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2018, Does Altruism Exist? Culture, Genes and the Welfare of Others
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This book belongs to a special series -Foundational Questions in Science-which has been published by the John Templeton Foundation to investigate crucial scientific concepts and their philosophical background. As the first book of this initiative, ""Does Altruism Exist?" puts its finger on the age-old debate extending from ancient to modern times in many branches-economics, social psychology, sociology -. In this respect, the question of whether altruism exists or not is a multi-faceted current discussion and one at the same time that is proving difficult to find a solution for. Professor David Sloan Wilson has been studying evolutionary theory and how it applies to all aspects of life in his non-profit organization-The Evolution Institute-and he is a distinguished professor of biology and antropology at Binghampton University. The aim of professsor Wilson and his team is to search for solutions to real-world problems. Therefore, in this book, the question has been tried to be cleared up with an evolutionary approach in terms of action and the context of everyday life (Wilson, 2015, p. x).
2012
Altruism is a malleable notion that is understood differently in various disciplines. The common denominator of most definitions of altruism is the idea of unidirectional helping behaviour. However, a closer examination reveals that the term altruism sometimes refers to the outcomes of a helping behaviour for the agent and its neighbours -i.e. reproductive altruism -and sometimes to what motivates the agent to help others -i.e. psychological altruism. Since these perspectives on altruism are crucially different, it is important to use a clear terminology to avoid confusion. In particular, we show that the notion of altruism used by biologists profoundly differs from the ones used by philosophers, psychologists and economists in cross-disciplinary debates about human altruism.
Study of Changing Societies: Comparative and Interdisciplinary Focus, Vol. 2'(4) 2012
, we will try to concern the nature and content of the altruistic behavior, the forms and the reasons of altruism. The author systematizes different typologies of altruism. The objective to look for the motives of altruistic behavior. One of crucial part of the paper is concerned about possible benefits of altruism nowadays. The article also concentrates on critics of altruism, trying to understand, why people are skeptical about altruistic acts.
Philosophical Studies, 1998
Those with an interest in the origin of altruism have to deal with an unnecessary complicating factor; an intrusion by evolutionary biologists into the discussion, which has had serious negative outcomes. The ascendancy of gene-centric thinking in evolutionary biology led to the perceived need to analyse altruism in a way that is consistent with the gene-centric world view. That is, with evolution being seen incorrectly as a process of continuous struggle and competition from which the development of selfishness and individuality are allegedly inevitable, the very existence of altruism was a challenge to that view. Two linked definitions were involved in solving the problem of altruism, biological altruism and biological fitness. (1) Biological fitness is seen as the capacity of an organism to produce adult offspring. Biological altruism is an act which lowers the fitness of the actor while raising the fitness of the recipient. The alleged existence of biological altruism means that we now see the existence of two forms, biological and psychological altruism. The difference between the two is explained here; " This biological notion of altruism is not identical to the everyday concept. In everyday parlance, an action would only be called 'altruistic' if it was done with the conscious intention of helping another. But in the biological sense there is no such requirement. Indeed, some of the most interesting examples of biological altruism are found among creatures that are (presumably) not capable of conscious thought at all, e.g. insects. For the biologist, it is the consequences of an action for reproductive fitness that determine whether the action counts as altruistic, not the intentions, if any, with which the action is performed. " (2) It was W.D. Hamilton's 1964 work on inclusive fitness that allowed altruism to be drawn into the propaganda web to which modern evolutionary orthodoxy has been reduced.
Since the brave attempts to bring Biology to the center of the social sciences discourse, by Edward Wilson and Richard Dawkins with their books Sociobiology and The Selfish Gene, more than forty years ago, Biology has gained recognition as one of the, if not the, main area in the search for human behavior understanding. Disciplines such as behavioral genetics, cognitive neuroscience, and evolutionary psychology among others have been brought to the center of the spectacle in the quest for the understanding of the mind and the influence of those areas is growing every day. Within this perspective this article brings attention to how the problem of understanding human altruism could be better comprehended with the addition of the information brought by the biological disciplines involved in the understanding of human behavior.
Smith and Smith claimed that altruistic action "is intended to benefit others beyond simple sociability or duties associated with role." This definition will need to be carefully applied to behavior in communal cultures as they have extended obligation networks, the basis of which are expected helping behaviors offered to others in the network. Therefore, behaviors that would be captured by the coding scheme in an individualistic culture would not necessarily be seen as altruistic in a communal culture as they may be non-voluntary and role-related. Six components of altruistic behavior are addressed here, and two of these are predicted to differ according to the culture in which they are enacted. These are determining whether the act was motivated by a primary concern for the other and whether the actor would be likely to engage in self blame if he or she did not engage in the action. The other three components of altruistic behavior are postulated to operate pan-culturally. They are actual benefit to the recipient, empathy, cost to the initiator, and ease of escape from social censure.
Altruism is a deep and complex phenomenon that is analysed by scholars of various disciplines, including psychology, philosophy, biology, evolutionary anthropology and experimental economics. Much confusion arises in current literature because the term altruism covers variable concepts and processes across disciplines. Here we investigate the sense given to altruism when used in different fields and argumentative contexts. We argue that four distinct but related concepts need to be distinguished: (a) psychological altruism, the genuine motivation to improve others' interests and welfare; (b) reproductive altruism, which involves increasing others’ chances of survival and reproduction at the actor’s expense; (c) behavioural altruism, which involves bearing some cost in the interest of others; and (d) preference altruism, which is a preference for others' interests. We show how this conceptual clarification permits the identification of overstated claims that stem from an imprecise use of terminology. Distinguishing these four types of altruism will help to solve rhetorical conflicts that currently undermine the interdisciplinary debate about human altruism.
2016
This study investigated the relations between altruism, empathy, and spirituality in a sample of 186 university students. Zero-order and partial correlations controlling for age, sex, and social desirability indicated that, although altruism and empathy are related to each other in a manner consistent with previous research, the association of both of these to spirituality is complex and multidirectional. In particular, empathy was found to be significantly positively related to nonreligious spiritual cognitions, religiousness, and spiritual experiences and negatively associated with existential well-being. Altruism, on the other hand, was most strongly linked to spiritual experiences, followed by spiritual cognitions. Regression analyses revealed that nonreligious spiritual cognitions and spiritual experiences are the most potent predictors of both empathy and altruism, respectively. Based on the findings and literature suggesting that spirituality may have an impact on empathy and...
Transactions of The American Philological Association, 2000
Zygon®, 2010
One of the central tenets of Christian theology is the denial of self for the benefit of another. However, many views on the evolution of altruism presume that natural selection inevitably leads to a self-seeking human nature and that altruism is merely a façade to cover underlying selfish motives. I argue that human altruism is an emergent characteristic that cannot be reduced to any one particular evolutionary explanation. The evolutionary processes at work in the formation of human nature are not necessarily in conflict with the possibility of altruism; rather, aspects of human nature are uniquely directed toward the care and concern of others. The relationship between altruism, human nature, and evolution can be reimagined by adopting an emergent view of the hierarchy of science and a theological worldview that emphasizes self-renunciation. The investigation of altruism necessitates an approach that analyzes several aspects of altruistic behavior at different levels in the hierarchy of sciences. This research includes the study of evolutionary adaptations, neurological systems, cognitive functions, behavioral traits, and cultural influences. No one level is able to offer a full explanation, but each piece adds a unique dimension to a much larger puzzle.
As one might have deduced from the few comments I offered in our course, DNA, Evolution and the Soul, the idea of the self and the pursuit of ones own growth, betterment and fulfillment occupy the position of central importance in my mind and heart. Within a seminarian setting, amidst many companions preparing themselves for lives of social leadership, group dynamics and moral guidance within the clergy, my own incentives, philosophy and spiritual practice often seem (to me at least) to stand at odds with the majority. Self-criticism and self-doubt mask the, often purposively hidden, foundation of guilt which underlies much of my personal perspective. 1 When Professor Pollack suggested that we choose a topic in the realm of science and religion which makes us uncomfortable, I decided to address the question of whether altruistic behavior in humans can be comprehensively explained within biological theory; namely the schools of evolutionary, behavioral and genetic science. If so, then to what degree can such behavior, and its seemingly moral focus on the well-being of another, be considered to distinguish human beings from other animal species? Furthermore, to what extent may altruistic, seemingly selfless and morally 'good' behavior be explained through, and thus attributed to, selfish 2
The integration of an evolutionary origin of human behavior with the capacity to symbolically idealize concepts such as altruism may help our understanding of the human yearning for transcendence and its biological roots. Biological adaptation has somehow created a brain that yearns for transcendent idealizations of behavior beyond our capability such as utopian ideals of altruism. We explore whether or not evolutionary explanations of altruism show that self-sacrificial behavior is a biological adaptation, a transcendent ideal, or some combination of the two. Using adoption of non-relatives as a model, we review existing data to determine if adoption behavior is altruism or if sociobiological explanations sufficiently show it to be egoistic. Human adoption practices are mostly amenable to evolutionary explanations. The best one can say about most adoption practices with respect to self-sacrifice is that they exhibit pro-social behavior, not altruism. In those few cases where adoption appears to be genetically altruistic, the behavior is most often explained as mis-directed adaptive behavior. To explain the exceptions that still exist, celibates who adopt, in this way is a form of question begging; this behavior deserves a more nuanced description. Although most adoptions are a result of pro-social behavior at best or mis-directed adaptation at worse, we still idealize the concept of adoption as altruism (genetic selfsacrifice), admiring the rare celibates willing to sacrifice reproductive imperatives to raise others' children. Therefore, altruism can be realized within a few who develop in an environment emphasizing transcendent conceptions. It appears that our ability to symbolically idealize altruism makes humans unique considering that our ability to biologically achieve it seems highly limited. Provided we continue striving to meet the ideal, humans can foster hope and purpose rooted in an eschatological future rather than a present reality.
Herbert A. Simon is widely known for his studies on rationality, artificial intelligence and for his pioneering approach to organizational studies. In one of his latest works, he presented a theory of human interaction, focused on the conflict between the selfish and the altruistic that can be seen as the essence of human relationships. The model is quite ambiguous: (1) it follows a kind of social Darwinism that (2) postulates selfish individuals’ extinction. Taking up Simon’s hypotheses on altruism, docility, and selfish behavior, we develop an alternative model of human interaction. The main objective of the paper is to show that rejecting neo-Darwinism and assuming slight complications in the model can explain more in terms of social system interactions. We assume that docility and then altruism, in a technical sense, is the basis of social interaction as it shapes the whole system. It is worth noting that, in the model, selfish individuals do not disappear.
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2020
In this essay, I first show that, from the view that God is the ultimate cause of the human ability to perform ethically laudable acts, does not follow that no continuity between biological and intentional altruism is possible. In line with recent theological research concerning the non-human world, I argue that there is a partial continuity between these two forms of altruism. I also show that, from a naturalistic viewpoint, no continuity at all seems demonstrable between the two forms of altruism at stake. I therefore contribute to strengthen a more general conviction, according to which evolution in itself is more persuasive than its combination with naturalism.
in: De Anna, Willing the Good, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2012, pp. 126-147, Nov 2012, 2012
"This paper exams the shift from optimism to pessimism (and lately back to optimism) about a reconciliation of ethics and evolution. The different options relate to different paradigms of evolutionary biology: Simply put, early biology, from Darwin to the school of ethology, tends to emphasise a possible harmony between nature and ethics: strong social instincts and cooperation are necessary for the survival of the group. Given natural selection and the progress of culture, virtue might likely be triumphant, as Darwin already claims (first section). Sociobiology and the selfish-gene theory emphasise however a deep rooted conflict between nature and ethics: selfishness is the only possible sustainable strategy in evolutionary competition (second section). This change of tone is related to a change from individual or group selection to gene selection. I want to argue that the paradigmatic shift about the ‘unit of selection’ in Sociobiology a) in fact might solve some of the notorious problems of the evolution of altruism in a Darwinian framework, but b) it does so by a misunderstanding concerning what should be conceptually labelled ‘selfishness’, and therefore c) this opens the door to a better re-interpretation of Dawkins’ insight in such a way that the resulting position is strikingly similar to Darwin’s optimism. Hence, rather than either re-invoking group selection as the only means to defend optimism about human nature, or stressing the gap between animals and humans in a dualistic fashion, a third possibility can be proposed: an option that does not fall into the simple trap of the dichotomy between ‘egoistic’ nature and ‘altruistic ethics’ (third section) "
vssr.info
One of the central tenants of the Christian tradition is the renunciation of self for the service and sacrifice of another, which is the general understanding of altruism. This is one of the defining characteristics of many religions and is often offered as an important feature that distinguishes religious concerns. However, many current and historical views on evolution presume that natural selection inevitably leads to a self-seeking human nature and altruism is merely a façade to cover underlying selfish motives. How can the altruism present in so many religious traditions arise from "selfish genes" and "nature red in tooth and claw" (Tennyson 1850; Dawkins 1976)? Human altruism is an emergent feature of human cognition that cannot be reduced to any one particular evolutionary explanation. However, the evolutionary processes at work in the formation of human nature are not necessarily in direct conflict with the possibility of altruism; rather, aspects of human nature are uniquely directed toward the care and concern of others.
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