In Defence of Moral Realism

2004

Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2007

There are striking parallels, largely unexplored in the literature, between skeptical arguments against theism and against moral realism. After sketching four arguments meant to do this double duty, I restrict my attention to an explanatory argument that claims that we have most reason to deny the existence of moral facts (and so, by extrapolation, theistic ones), because such putative facts have no causal-explanatory power. I reject the proposed parity, and offer reasons to think that the potential vulnerabilities of moral realism on this front are quite different from those of the theist.

Ethics and Moral Philosophy, 2011

Revelatory Ethics, 2015

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relations between various forms of moral realism and some views about religious ethics, particularly, religious ethics in the Islamic tradition, although much of what is said will apply to ethical views in other religious traditions, as well. First, there is a brief historical review of the rise of moral realism in the twentieth century. Second, the major types of moral realism are distinguished. Third, it is argued that for each of the major types of moral realism, from robust moral realism to minimalist moral realism, religious views of ethics can be formulated that are compatible with both realism and its denial. In each case, however, the religious ethicist must pay a price for taking on realism or its denial. Finally, it is argued that the position taken by major Muslim philosophers in the tradition of Ibn Sina through Mulla Sadra is one that concurs with the non-realist position on a number of significant points.

Philosophy Compass, 2007

This article explains for a general philosophical audience the central issues and strategies in the contemporary moral realism debate. It critically surveys the contribution of some recent scholarship, representing expressivist and pragmatist nondescriptivism (Mark Timmons, Hilary Putnam), subjectivist and nonsubjectivist naturalism (Michael Smith, Paul Bloomfield, Philippa Foot), nonnaturalism (Russ Shafer-Landau, T. M. Scanlon) and error theory (Richard Joyce). Four different faces of 'moral realism' are distinguished: semantic, ontological, metaphysical and normative. The debate is presented as taking shape under dialectical pressure from the demands of (i) capturing the moral appearances; and (ii) reconciling morality with our understanding of the mind and world.

In this article I argue that the would-be denier of the existence of objective moral properties necessarily ends up contradicting herself, in light of her commitment to a pair of propositions that cannot be consistently denied, and which together entail the existence of at least one objective moral fact. In section 1 I explain the primary motivation for my argument and clarify some key terms. In section 2 I defend two principles of reason which will be used in formulating the central argument against the moral anti-realist. In section 3 I present that argument, which I illustrate with a hypothetical scenario. In section 4 I address some possible objections. I conclude with a rehearsal of the preceding dialectic, and gesture at some outstanding questions and issues.

Philosophical Studies, 2005

Philosophical Studies, 2005