Quatenus and Spinoza's Monism

I show how Spinoza developed Cartesian metaphysics in order to draw from it some very extreme theological implications, situating his work in his intellectual and political context. Many Dutch Cartesians wanted to separate theology from philosophy entirely. Metaphysics was a problem for them, since it had traditionally been a point of contact between theology and philosophy. Accordingly, they attempted to play down the metaphysical elements in Descartes' philosophy. Spinoza, by contrast, emphasised these elements, and in this move, I propose, we find the origin of the most theologically radical elements of his own mature philosophy.

"Spinoza is the rationalist philosopher par excellence, making every conceivable emancipatory claim for reason in delineating the connection of reason to freedom and power. Spinoza develops a philosophy which affirms the emancipatory function of reason. This kind of philosophy has been challenged in recent times by postmodernist modes of thought. Whereas Spinoza affirms knowledge as power in a positive sense, the likes of Michel Foucault argue a knowledge/power nexus that savours more of an Hobbesian ceaseless conflict. Foucault’s equation of all forms of knowledge with the endless exercise of a power, the effects of which may be discursively placed but whose authority cannot be subject to rational criticism, explicitly denies the emancipatory function that Spinoza assigned to reason. Free of such rational critique, discourse inspired by Foucault lacks political and ethical import. Not surprisingly, Foucault’s work has proved itself to be compatible with a wide range of political platforms, spanning the spectrum from New Left to New Right. This political ambivalence directly follows from the loss of an ethical position owing to the denial of rational critique. The distinguishing characteristic of ‘the Left’ in both politics and ethics has been the commitment not just to challenge existing power structures in favour of the poor, the marginalized and the suppressed but to associate this challenge with a commitment to distinguish truth from ideological mystification and obfuscation. In connecting his rational philosophy with democratic politics, Spinoza is a ‘Left’ thinker in this grand tradition. This thesis highlights the ‘radical’ aspects of Spinoza’s rationalist philosophy, finding inspiration in his God-Nature relation, his democratic politics and his commitment to free rational thinking as subversive of all forms of coercive or state-sanctioned religious doctrine. The book argues that Spinoza makes it possible to resist the postmodernist drift by affirming the possibility of separating truth from illusion, reason from rhetoric. In this manner, philosophy can retain its emancipatory function and engage the political, social and economic issues of the day in a critical and emancipatory sense. In delineating the terms of freedom, knowledge and power and in showing their connection to each other, Spinoza offers a means of resisting the relativising tendencies of contemporary theory and, indeed, the way that this relativism in ethics serves existing power and entrenches the forces of political conservatism. The truth, for Spinoza, is the product not of consensus-belief but of rational critique which subjects existing norms and values to question. Not the least of Spinoza’s achievements is to have shown how such rational critique – the very stuff of philosophy – is no longer an elitist concern leading to the philosopher-ruler but has the potential to emancipate all humankind, since knowledge is key to an active relation to the world." This book has now been published and is available for purchase.

Encyclopedia of Early Modern Philosophy and the Sciences

In Y. Melamed (ed.), The Young Spinoza (Oxford UP, forthcoming)., 2015

We are accustomed to think of Spinoza's definitions of God, Substance and Attribute as fixed and settled formulations of the core of Spinoza’s metaphysics, but if we look at the development of Spinoza’s thought, the picture we get is quite different. In the early drafts of the Ethics and in his early works, Spinoza seems to have experimented with various conceptualizations of the relations between substance, attribute, and God. Some of Spinoza’s works make barely any use of the notions of substance and attribute, and the testimony of Spinoza’s letters suggests that, at a certain stage in his philosophical development, the concept of attribute may have been put on the back burner, if not completely dropped. In this paper I will attempt to provide a brief outline of the genealogy of Spinoza’s key metaphysical concepts. This genealogy, like any other, can help us to reexamine and reconsider what seems to us natural, stable and obvious. In the first part of the paper, I rely on Spinoza’s letters to trace the development of his definitions of substance and attribute in the early drafts of the Ethics. The letters, whose dates are more or less established, also provide a temporal grid for our subsequent discussions. The second part surveys Spinoza’s discussion and conceptualization of substance and attributes in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, the Theological-Political Treatise (1670), and briefly, Spinoza’s 1663 book on Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy, and its appendix on Metaphysical Thoughts, the Cogitata Metaphysica. The third part of the paper is dedicated to Spinoza’s understanding of substance and attribute in the Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being. I conclude with some remarks on the stability of Spinoza’s final position on the issue, as expressed in the published version of the Ethics

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

In this paper, I address the issue of what kind of distinction separates the attributes of Spinoza's substance. I propose to consider the distinction between attributes neither as a real distinction nor as a pure distinction of reason. Instead, I ventilate the alternative of understanding attributes as distinguished by a hybrid distinction, of which I trace the development during the Medieval and Early Modern eras. With the term hybrid, I capture distinctions which are neither a real distinction between substances or real accidents; nor a pure distinction of reason, produced or fabricated by the intellect. I shall argue that Spinoza’s notion of attribute falls under the scope of a hybrid distinction, thus sidestepping the longstanding debate between objectivism and subjectivism.

The main thesis of Michael Della Rocca's outstanding Spinoza book (Della Rocca 2008a) is that at the very center of Spinoza's philosophy stands the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR): the stipulation that everything must be explainable or, in other words, the rejection of any brute facts. Della Rocca rightly ascribes to Spinoza a strong version of the PSR. it is not only that the actual existence and features of all things must be explicable, but even nonexistence-as well as the absence of any feature of any thing-demands an explanation. Della Rocca does not stop here, however. He feeds his PSR monster with some more powerful steroids and suggests that Spinoza advocates what he terms "the twofold use of the PSR." It is not only that everything must be explained and made intelligible, but it must ultimately be explained in terms of explicability or intelligibility itself. Thrs twofold use of the PSR is the key to the entire book. Della Rocca's strategy throughout the book is to argue that any key feature of Spinoza's system-be it causality, inherence, essence, consciousness, existence, rejection of teleology, goodness or political right-must be explained, and ultimately it must be explained in terms of intelligibility.

2018

The Mechanical Philosophy of Spinoza • Following Paolo Rossi’s definition of mechanical philosophy, this paper aims to prove that mechanism is the only possible model of natural philosophy for Spinoza. First, I discuss Spinoza’s theory of matter, that is, nothing but a system of matter in motion ruled by eternal laws. Then, I consider the meaning of ‘law’ in Spinoza’s philosophy. A law expresses a logical content; a logical content is always a necessary content. What for humans has a sufficient reason, becomes a divine absolute reason. Thus, the laws of nature are the expression of a logical model, which is underpinned by the field of mathematics’ truths. Then, I deal with the hardest issues for a mechanist interpretation of Spinoza’s natural philosophy, that is, conatus and final causes. In Spinoza’s philosophy, not only do final causes lack any epistemological explanation, but they are also impossible, because of the logical structure of the concept of substance. Regarding conatus, I show that it can be understood as something always resulting from a determination (conatus seu dispositio) and never as what determines something. Understood in such a way, the deep reality of conatus is not an undetermined power to cause something. On the contrary, conatus is always the effect of a determination. In purely mechanistic terms, conatus can be conceived as a geometrical-mechanical form, or essence, which complies with a certain logic of development. In the conclusion of this work I deal with some problems regarding Descartes’ and Spinoza’s physics – above all, the shared claim that any variation proceeds always by a stronger force. Not only does this assumption undermine a true relativistic vision of motion, but it also prevents a genuine knowledge of the notion of ‘rest’ as a measure for the same kind of movement, as Galilei before, and Huygens after understood it.

The Cambridge Critical Guide to Spinoza's Ethics, Yitzhak Melamed, ed. Cambridge, 2017

History and Philosophy of Logic, 2018

The aim of the paper is show that that W. V. O. Quine's animadversions against modal logic did not get the same attention that is considered to be the case nowadays. The community of logicians focused solely on the technical aspects of C. I. Lewis' systems and did not take Quine's arguments and remarks seriously – or at least seriously enough to respond. In order to assess Quine's place in the history, however, his relation to Carnap is considered since their notorious break was about the status of extensionality and modal logic (and analyticity was much more of a second issue). Since much of the works about the history of analytic philosophy is centered on the relationship of Quine and Carnap, their break about modality deserves much more attention – it also sheds some light on why should anyone wonder about Quine's early arguments against modal logic. The paper ends with some further considerations regarding the early formation of modal logic and hitherto unconsidered problematic issues.

Intellectual History Review, 2017

Among Spinoza’s principal projects in the Ethics is his effort to “remove” certain metaethical prejudices from the minds of his readers, to “expose” them, as he has similar misconceptions about other matters, by submitting them to the “scrutiny of reason”. In this article, I consider the argumentative strategy Spinoza uses here – and its intellectual history – in depth. I argue that Spinoza’s method is best characterised as a genealogical analysis. As I recount, by Spinoza’s time of writing, these kinds of arguments already had a long and illustrious history. However, I also argue that, in his adoption of such strategies, we have good reason to think Spinoza’s primary influence was Gersonides. Elucidating this aspect of Spinoza’s critique of his contemporaries’ axiologies brings a number of explicatory and historical boons. However, regrettably, it also comes at a cost, revealing a significant flaw in Spinoza’s reasoning. Towards the end of this article, I consider the nature of this flaw, whether Spinoza can avoid it and its ramifications for Spinoza’s wider philosophical project.

Oxford University Press, 2013

Axioms

In this review, I will discuss the historical importance of “The Significance of the New Logic” by Quine. This is a translation of the original “O Sentido da Nova Lógica” in Portuguese by Carnielli, Janssen-Lauret, and Pickering. The American philosopher wrote this book in the beginning of the 1940s, before a major shift in his philosophy. Thus, I will argue that the reader must see this book as an introduction to an important period in his thinking. I will provide a brief summary of the chapters, remarking on valuable features in each of them and positions Quine abandoned in his later work.

ProQuest, 2020

Spinoza’s doctrine of parallelism admits of certain observed inconsistencies that have long troubled Spinoza scholars. The scholarship over the last one hundred and thirty years or so has offered three dominant interpretations of Spinoza’s metaphysics as a result of the deficiencies with the doctrine of parallelism. These are 1) the subjective/objective distinction according to which the attribute of thought is understood as subjective and the attribute of extension is understood as objective, 2) materialism according to which the attribute of thought is claimed to depend on the attribute of extension, and 3) idealism according to which the attribute of extension is claimed to depend on the attribute of thought. A tension between materialism and idealism is addressed by each of these approaches. And the question of Spinozist idealism is of great concern to contemporary Spinoza scholarship. However, none of these interpretations succeed as they each fail to properly locate Spinoza’s problems with parallelism in a deeper attribute problem. Interpretations 1 and 2 fail more severely for also clashing with other central themes of Spinoza’s project such as his ethics which prioritizes thought at the expense of extension. This dissertation observes that the interpretive trends in the literature not only do not succeed but cannot succeed as Spinoza’s system admits of certain contradictions. Of primary consideration, and beyond the problems with parallelism, conflation of attribute with substance and conflation of attribute with mode. It being the case that Spinoza’s theory of attributes is deficient, I propose a revisionist approach to what I have termed Spinoza’s “deep attribute problem” according to which the attributes are disassociated from the active/passive distinction. The active/passive distinction is shown to be instrumental in tying Spinoza’s metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics together as well as being erroneously applied to the attributes. The proposed revision is that the attributes be disassociated from the active/passive distinction which is to be understood now in terms of a vertical and horizontal association. The vertical association identifies substance-mode relations and the horizontal association identifies mode-mode relations. An important consequence of this revision is that substance is recast as absolutely infinite intellectual substance. As such, Spinoza’s revised system is ontological idealism and it is suggested but left for future research that the revision may entail un understanding of Spinoza’s system too as modal existentialism and ethical mysticism.