Relativism

This paper discusses the ethical and epistemological implications of cultural relativism. An initial analysis identifies two possible sources of cultural relativism – the ideology rampant in current liberal democracies and what I term as “environmental fundamentalism”. It then moves on to discuss cultural relativism in relation to such universal ethical values as the basic human right of survival and the right to physical integrity. The paper ends by pitting itself against epistemological relativism and by upholding the universal character of scientific theorems.

Cultural relativism, which has been discussed in the different modes of thought for many years by a great number of philosophers, greets the eye as one of the crucial subjects of philosophy. Whilst a number of philosophers have a tendency for supporting it, the other majority takes a critical stance towards it as opponents. But it is still unclear whether or not it may be possible to find a way out in order to assert that there could be a middle way. As the third group, the philosophers, who argue that there could be a middle way to discuss the matter, strongly take an attention of two categories concerning cultural relativism, namely descriptive and normative cultural relativism. Since descriptive cultural relativism is just due diligence, that is, it is only interested in the factual observations on cultures and it reports what it notes without any judgments and evaluations, descriptive cultural relativism says normatively nothing on the moral dimensions of cultures and societies. It may be the best way that the general proclivity to evaluate the matter is to focus on the arguments for/against to most specifically normative cultural relativism. In this paper, what we have tried to do is to emphasize the arguments for and against to normative cultural relativism so as to show whether or not it is sound and supportable.

2011

I attempt to rebut the following standard objections against cultural relativism. 1. It is selfdefeating for a cultural relativist to take the principle of tolerance as absolute. 2. There are universal moral rules, contrary to what cultural relativism claims. 3. If cultural relativism were true, Hitler's genocidal actions would be right, social reformers would be wrong to go against their own culture, moral progress would be impossible, and an atrocious crime could be made moral by forming a culture which approves of it. 4. Cultural relativism is silent about how large a group must be in order to be a culture, and which culture we should follow when we belong to two cultures with conflicting moralities.

International Journal of Multicultural and Multireligious Understanding, 2017

The aim of this review article is to reveal the cons and pros of ethical relativism, especially conventionalism. This article is written with the intention of showing some of the practical upshots of conventionalism without totally denying some of its virtues in a world where diversity of cultures and customs is apparent. The article inquires the question: Is ethical relativism tenable? The review article relies on reviewing secondary sources. What I am arguing in this article is that despite the attraction of ethical relativism as an intellectual weapon to fight against ethnocentrism and cultural intolerance, the view still goes against the idea of intercultural comparison, criticism and moral argumentation, so that it would have serious disastrous implication on practice, especially on the universal character of human rights and shutters all together any sort of moral progress and reform. The article concludes that we can set forth certain objective moral codes, discovered through...

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2004

Kpanie Addy MA Philosophy 'The very existence of other cultures with different moralities from ours is, in itself, enough to show that moral relativism is true.' Discuss. This essay discusses the view that the very existence of other cultures with different moralities from ours is, in itself, enough to show that moral relativism is true. To reformulate the issue as a question: does the existence of other cultures with moral views dissimilar to ours constitute a condition sufficient for establishing the truth of moral relativism? A careful treatment of this issue requires understanding moral relativism; I shall therefore begin by briefly sketching out this viewpoint. A focused discussion of the matter in hand will then follow. I shall deploy arguments in support of my opinion that the case for moral relativism actually seems to founder when premised on moral diversity. I shall conclude this essay by stating why in my view moral relativism lacks viability as an ethical position. Moral relativism, as Harman explains, is the view that "moral right and wrong (good and bad, justice and injustice, virtue and vice etc.) are always relative to a choice of moral framework. What is morally right in relation to one moral framework can be morally wrong in relation to a different moral framework. And no moral framework is objectively privileged as the one true morality" (Harman and Thomson 1996: 3). Meiland and Krausz express a similar view: "moral relativism tells us that an action is morally right only relative to a particular moral code or set of moral principles" (1982: 8). The term, moral relativism (MR) or ethical relativism, thus aptly reflects the general idea underlying this viewpoint that moral truth is relative to or contingent on a specific moral framework and equally relative is the justifiability of such truth. MR contrasts sharply with the view that there is an objective, universal, absolute moral truth which exists, as Mackie picturesquely puts it, as part of the fabric of the world. It thus diametrically opposes moral objectivism and universalism, both of which, in very simple terms, are claims supporting the position that objective standards bearing on truth or falsity obtain with regard to evaluating moral judgments and that such judgments have universal application. MR, although often likened to moral scepticism, differs significantly from the latter viewpoint. Outlining this difference helps to further clarify what MR consists in. Meiland and Krausz highlight the key similarity and difference as follows:

Society, 2008

The meanings and implications of cultural relativism have been debated for decades. Reprising this debate, Roger Sandall offers a pointed critique of the anthropological concept of culture and identifies relativism as the internal and corrosive enemy of the open society. I challenge his reading of our predicament. Considering the work of Franz Boas and his debts to the philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder, I distance the social science concept of culture from positions-the rejection of standards of truth, beauty, and morality; the belief that cultural value systems and practices are all equally true (or untrue); the valorization of primitivism-that are not intrinsic to it. Next, I consider the use of culture in the "philosophy of primitivism" and its meanings in multiculturalism and identity politics. I argue that many ostensibly relativist claims are used to serve non-relativist agendas, or hide universalistic claims in unstated but essential premises and background assumptions. Rather than a world dominated by relativism, where cultural differences are held to be inviolable and cross-cultural judgments have been rendered impossible, I see something like the reverse. Our problem is not that we overvalue cultural differences but that we underestimate them. Even in our multiculturalism, we imagine a sameness of outlook and aspiration, an unwitting projection of ourselves in the end.

Current Anthropology, 2008

Cultural relativism continues to be closely identified with anthropology even though few anthropologists today endorse the comprehensive version of it first articulated by students of Franz Boas. A review of the progressive reduction of the scope of cultural relativism since the early decades of the twentieth century suggests that it should be regarded not as a comprehensive theory or doctrine but as a rule of thumb that when used prudently serves the limited but indispensable function of keeping anthropology attentive to perspectives that challenge received truth.

This is a revised and extended version of the paper presented in the Plenary Session 1 "Cultural Relativity and Universalism," the 1st World Humanities Forum, which was held in Busan, Republic of Korea, in November 2011. It is reproduced here from the Proceedings of the above conference.