Two Theories of Christian Virtue

THOMAS AQUINAS famously posits not one, but two sets of moral virtues: the acquired virtues, which order man to his natural good and which can be acquired through one's own repeated virtuous acts, and the infused virtues, which order man to supernatural beatitude and which must be bestowed on man by God.The very fact that Aquinas describes two sets of moral virtues naturally raises the question of how he believes those virtues are related.This latter question is particularly important because of its ties to broader questions about the relationship between grace and nature.To draw too sharp a distinction between the infused and acquired virtues-to argue, for instance, that one set of virtues has nothing at all to do with the other-would be tantamount to a denial of the oft-repeated and thoroughly Thomistic idea that grace perfects nature. Aquinas clearly believes that there is at least a minimal relationship between the infused and acquired virtues, for he argues that the cultivation of the acquired virtues disposes one to receive grace and the infused virtues. A number of scholars, however, argue that the relationship between the infused and acquired virtues goes much deeper than this, and that these virtues are mutually interdependent: on the one hand, the infused virtues perfect and complete the acquired virtues; on the other hand, one cannot successfully carry out acts of infused virtue unless one simultaneously cultivates the acquired virtues. Scholars who make such claims, moreover, typically support them by citing the same few texts of Aquinas. My aim in this essay is not to defend or refute the claims themselves, but rather to examine three texts

The hybrid character of the infused moral virtue according to

Journal of Religious Ethics, 1999

Aquinas is often presented as following Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics when treating moral virtue. Less often do philosophers consider that Aquinas's conception of the highest good and its relation to the functional character of human activity led him to break with Aristotle by replicating each of the acquired moral virtues on an infused level. The author suggests that we can discern reasons for this move by examining Aquinas's commentary on the Sententiae of Peter the Lombard and the Summa theologiae within their historical context. The author's thesis is that Dominican pastoral and intellectual concerns led Aquinas to argue that moral virtue must necessarily be ordered toward the highest good. Understanding this purpose helps to explain his presentation of moral virtue and its implications for standard philosophical interpretations of his work.

In her seminal essay The Subversion of Virtue: Acquired and Infused Virtues in the “Summa theologiae”, Jean Porter notes a key challenge for offering a persuasive account of Aquinas’ theory in the contemporary context; namely, one must explain how the acquired and infused moral virtues relate to each other. The debate that has ensued has not yet definitively resolved this issue, and at least two contrary Thomistic interpretations have developed. While a large amount of scholarly literature has covered the intricacies of this debate, this paper seeks to approach the problem from the perspective of cases in the life of a Christian where the acquired and infused virtues seem to conflict. Following the theory of Angela Knobel, I will argue that rather than a true conflict between virtues, this could be better understood as a conflict between the residual dispositions of acts of acquired virtue and the infused moral virtues. This claim ultimately relies on a transformation theory, but what exactly is transformed needs to be further clarified. The structure of this paper consists in three parts. In the first part, I will present the cases of apparent conflict between the acquired and infused moral virtues. One case is drawn from Scripture and two from possible experiences in the lives of recently converted Christians. The question these cases pose concerns the nature of the conflict and the ensuing status of acquired virtues after the infusion of grace. Before providing an answer, the second part of the paper will draw from three developments in the recent Thomistic debate in order to conclude that, after the reception of grace, previous acts of acquired virtue leave behind residual dispositions that potentially conflict with the infused moral virtues. Finally, in the third part of the paper, I will attempt to use the resources gained from part two in order to provide a plausible resolution to the question that arose from the conflict cases. In short, the conflict in the cases is only apparently between the acquired and infused moral virtues. This implies, however, that the acquired virtues no longer remain in the life of the Christian after grace. Since this claim is often taken as a violation of the basic Scholastic axiom that grace perfects nature, I will further show how grace transforms not the acquired virtues but the faculties and powers of the human person. Lastly, in answer to an objection by David Decosimo, I will focus on two conclusions made by Jean Porter concerning the necessity of the infused virtues in the thought of Aquinas.

The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review, 1997

Varieties of Virtue Ethics, 2016

Studies in Christian Ethics, 2023

This essay examines the important role and historical context of spiritual ‘training’ (exercitium) in St. Thomas Aquinas’ account of infused virtue growth. The traditional practice of spiritual training or discipline confronted the dangers of mediocrity, lukewarmness, and relapse in the moral life, seeking further to train us into virtuous conduct through prayer, fasting, vigils, recitation of psalms, examination of conscience, meditation on Scripture, and so forth. Thomas strongly advocated this praxis as crucial to infused virtue growth. I examine the concept of spiritual training as he knew it, and in particular bring into view the unfamiliar context and landscape which gave it intelligibility. To this end I articulate the patristic and medieval sources which he relied upon and show what is distinctive in his account relative to that of contemporaries. While his account is not parochial to Dominican life, I argue that the Order’s literature regulating the formation of friars sheds crucial light on how Thomas conceived of spiritual training in practice, and conclude by suggesting some implications for moral theology and virtue theory.

Whereas the New Testament presents the theological virtues as directed to Christ, Thomas Aquinas argues that their object is God. This paper argues that he plays close attention to these New Testament teachings and identifies a threefold christological dimension of the theological virtues. Nevertheless, this dimension is often in the background. In his view, Scripture presents the theological virtues as an eschatological reality: a requirement of beatitude, which consists in consummated union with the Triune God. Consequently, their object is the Triune God, who offers us a share in his beatitude. Nevertheless, God has communicated grace and beatitude to us through Christ and his paschal mystery. For this reason, Christ's humanity, and with it his mysteries and actions, also belongs to the object of the theological virtues.

Parergon, 2018