Fisheries Economics and Management

Journal of Bioeconomics, 2010

2015

Citation for published version (APA): Nielsen, M., Cozzari, B. L., Eriksen, G., Flaaten, O., Gudmundsson, E., Lokkegaard, J., ... Waldo, S. (2007). Focus on the economy of the Nordic fisheries: Case study reports from Iceland, Norway, the Faroe Islands, Sweden and Denmark. Frederiksberg: Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen. (Report / Institute of Food and Resource Economics; No. 186).

Marine Policy, 1990

species." The quantity of fish harvested may remain constant but the the role of international agencies', World value of the catch will decline. In short, levels of fishing effort beyond Development, Vol 14, Nos 1 O/l 1 October/ those necessary to achieve MSY either deplete the resource or degrade November 1986, pp 1269-l 275; C. Bailey, 'The political economy of fisheries de-its value. velopment in the Third World', Agriculture The limited nature of fisheries resources and their vulnerability to and Human Values. Vol V. Nos 1-2. overexr>Ioitation necessitate proper management to ensure sustainable Winter/Spring 1988, pp 3548; J.P. PIat: teau, 'The dynamic of fisheries develop-harvesis.

Environmental Modeling & Assessment, 2011

Using a bioeconomic model of the cod (Gadus morhua) and capelin (Mallotus villosus) fisheries of the Barents Sea, this study assesses the role of the fishermen's behavior in reducing or intensifying the effects on the stocks caused by altered population dynamics. The analysis focuses on the economic development of the fisheries employing a coupled stock size-hydrography based fishing strategy, which attempts to maximize returns from fishing over a given number of fishing periods. Results show that if the fishing strategy is based on a short optimization period of only two fishing periods, changes in population dynamics have a direct influence on the returns from fishing due to the strong pressure on the stocks applied by the fisheries. If the strategy is based on a longer optimization period, fishing activities may be deferred to allow for stock regrowth, which improves the economic performance of the fisheries. However, in that case the relationship between population dynamics and fishing activities becomes less clear, as even a reduction of the carrying capacities of the two species allows for an increase in the amount of fish landed without causing a stock collapse due to an increased efficiency of fleet utilization. The simulations indicate that management considerations and the time horizon of the fishing strategy dominate the influence of altered population dynamics on the development of the stocks considered in the model.

2005

An analysis is given of some policy aspects in the fishery sector, with particular attention to the European Union situation. The possibility to adapt some traditional economic tools to fisheries management problems is dealt with, in particular the instruments usually used in agricultural economics (concerning demand analysis, production analysis, fishery supply chain analysis and market analysis). In particular some problems of fish production are considered: the problem of production function used to estimate fishing effort, with particular attention to multi-catch activity, typical of the Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas.

Fisheries Centre …, 2005

Economic analysis of fisheries management often relies on the assumption that some form of authority exists which will be able to take up the recommendations of economists, using adequate regulatory instruments. The discussion of management measures implicitly assumes that an external intervention will be possible -usually by the State -either to regulate directly resource use, or to allocate and enforce private use rights in order for decentralised co-ordination systems to operate efficiently. At first sight, economic models developed to explain fisheries over-exploitation leave little hope for selfregulation to emerge from a competitive fishery. The paper focuses on the analytical issues underlying the on-going debate on the possibility for fisheries to be self-regulated. Based on the analysis of a historical case study -the development of management arrangements between whaling firms in the 1930ies and 1950-60ies -it shows that the absence of a central authority cannot be systematically associated to an absence of regulation, and explores some of the implications this has for the economic analysis of fisheries management.

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2001

Economic prescriptions for the sustainable management of fisheries have typically been framed in the context of commercial fisheries. Fishery management failures have been characterized as a consequence of disjointedness between individually rational decisions and globally sensible outcomes-the "tragedy of the commons." The solutions proposed by economists flow from the insight that rational self-interest can lead to socially beneficial outcomes when ownership is secure and prices reflect the opportunity cost of resource use. Theoretical and empirical analyses have demonstrated that sole ownership, individual quotas, territorial use rights, fishing cooperatives, and common property management regimes can promote biologically and economically sustainable fisheries. Nevertheless, implementation of these "solutions" has met with resistance, due in part to the impossibility of uncoupling species within ecological systems and conflict between the proposed solutions and broadly accepted concepts of social justice. The problem of devising a sustainable management strategy is exacerbated in fisheries with diverse consumptive and non-consumptive users. An empirically based simulation-optimization model is used to characterize the biological and economic effects of alternative management regimes in a fishery with commercial and sport fishers. The results are generalized to the case of additional use and nonuse values.

2000

Marine Policy

National wealth can be estimated via the System of National Accounts (SNA). According to SNA-numbers, Norwegian fisheries contributed negatively to the national wealth in the period 1984-2016 with exception of the years 2010-2011 and 2015-2016. Because all parameter values entering the calculation of national wealth are conditional on the existing management regime, the potential value of the natural resources may be concealed. This paper finds that this is the case for the Norwegian fishery sector. Using a numerical optimization model, the paper estimates the contra factual resource rent to be 1.6 billion USD if the fishing quotas were harvested efficiently with the currently available technology. This is 1.2 billion USD more than the observed resource rent in 2011 and means that Norwegian fisheries contribute to national wealth four times more than indicated by 2011 SNA-numbers. Hence, national wealth calculations based on official statistics may trivialize the role of natural resources.

Marine Policy, 2014

In Norway there is a long tradition of allocating fish resources among the fishers. In modern times this has been done through specific allocation keys. This article describes the development of the allocation system for the offshore (trawler) and coastal fleets. The allocation system is closely related to stock assessment and the fixing of global quotas (TACs) as well as structural policies to prevent "capacity creep". All three systems can be seen as institutions, where the TAC-machine is firmly established while the two others are under pressure, largely due to competition on the global fish market. The established goal of maintaining a diversified fishing fleet is now gradually being dismantled, with repercussions for coastal employment and settlement patterns. The coastal fleet is per 2013 something entirely different from the situation in 1990, when the coastal fisheries were effectively closed. Sooner or later this development is bound to change also the management institutions, and in particular the allocation system and the closely related structural policies.

Marine Policy, 2010

ABSTRACT The cod stocks in the Baltic Sea are important not only for fisheries but for the entire ecosystem utilized by numerous stakeholders around the coast. All such activities have economic values. In this note the economics of the Swedish Baltic Sea cod fishery is estimated in relation to the sector's interaction with other users of the Baltic Sea ecosystem. The results show a negative resource rent for the fishery, [euro] -5 million without public expenses (subsidies and administrative costs), and [euro] -13 million including public expenses. The interactions between the fisheries and tourism, seal population, carbon dioxide emissions, recreational fishing, and discards are discussed, and when monetary estimates are available these are related to the estimated resource rent.

Marine Policy, 1993

This paper is concerned with ocean fisheries management with particular emphasis on the application of economic theory to fisheries management practice. The paper begins by briefly discussing the common property nature of ocean fisheries and explains how the common property problem gives rise to the need for a specific management of fisheries. It goes on to examine various proposed methods of fisheries management arguing that only property-rights-based fisheries management systems, such as individual transferable quotas (IT&) or fisheries management based on the imposition of the appropriate tax on catch seem to be capable of delivering the full potential economic benefits of ocean fisheries. Finally, it reviews recent developments in the management of actual ocean fisheries with special reference to Australia, Iceland and New Zealand. The paper concludes that an economic rationalization of ocean fisheries is probably historically inevitable. Moreover, judging from historical trends in fisheries management, this rationalization will probably be accomplished by a property-rights-based management system such as the ITQ system.

2006

In 1976 global exports for fish and fisheries products was approximately $8 billion. In 2000, global exports exceeded $55 billion. The period between 1985 and 1995 witnessed the tripling of global fisheries exports. This represents more than half of total value of global fisheries production. Developing countries began to increase their share of this total during the 1990s and now account for more than half of global exports. In 2000 the net trade value (exports minus imports) for developing country seafood exports exceeded $18 billion. Taken at face value these statistics suggest that the monetary benefits of fisheries trade have increased in the wake of EEZ extension with developing countries benefiting the most. These statistics fail to reflect some important costs, however. Such costs include subsidies to the fishing industry and a variety of social and environmental externalities associated with changes in fishing activity. They also tell us little about how both costs and benefits resulting from fisheries trade our distributed among a variety of affected stakeholders within fisheries and the communities that depend upon them. In particular, the trends depicted above have been criticized for adverse impacts on small-scale fishing communities and their historical institutional arrangements. This paper will explore the interplay between seafood trade, fisheries management and human livelihoods. The paper will argue that economic structure of a given fisheries sector, the political organization of its industry, and the institutional arrangements that govern it all play important roles in determining the size and distribution of costs and benefits associated with the expansion of seafood trade.

Collection of four papers on the system of ITQs, Individual Transferable Quotas, in fisheries, in particular the ethics and economics of the initial allocation of quotas and the experience in Iceland of an ITQ system.