Democratic Leaders and War

2012

Despite strong empirical evidence for democratic peace theory, the historical record indicates that democracies have been involved in many wars. This article conducts a critical examination of how democratic polities become entangled in international conflict. The examination focuses on how democratic leaders manage domestic politics and public opinion at each stage of the conflict (i.e. disputes, crises, wars and settlement). The study explores how democracies are drawn into conflict; when democracies provoke conflict; what claims democratic leaders make to justify conflict; when domestic audiences support or oppose conflict; and the implications for democratic leaders after conflicts. It argues that democratic leaders pursue various strategies that are shaped by the stage of the conflict, the domestic institutional structure and the level of mobilized domestic opposition.

International Security, 2009

In previous articles and in our 2002 book Democracies at War, we argued that democracies are particularly likely to win their wars. Democratic political institutions provide incentives for elected leaders to launch only short, winnable, low-cost wars, so they may avoid domestic political threats to their hold on power. Democracies tend to win the wars they initiate because democratic leaders generally "select" themselves into winnable wars, and they are more likely to win when they are targeted because their armies ªght with better initiative and leadership. Analyzing all interstate wars from 1816 to 1987, we found strong empirical support for our theory. 1 Other scholarship has produced ªndings supportive of our theory. Elsewhere, two different formal game-theoretic models produced the hypothesis that democracies are especially likely to win the wars they initiate. 2 The empirical results generated to test these and related hypotheses have withstood challenges to data selection and research design. 3 Using data sets and research designs different from ours, other scholars have uncovered empirical patterns consistent with our theory that democracies are especially likely to win the crises they initiate, 4 that wars and crises are shorter when democracies and democratic initiators are involved, and that democracies become increasingly likely to initiate wars as their likelihood of victory increases. 5 H.E. Goemans's recent

Peace Review, 2007

Democracies & War: The Limit of Democratic Regimes in Warfare, 2021

The main issue with democracies lies in the structural conditions that shape a hierarchical mechanism of selection, election, and policies, impacting the processes and stakes of warfare. The limiting factor revolves around social conditions that must be subdued during wartime. This democratic functioning is constantly anchored to answer and satisfy these conditions, whether it is political, economic, social, moral, or philosophical. While democracies have an impressive military record, their weaknesses and failures fundamentally reside within politics, as “war is policy by other means”. This study will examine the structural, functional, and fundamental elements that might render the democratic system ill-suited for shaping military endeavours, strategic policies, and warfare in general (DV). To achieve this, we will analyse the democratic framework that shapes the dynamic of power (1), looking at the flexibility of command, and centralized vs. decentralized system of command (indicators). Then, we will explore how the democratic system, governed by the selectorate principle (i.e. popular support) (2) influences aspects such as war duration, policies, goals, resources, and power (indicators). This will lead us to examine the fundamental incompatibility between popular support and the overall democratic regime in the context of war (3), considering factors such as the democratic peace theory, the homeostatic principle, and the fundamental philosophy (indicators). This research consists in an ecosystemic evaluation of the functionality of democratic system. It serves as a diagnosis of democratic weaknesses and failures in war.

Foreign Policy Analysis, 2010

Some studies find that democratic states are more amenable to third party forms of conflict management, while other studies indicate that democracies are able to resolve contentious issues on their own through bilateral negotiations. Using data from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Project, the authors investigate peaceful and militarized conflict management strategies that democratic states employ to resolve contentious issues. Theoretically, the authors focus on how militarized conflict history, relative capabilities, and issue salience influence the tools of conflict management employed by democratic states. Empirical analyses suggest that democratic dyads employ bilateral negotiations more often to resolve contentious issues when the issue has not been militarized previously, when the issue is more salient, and when democratic states face equal adversaries. Democratic dyads seek out nonbinding third party settlement more frequently in situations of power preponderance than nondemocratic dyads, although binding forms of third party settlement occur most often in relatively equal democratic dyads. When it comes to the use of force, democratic states are much less likely than their authoritarian counterparts to militarize an issue claim when little or no armed conflict characterizes the relationship. However, democratic leaders show a willingness to confront force with force. After one militarized dispute, democratic states are no different in their conflict propensity than autocratic states.

Democracies at War, 2002

2005

The American Political Science Review, 1999

We examine formally the link between domestic political institutions and policy choices in the context of eight empirical regularities that constitute the democratic peace. We demonstrate that democratic leaders, when faced with war, are more inclined to shift extra resources into the war e®ort than are autocrats. This follows because the survival of political leaders with larger winning coalitions hinges on successful policy. The extra e®ort made by democrats provides a military advantage over autocrats. This makes democrats unattractive targets since their institutional constraints cause them to mobilize resources toward the war e®ort. In addition to trying harder, democrats are also more selective in their choice of targets. Since defeat is more likely to lead to domestic replacement for democrats than for autocrats, democrats only initiate wars they expect to win. These two factors lead to the interactions between polities that is often referred to as the democratic peace.

Abstract Democracy is positively valued. This positive evaluation extends to a democracy’s actions, even if it is to wage war. The authors investigated whether the perceived legitimacy of military interventions depends on the political structure (democratic vs. nondemocratic) of the countries involved and on the aggressor country’s popular support for the government’s aggressive policy. Participants learned that an alleged country planned to attack another. The political structure of both countries was manipulated in the two experiments. The support of the aggressor’s population toward military intervention was measured in Experiment 1 and manipulated in Experiment 2. Both experiments confirmed that military intervention was perceived as being less illegitimate when the population supported their democratic government’s policy to attack a nondemocratic country.

Review of International Studies, 1996

The contention that ‘democracies don't fight against each other’ has received considerable attention in recent years from academics, policy analysts and world leaders. While the accuracy, significance and implications of the claim are still debated, supporters and critics alike have, virtually without exception, agreed that they are addressing the significant topic: the absence of war between democracies. Both accept the terms of the debate which is to focus upon the existence of a ‘separate peace’ between democracies or liberal states. Supporters of the contention are engaged in devising an explanation of the relationship between democracies/liberal states and peace which ‘needs to explain, simultaneously, both (a) the fact that democratic states have rarely clashed with one another—the democratic peace phenomenon, and (b) the fact that democracies are about as war prone as non–democracies’ in their relations with non–democracies. Critics (mostly Realists) are engaged in refuti...