Untangling the Syrian jihadist web

The Syrian uprising began as a secular, nationalist struggle in 2011 but gradually devolved into a vortex of sectarian warfare with more than 200,000 dead and another 10 million people displaced. Amid the chaos, the radical Sunni Islamist groups Ahrar al-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusra, and the Islamic State became the most prominent in the conflict. This thesis explores why and how the groups emerged in Syria, rose to power, and proliferated to unprecedented levels by tracing the progression of the Syrian conflict through three cycles of contestation: protest, insurgency, and civil war. Combining elements from social movement, insurgency, and radicalization theories as well as civil war literature, this thesis dissects the radical Islamist ideology, the institutional legacies from prior struggles, and the role of external sponsors and places each in the context of the Syrian conflict. History has proven that the radical Islamists fighting in Syria today are the next generation of leaders in the global jihad movement. Understanding their rise to power provides crucial insight to our future enemies. This thesis seeks to go beyond a recitation of facts and links multiple frameworks with the rise of the most powerful radical Islamist groups in the Syrian conflict.

Small Arms Survey - Dispatch n°4, 2014

Key findings of the Dispatch include the following: - Recruiting networks outside Syria do not appear to be structured. Instead, a largely bottom-up voluntary recruitment and routing process is in place. - Foreign fighters in Syria are most concerned with the political context of their home countries set in a regional perspective. The special place of Bilad al-Sham (Greater Syria) in Islamic doctrine and the fight against the Syrian government’s injustices are lesser motivations. - ISIS’s strength should not be overestimated. While it has some comparative advantages, it does not maximize them, or they are outweighed by its weaknesses.

2013

Perspectives on Terrorism, 2019

The period 2012-2018 is turning out to be an important transformative period for the global Jihadi movement, most importantly because of events in Syria but also resulting from Jihadists' ability to expand and take advantage of beneficial opportunity structures in other war theatres. The article identifies the most important trends of this period for the future evolution of Jihadism, namely the ideological evolution, Jihadism as a tangible political project, internal conflict, networks and training, the coming of a new generation of ideologues and technical evolution. Similar to previous transformative periods in Afghanistan and Iraq, the argument made here is that these six trends will have a long-lasting impact on the Jihadi movement and guide the behaviour of groups and individuals for years to come.

The Syrian regime unleashed unprecedented violence to suppress large-scale non-violent protests amid the Arab uprisings. Hundreds of armed groups formed throughout the country to defend the protesters and fight back. However, in contrast to other conflicts previously dominated by al-Qaeda and Islamic State, the two largest Syrian Jihadi groups, Ahrar al-Sham and then Jabhat al-Nusra, rejected global jihad and began to cultivate new ties with the population, other armed opposition groups, and even foreign states. This strategic shift is a response to the Jihadi paradox--a realization that while Jihadis excel at leading insurgencies, they fail to achieve political victories. In From Jihad to Politics, Jerome Drevon offers an examination of the Syrian armed opposition, tracing the emergence of Jihadi groups in the conflict, their dominance, and their political transformation. Drawing upon field research and interviews with Syrian insurgents in northwestern Syria and Turkey, Drevon demonstrates how the context of a local conflict can shape armed groups' behavior in unexpected ways. Further, he marshals unique evidence from the Arab world's most intense conflict to explain why the trajectory of the transnational Jihadi movement has altered course in recent years.

Hoover Institution Press, 2010

With field notes accumulated in a Syrian environment not generally hospitable to research and inquiry, Nibras Kazimi provides a unique view of the Syrian regime and its base at home, filling a void in our understanding of the intelligence barons and soldiers who run that country. He offers a look at the tactical, propagandists and strategic ingredients required, in jihadist eyes, for a successful jihad—and whether those ingredients are available in Syria.

2014

ne of the key factors contributing to the success of efforts to defeat al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was that "foreign" fighters, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and others primarily from Jordan and Syria, dominated the organization. These outsiders attempted to impose their influence in Iraq, alienating local Sunni communities and turning them against AQI. Will Syria's extreme Islamists make the same mistakes, or will they build strong local connections? Will they play the role of spoilers in the political process, as suggested by announcements coming from the Nusra Front and others, or can they be convinced to participate in the political process? Reports indicate there are up to 10,000 foreign fighters, many affiliated with al-Qaeda, currently in Syria. 1 In what directions and how far will they pull the Syrian opposition? Security analysts are raising questions about the organizational structure, ideology and potential unintended impacts of Salafi networks within the umbrella of Syrian Islamist groups fighting the Assad regime in Syria. 2 Whatever the post-conflict power sharing arrangement, important decisions must be made about these Salafi networks: will they be spoilers or will they be powerful political brokers? There is no question that battlefield heroes will wield significant sway; however the secular opposition groups supported by the West lack discipline, loyalty, and a united overarching vision for a post-Assad Syria. Meanwhile Syrian Salafi jihadists have set themselves apart from traditional armed groups like the Free Syrian Army (FSA), gaining popularity and credibility due to their bravery, guerrilla fighting capabilities, access to arms, financing and uniting ideology. 3 As Salafi influence grows, the secular elements of the Syrian opposition still struggle to obtain strategic weapons, training, and international financing to help make tangible military advances on the ground.

2016

In The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, The Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency , Charles Lister offers a comprehensive, detailed analysis that traces the ebb and flow of the conflict in Syria from March 2011 to September 2015 and its complex dynamics. Fisayo Ajala recommends this book as an indispensable guide to the different jihadist groups, their governance structures and modes of operations for those researching terrorism in the contemporary moment.