesis will come illumination of our tacit metaphysical or ontological assumptions, and perhaps even the solution of major philosophical problems.

The paper reviews some conceptions of logical form in the light of Andrea Iacona's book Logical Form. I distinguish the following: logical form as schematization of natural language, provided by, for example, Aristotle's syllogistic; the relevance to logical form of formal languages like those used by Frege and Russell to express and prove mathematical theorems; Russell's mid-period conception of logical form as the structural cement binding propositions; the conceptions of logical form discussed by Iacona; and logical form regarded as an empirical hypothesis about the psychology of language processing, as in the Discourse Representation Theory tradition. Whereas neither schematization, nor the use of special languages for mathematics, raise general methodological or empirical difficulties, other conceptions of logical form raise at least apparent problems.

' Wittgenstein I Bertrand Russell, in the second of his 1914 Lowell lectures, Our Knowledge of the External World, asserted famously that 'every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, is found either to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, logical' (Russell 1993, p. 42). He went on to characterize that portion of logic that concerned the study of forms of propositions, or, as he called them, 'logical forms'. This portion of logic he called 'philosophical logic'. Russell asserted that ... some kind of knowledge of logical forms, though with most people it is not explicit, is involved in all understanding of discourse. It is the business of philosophical logic to extract this knowledge from its concrete integuments, and to render it explicit and pure. (p. 53) Perhaps no one still endorses quite this grand a view of the role of logic and the investigation of logical form in philosophy. But talk of logical form retains a central role in analytic philosophy.