The Artistic Turn: A Manifesto

This paper will look a tradition in Western philosophy that is sympathetic to a conception of knowledge, which is amenable to the truth claims of practice. Proceeding through an examination of a tradition, beginning with Aristotle’s analysis of the kinds of knowledge represented by techne and phronesis (or practical wisdom), the paper will examine the thought of the eighteenth century Neapolitan theorist Giovanni Battista Vico, in particular his reassertion of the significance of phronesis in the context of the overwhelming impact of Cartesian method. The paper will finally concentrate on the contribution of two major tinkers whose work progresses this tradition, Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Aristotle pointed out that someone “knows a thing scientifically when he possesses a conviction arrived at in a certain way, and when the first principles on which the conviction rests are known to him with certainty”. Thomas Kuhn develops this idea when he asserts that, “normal science... is predicated on the assumption that the scientific community knows what the world is like”. It is this idea that Heidegger addresses when he says that: “the mathematical” or scientific “project... is the anticipation of the essence of things, of bodies; thus the basic blueprint of the structure of every thing and its relation to every other thing is sketched in advance”. In this regard he critiques science’s fore-projection onto the real. This paper presumes that research in the visual arts should reflect the nature of those arts, their processes and purposes. The knowledge claims of the arts and particularly the fine arts are often compared in less than favourable terms to those of science, a phenomenon reminiscent of an earlier historical moment outlined by Gadamer, when “the human sciences’ claim to know something true came to be measured by a standard foreign to it – namely the methodical thinking of modern science”. The contemporary manifestation of this phenomenon is the cause of considerable anxiety within the still emerging culture of practice based and practice-led research in these fields. This phenomenon for both Gadamer’s and Heidegger might be regarded as being due to a kind of category error, because as Heidegger in particular asserts, those aspects of truth that emerge from each discipline differ according to the ontological status of the nature of their enquiry. In Being and Time, Heidegger argued that ‘the kind of care that manipulates things and puts them to use... has its own kind of knowledge’. Gadamer develops this point further in asserting that the human being is fundamentally concerned with action, application and service. He or she is primarily a doer and a maker, concerned with their environment and predisposed to intervention. With regard to the question of knowledge, the human being is not merely concerned with establishing “what is”, rather as “an active being”, his or her more primal concerned is with “what is not always the same but can also be different”. This paper outlines how in this tradition knowledge embodied in creative praxis represents in epistemological terms a paragon.

w/k - Between Science and Art, 2022

Those were the days, when we were all at sea. It seems like yesterday to me. Species, sex, race, class: in those days none of this meant anything at all. No parents, no children, just our selves, strings of inseparable sisters, warm and wet, indistin guishable one from the other, gloriously indiscriminate, pro miscuous and fused. No generations. No future, no past. An endless geographic plane of micromeshing pulsing quanta, lim idess webs of interacting blendings, leakings, mergings, weaving through ourselves, running rings around each other, heedless, needless, aimless, careless, thoughdess, amok. Folds and fold ings, plying and multiplying, plicatirig and replicating. We had no definition, no meaning, no way of telling each other apart. We were whatever we were up to at the time. Free exchanges, microprocesses finely tuned, polymorphous transfers without regard for borders and boundaries. There was nothing to hang on to, nothing to be grasped, nothing to protect or be protected from. Insides and outsides did not count. We gave no thought to any such things. We.gave no thought to anything at all. Every-on the cards Until the early eighteenth century, when mechanisms which allowed looms to automatically select their own threads were introduced, it could take a weaver "two or three weeks to set up a drawloom for a particular pattern." The new devices used 1 punched-paper rolls, and then punched cards which, when they 4 were strung together in the early nineteenth century, made the loom into the first piece of automated machinery. It was Joseph Marie Jacquard, a French engineer, who made this final move. ''Jacquard devised the plans of connecting each group of threads that were to act together, with a distinct lever belonging exclu sively to that group. All these levers terminate in rods" and a "rectangular sheet of pasteboard" moves "with it all the rods of the bundle, and consequendy the threads that are •connected with each of them." And if this board, "instead of being plain, were pierced with holes corresponding to the extremities of the levers which meet it, then, since each of the levers would pass through the pasteboard during the motion of the latter, they would all remain in their places. We thus see that it is easy so to determine the position of the holes in the pasteboard, that, at any given moment, there shall be a certain number of levers, and consequendy parcels of threads, raised, while the rest re main where they were. Supposing this process is successively repeated according to a law indicated by the pattern to be 1 the one operation, +, is, in fact, the whole sum and object of 7 that engine." But if the Difference Engine could simply add up, the Analytical Engine was capable of performing the "whole of arithmetic." Women can't add, he said once, Jokingly. Wh en I asked him what he meant, he said, For them, one and one and one and one don 't make four. What do they make? I said, expecting five or three. Just one and one and one and one, he said. Margaret Atwood , The Handmaid's Ta le "If we compare together the powers and the principles of con struction of the Difference and of the Analytic Engines," she wrote, "we shall perceive that the capabilities of the latter are immeasurably more extensive than those of the former, and that they in fact hold to each other the same relationship as that of analysis to arithmetic." It was, as Babbage wrote, "a machine of 1 once, and passed on in the ordinary regular succession, is 9 brought back to the position it occupied just before it was used the preceding time. The prism then resumes its fo rward rotation, and thus brings the card or set of cards in question into play a second time." The cards were selected by the machine as it needed them, and effectively functioned as a filing system, a means of storage and retrieval which allowed the engine to draw on its own information as required without having to make a linear run through all its cards. "There is no limit to the number of cards that can be used. Certain stuffi require fo r their fa brication not less than twenty thousand cards," and because their repetition "reduces to an immense extent the number of cards required," the Engine could "far exceed even this quantity." This was an improve ment "especially applicable wherever cycles occur in mathemati cal operations," so that "in preparing data for qlculations by the engine," wrote Ada, "it is desirable to arrange the order and combination of the processes with a view to obtain them as • a d e p a n t veal, no soul to bare, not even a sex or a self to please. He pull s aside the veils, the webs of lies, the shrouds of mystery, and the layers of deception and duplicity, and finds no comfort, no there there. Only "the horror of nothing to be seen." Good of her to cover it up for him. This tale of absence, castration, deficiency, negativity, sub stitution was composed by one who m Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari describe as "an overconscious idiot who has no under standing of multiplicities." From Freud's point of view, there is one and its other, which is simply what one sees of it. And what one sees is nothing at all. "Because the path it traces is invisible and becomes visible only in reverse, to the extent that it is travelled over and covered by the phenomena it induces within the system, it has no place other than that from which it is 2 'n.ll ssing,' no identity other than that which it lacks." 5 Anna Freud's biographer describes her as a woman who "specialized in reversals, in making the absent present, the lost found, the past current. .. she could also make the undone 4one, or-even more valuable-d oable. When she was tired and faced with a stack of letters to answer, for example, she would simply set her pen down on a blank page and scurry it along, making quick mountain ranges of scribble. Then she would sign her name under the rows of scribble in her charac teristic way, as one flourishing word: ANNAFREUD. " After that, it was downhill all the way. "Having thus writ ten a l etter in fantasy with complete ease, she wrote a real letter helped by the sense that the task was accomplished anyway." It's easy to complete a job already done. "Her lectures were com posed in the same way. First she lectured in her imagination, enjoying the thunderous applause, and then she made an outline of what she had said, adjusting it if she needed to for greater simplicity and coherence. Later, with her outline in hand, she ': : f. 1!� " ;o_ .. :W.e. ; • ; �-.. With his argument that organisms survived because they :,were fit enough to do so, and not because they were hand '•picked by God, Darwin certainly succeeded in removing theol 'ogy from the evolutionary picture. Biological selection was not �divine, but natural, and the organisms which proliferated were �ply those which proliferated. Natural selection "is a game

2018

catala«La recerca artistica» es un terme de moda que sembla portar les practiques de les arts contemporanies cap a noves formes, academicament mes respectables i properes a les ciencies socials i empiriques i a les humanitats. La introduccio de doctorats a les escoles d’arts i la normalitzacio dels plans d’estudi a Europa arran del Proces de Bolonya han estat cabdals en aquest sentit. Aquestes urgencies han creat una confusio enorme al voltant del significat de «recerca artistica». M’agradaria ajudar a aportar una mica d’ordre a aquestes veus sovint contradictories. El valor de l’art rau en el que el separa de la religio, la ciencia, la filosofia i totes les altres formes i productes del pensament huma, i estic convencut que qualsevol persona que cerqui el reconeixement academic i l’eliminacio de les diferencies esta confosa. En aquest article distingeixo entre cinc conceptes diferents en l’us de l’expressio «recerca artistica»: 1. Recerca per a l’art; es a dir, per a la produccio d...

2015

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the importance of mastering the academic writing skill . In order to achieve our goal, two main ideas will be developed ;the first will discuss new concepts of the theory of learning with a specific focus on the relationship between transformational/telling knowledge, constructivist theory and the difference between successful /average learner . The second section will expose the three-stages of writing as a process approach in terms of pre writing, writing and post writing tasks. This will hopefully help students of fine arts promote an analytical spirit and achieve personal and academic writing for the fulfillment of their memoirs

2020

Sisyphus — Journal of Education, 2015

Although almost every debate about artistic research highlights its novelty in references to «uncertainty», »indefinability», and to its lack of identity whilst «bound to a tradition external to itself», this novelty has lasted for a few decades already. Many of the problems raised today are to be found back when research and art education began to relate within the academic context in the 1980s. So where is the speculative discussion on its uncertainty taking artistic research to? Is a solution intended to be found? Is there a problem to be solved? Through ‘productivitism’ this text argues that the aprioristic idea that artistic research is problematic has been securing its state of pendency and increasing its fragility. The final part of the article suggests a creative potential and a challenging dimension in the process of institutionalization, and ends by pointing out possible topics of work for a shared agenda with contemporary art.

If we wish to investigate the processes of artistic creation, we will probably start with the question of how we can best penetrate these processes. Our basic understanding of artistic praxis here determines whether we regard it primarily as a product of a discourse or whether we understand 'praxis' as a term that refers to an array of connected activities that also have an ontological dimension. In the second case, our object of investigation cannot be exclusively discursive. The process of artistic creation as a subject of research is by no means spotless. On the one hand we ascribe the attribute of 'artistic' to some practices, but to others we do not. Secondly, the concept of creation is embedded in a semantic field and closely linked to historic and discourse-specific assumptions. A large majority would probably agree with the statement that artistic creation is more or less an open process that is embedded in a social and cultural sphere. This also implies that artistic processes presuppose knowledge. The assumption that processes of creation are characterised by the intention or the desire to create or invent something aesthetically and artistically valuable also seems generally plausible. If one follows embodied knowing, etc.)so we may speak of a theory of knowing. This differs from the traditional theory of knowledge. The difference refers to distinct objects. The traditional theory of knowledge distinguishes between truth in the sense of conception, however defined (empirically proved, logically consistent or theoretically founded) and non-truth. The theory of knowing, in contrast, develops on the basis of a different guiding differentiation, namely between successful and unsuccessful action. 'Successful' refers to a pragmatic 1 dimension. Valuations of action are based on culturally established forms of engagement and styles of action that play a paradigmatic role. The success criteria are complex and contentious 2similar to the truth criteria. The difference between knowledge and knowing, connoisseurship and ability is also evident in their absence. The lack of knowledge usually leads to ignorance; the lack of ability and skill, to incompetence and failure. 3 There is also a further differentiating aspect. While the validity of knowledge is dependent either on theory or on sound experience, the value of knowing is less oriented on explicit theories but rather on implicit examples and competence regimes. 4 All these differences can be derived from the Aristotelian distinction between episteme, technai and praxis as well as from the differentiation between propositional and non-propositional knowledge, which was already formulated in 20th century philosophy (see Wittgenstein, Dewey, Heidegger, Polanyi). 5 True, there are theoretical analyses of practical fields such as pedagogic action, ethics, arts, politics or technology, but theoretically formulated insights cannot replace praxis and no practical knowing, no ability arises solely from theory. When people learn to play the piano, they have to practise on the instrument. Knowledge of music theory cannot improve their knowledge. It must also further think through the development of artistic knowing and its interplay with other aggregate states of knowledge. Apart from this, the explanation of creative practice, that is, the emergence of actions that have not been planned in advance and which are tailor-made for a specific situation, still represents a great challenge. If nothing else, the theory of artistic knowing should show the social origin of knowing. Without a social theory, without the integration of an institution theory, epistemological analysis will not be able to cope with the task. In view of these challenges, it is clear that the theory of knowing has to exceed the disciplinary boundaries of philosophy. It has to open itself up methodologically and theoretically and allow itself to be enriched by other specialist disciplines.

2020

Since its beginnings in the 1990s, “artistic research” has become established as a new format in the areas of educational and institutional policy, aesthetics, and art theory. It has now diffused into almost all artistic fields, from installation to experimental formats to contemporary music, literature, dance or performance art. But from its beginnings—under labels like “art and science” or “scienceart” or “artscience” that mention both disciplines in one breath—it has been in competition with academic research, without its own concept of research having been adequately clarified. This manifesto attempts to resolve the problem and to defend the term and the radical potentials of a researching art against those who toy all too carefully with university formats, wishing to ally them with scientific principles. Its aim is to emphasize the autonomy and particular intellectuality of artistic research, without seeking to justify its legitimacy or adopt alien standards.

English version of "Künstlerische Forschung", in Hans-Peter Schwarz (Hg.): Zeichen nach vorn. 125 Jahre Hochschule für Gestaltung und Kunst Zürich. Hochschule für Gestaltung und Kunst Zürich, Zürich, 2003

Knowledge in its current form is not identical to the knowledge of the sciences. Scientific knowledge is a specific kind of discourse that is set off from the discourse genres of other, non-scientific areas of competence. In concert, they all form a diversity of essentially equivalent and equally necessary systems. Nonetheless, the currently prevalent style of thinking is that cultivated by the sciences and the humanities. And it is primarily scientific technology that has proven to be the most efficient contributor to contemporary society's focus on innovation. Scholarship and the sciences also constitute the last bastion of a culture that exists exclusively as high culture. Scientific research is a curious mixture of ideology and practice, of realistic procedures and unreal demands. The need to resort to scientific support in order to reinforce the relevance or status of a given area of competence has become obsolete. In this paper I shall outline a few thoughts on the character of research in the fine arts. The concept of research is closely allied with the sciences. Even so, it is fruitful to apply this term to the pragmatic context of artistic endeavour although it is not possible to address the concepts of research and art in greater depth in this context.

Journal of Research …, 2011

Following the integration of artistic disciplines within the university, artists have been challenged to review their practice in academic terms. This has become a vigorous epicentre of debates concerning the nature of research in the artistic disciplines. The special issue "On Reflecting and Making in Artistic Research Practice" captures some of this debate. This editorial article presents a broad-brush outline of the debates raging in the artistic disciplines and presents three discernible trends in those debates. The trends highlight different core questions: (1) Art as research: Can artistic practice represent forms of inquiry acceptable within academic settings? (2) Academically-attuned practiceled research: Can art practice and research practice cooperate as equal partners within the university context? (3) Artistic research: Can the academic notion of research be extended to include the unique results possible through artistic research? The articles in the special issue offer a discussable overview of the current stage in the development of artistic research, demonstrating how creative practice and research practice can come together.