The US and Russia: They Don&#39;t Need Us

Daniel Treisman

The US and Russia: They Don't Need Us

2015

Abstract

Russia"s international behavior during the last decade puzzles many American observers. As seen from Washington, the greatest current challenges-terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change-are global ones that threaten all states. The US, the world"s only remaining superpower, has been trying to organize multilateral responses. Yet, on issue after issue, the Kremlin has proved singularly unhelpful. For years, Russian negotiators stalled efforts to compel Iran and North Korea to give up nuclear weapons or weapons programs. Moscow has applied economic and diplomatic pressure to keep nearby states from joining NATO or letting American troops use their bases to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan. In late 2008, Russia invaded its southern neighbor Georgia and effectively detached two mountain enclaves from its territory.

U.S.-Russia relations have improved dramatically since hitting rock bottom three years ago. Yet several of the sources of tension that precipitated that downturn remain unaddressed. Among them, the nature of the United States’ and Russia’s relationships with the countries of post-Soviet Eurasia—the eleven former Soviet republics besides Russia that are not NATO or EU member-states—is perhaps the most long-standing, and the one seemingly least prone to resolution. This study is the first to examine this issue in detail. It concludes that the assumption guiding much strategic thought about post-Soviet Eurasia in Moscow and Washington—that the differences between the two regarding the region are fundamental and therefore irreconcilable—is false. Indeed, the persistence of the zero-sum dynamic between the two countries regarding the region is highly contingent; it cannot be accounted for by immutable factors inherent to either of them or the international system. Whatever its source, not only has this dynamic been a key driver of past downturns in the bilateral relationship, but it has also done serious damage to the development of the independent states of post-Soviet Eurasia themselves. We identify three sources of U.S.-Russia tensions in post-Soviet Eurasia: • Historically conditioned policy patterns. The legacy of the past can explain many U.S.-Russia disagreements regarding post-Soviet Eurasia. The continuation of Soviet-era patterns of thought and behavior has led Russia to treat post-Soviet Eurasian countries with a heavy hand. In the United States, the objective from the early 1990s of bolstering the sovereignty of post-Soviet Eurasian countries later mutated into a posture of countering all forms of Russian influence in the region. Another path-dependent factor behind the tensions between the United States and Russia is their support for competing economic and security integration initiatives in the region. The absence of pan-Eurasian integration initiatives and fact that the West’s institutional enlargement since 1991 has been de facto closed off to Russia have created an “integration dilemma,” which Moscow resolved by pioneering its own integration initiatives. • Parochial agendas. U.S.-Russia rivalry in post-Soviet Eurasia has been further reinforced by the parochial agendas of actors such as business lobbies and “freelancing” government agencies. Rarely consistent with the national interests of either country, these agendas have often been a source of friction between Moscow and Washington. • Mutual misperceptions. Patterns in the analyses and normative judgments concerning U.S. and Russian actions in post-Soviet Eurasia reflect a basic assumption: that the influence of one country in the region necessarily comes at the expense of the other’s interests. But frequently these claims lack conclusive empirical evidence. In the United States, Russian influence in the region is often perceived to threaten the sovereignty and independence of the states of post-Soviet Eurasia, and to undermine prospects for democratic reform in these countries. In Russia, meanwhile, some see the specter of containment in any U.S. engagement in the neighborhood. As a result of these factors, Russia and the United States have become prone to viewing their interaction in post-Soviet Eurasia as a zero-sum game. Over the past twenty years, there have been instances in almost all the post-Soviet Eurasian states where the United States and Russia have sought to balance each other’s influence rather than find outcomes acceptable to themselves and the state in question. Indeed, actions based on perceived U.S.-Russia competition have at times set back the political and economic development of the countries of post-Soviet Eurasia and contributed to the ossification of unresolved conflicts. Washington and Moscow now face a choice: they can pursue a maximalist vision of “victory” over each another in the region (and expect a return to the near-confrontation of 2008), or they can seek “win-win-win” outcomes for the United States, Russia and the countries of post-Soviet Eurasia. The oft-invoked “grand bargains” to demarcate “spheres of influence”—enthusiastically endorsed by some, vehemently denounced by others—are figures of speech, not feasible policy options. We propose six measures to facilitate positive-sum outcomes: • Implement greater transparency. The United States and Russia should regularly convey information about their respective policies and activities in the region on a direct, government-to-government basis to avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations. • Regularize bilateral consultations on regional issues. Officials from Washington and Moscow whose portfolios include post-Soviet Eurasian countries should regularly conduct working-level consultations on regional issues. Diplomats on the ground should establish channels of communication, both with one other and, when needed, trilaterally with officials of the countries where they are stationed. • Adjust public rhetoric. Official statements about the region from the United States and Russia often contain inflammatory rhetoric that provoke counterproductive responses. The governments should modify the language they use in their public statements. • Take domestic contexts into account. U.S. and Russian officials should remember that their counterparts do not operate in vacuums. Proposals that would be anathema in the respective domestic political environments are unlikely to be met with approval. • Signal positive-sum intentions. Officials should make a point of publicly affirming a positive-sum approach to bilateral interactions in the region. • Be aware of parochial influences. Senior policymakers must be conscious of the impact of parochial agendas on policy, and take action to mitigate it when circumstances merit. The study analyzes in detail two examples of U.S.-Russia disagreement in the region—the Georgia conflicts and competing integration initiatives—and offers practical recommendations for addressing them. While implementing all of these policy recommendations would not eliminate competition between the United States and Russia in post-Soviet Eurasia—especially among firms from the two countries—it would remove a major source of tension that has in the past nearly upended the U.S.-Russia relationship. Such a breakthrough would bring important benefits to both the United States, Russia and the countries of the region.

Abstract My research will focus on Russia’s relations versus the Western world from the past to the present day. Russia's vision and perception of the West since the end of the Cold War have changed the world substantially, and as a result, the idealism for the West and Russia to be strong allies have rather distanced themselves both diplomatically and politically on the international stage. For viewers to understand the implication of this research analysis, I will examine Russia’s brutal past, the Russian Revolution of 1917, the post-WWII Soviet era, the unending Cold War’s with renewing tensions today and the fall of Communism which precipitated the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. These historical events are thematically linked as early as the Battle of Kulikovo in 1380 in which Russians defeated the Mongols by creating a surprising attack hidden from view. This ideological mechanism of Maskirovka in Russian (Маскировка), meaning ‘masking’ is a deceptive psychological apparatus used in Russian’s technical warfare during previous wars to deceive its enemies from within in a mastery art of wars. This psychological framework of deception is still present today in a series of recent international events about the attempt at reacquiring the former Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia as a sovereign state within the former Soviet Union Republics now known today as Russia. The invasion of Crimea, followed by the annexation of Ukraine in 2014 and the military intervention in Syria in 2015 not only reinserted Russia as a superpower, but also demonstrated these geopolitical moves were carried out to counter-attack NATO aggressive policy of containment toward the Baltic States and along the Russian national borders. Russia also views the West with the propagation of pro-liberalism, the promotion of democracy, human rights, international law, and the global war on Islamic terrorism carrying some significant caveats. The West places Russia on a pedestal of being an antagonist player, nonconformist and rebellious in contradiction with the West’s foreign policy which dictates liberal values and liberties. All of these historical events corroborate with consistency and conformity with the current cold war tensions and frustrations between Russia and the West in a battle of disinformation, cyber warfare attacks and impartial truths. This Russian doctrine also magnifies why Russia does not correlate to the West in a same diplomatic and political manner as the West does. As a result, it creates more geopolitical differences and political divisions. In this Master’s research paper, I will analyze the underlying causes of diplomatic tensions such as the historical, ideological, geopolitical, and political nuances that Russia’s past battles, wars, attacks, and foreign invaders from the West hemisphere have led Russia to be both fearful and defensive toward the Western world. Russia’s tumultuous and dramatic past has cast an overshadowing net over unconstructive ties with the West and deteriorating relations that continue to exacerbate any diplomatic relations from leading to successful outcomes. That has prevented both hemispheres from reaching encouraging and promising mutual footings in world affairs. Is there a way to mollify the renewed tensions between the West and Russia? Yes, and I will demonstrate that both the West and Russia can mend their differences and reset their partnerships. However, the latter is also true that increasing strains during the investigation will bring forth to the readers tangible evidence that Russia and the West will continue for years to come to be suspicious and skeptical of one and another. East-West’s problematic political discourses compounded by distrustful and complicated bilateral relations within the crossfire NATO and the European Union could potentially destabilize peace and security and as a result, reshape the world itself between the East and the West.

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