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Context • Philosophy of science is the branch of philosophy that deals with methods, foundations, and implications of science. It is a theory of how to create scientific knowledge. Presently there is widespread agreement on how to do science, namely conjectures, ideally in the form of a mathematical model, and refutations, testing the model using empirical evidence. Problem • Many social scientists are using a conception of science created for the physical sciences. Expanding philosophy of science so that it more successfully encompasses social systems would create new avenues of inquiry. Two dimensions could be added to philosophy of science: the amount of attention paid to the observer and the amount of impact of a theory on the system described. Method • My approach is to illuminate underlying assumptions. I claim that there are at least three epistemologies and that they can be combined to form a more robust conception of knowledge and of how to do research. There are at least four models and four basic elements (i.e., ideas, groups, events, variables) being used by (social) scientists. Results • The article identifies the logical propositions underlying second-order science. It suggests strategies for developing second-order science. And it describes several methods that can be used to practice second-order science, including how past theories have not only described but also changed the phenomenon being studied. Implications • The task for members of the scientific community, particularly social scientists, is to practice second-order science and to further develop its theories and methods. A practical implication is to accept methods for acting as well as theories as a contribution to science, since methods explicitly define the role of an observer/ participant. Constructivist content • The paper is an extension of the work of Heinz von Foerster and other second-order cyberneticians. Key words • Philosophy of science, epistemology, models, descriptions, cybernetics.
• ariegler/at/vub.ac.be > Context • Many recent research areas such as human cognition and quantum physics call the observer-independence of traditional science into question. Also, there is a growing need for self-reflexivity in science, i.e., a science that reflects on its own outcomes and products. > Problem • We introduce the concept of second-order science that is based on the operation of re-entry. Our goal is to provide an overview of this largely unexplored science domain and of potential approaches in second-order fields. > Method • We provide the necessary conceptual groundwork for explorations in second-order science, in which we discuss the differences between first-and second-order science and where we present a roadmap for second-order science. The article operates mainly with conceptual differentiations such as the separation between three seemingly identical concepts such as Science II, Science 2.0 and second-order science. > Results • Compared with first-order science, the potential of second-order science lies in 1. higher levels of novelty and innovations, 2. higher levels of robustness and 3. wider integration as well as higher generality. As first-order science advances, second-order science, with re-entry as its basic operation, provides three vital functions for first-order science, namely a rich source of novelty and innovation, the necessary quality control and greater integration and generality. > Implications • Second-order science should be viewed as a major expansion of traditional scientific fields and as a scientific breakthrough towards a new wave of innovative research. > Constructivist content • Second-order science has strong ties with radical constructivism, which can be qualified as the most important root/origin of secondorder science. Moreover, it will be argued that a new form of cybernetics is needed to cope with the new problems and challenges of second-order science.
Constructivist Foundations, 2014
The work that scientists do, particularly social scientists, is currently constrained by their conception of science. Expanding the conception of science would lead to more innovative work and more rapid social progress.
Constructivist Foundations, 2010
> Context • The enactive paradigm in the cognitive sciences is establishing itself as a strong and comprehensive alternative to the computationalist mainstream. However, its own particular historical roots have so far been largely ignored in the historical analyses of the cognitive sciences. > Problem • In order to properly assess the enactive paradigm’s theoretical foundations in terms of their validity, novelty and potential future directions of development, it isessential for us to know more about the history of ideas that has led to the current state of affairs. > Method • The meaning of the disappearance of the field of cybernetics and the rise of second-order cybernetics is analyzed by taking a closer look at the work of representative figures for each of the phases – Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow for the early wave of cybernetics, Ashby for its culmination, and von Foerster for the development of the second-order approach. > Results • It is argued that the disintegration of cybernetics eventually resulted in two distinct scientific traditions, one going from symbolic AI to modern cognitive science on the one hand, and the other leading fromsecond-order cybernetics to the current enactive paradigm. > Implications • We can now understand that the extent to which the cognitive sciences have neglected their cybernetic parent is precisely the extent to which cybernetics hadalready carried the tendencies that would later find fuller expression in second-order cybernetics.
Reconceptualizing Educational Research Methodology, 2012
This article is about seeing/creating/trying out an idea of pedagogy and pedagogical/ educational research in/as/with self-reflexive, circular and diffractive perspectives and about using second order cybernetics as thinking tool. It is a move away from traditional hypothesis driven activities and a move towards data driven pedagogies and research: Teachers, teacher researchers and researchers simultaneously producing and theorizing our practices and ourselves. Deleuzian becomings-eventually becomings with data -theory -theodata is pivotal. It is a move towards a Derridean bricolage. A different science of pedagogy operating as a circular science of self-reflexivity and diffraction in search of quality again and again and again: Theopractical becomings and inspiractionresearch.
World Futures
In March 2016 an interdisciplinary group met for two days and two evenings to explore the implications for policy making of second order science. The event was sponsored by SITRA, the Finnish Parliament's Innovation Fund. Their interest arose from their concern that the well-established ways, including evidence based approaches, of policy and decision making used in government were increasingly falling short of the complexity, uncertainty and urgency of needed decision making. There was no assumption that second order science or second-order cybernetics would reveal any practical possibilities at this early stage of enquiry. On the other hand some members of the group are practioners in both policy and in facilitating change in sectors of society. Thus the intellectual concepts were strongly grounded in experience. This is an account of the deliberations of that group and some reflections on what came out of the various shared contributions and ensuing dialogues. The overall conclusion of the event is that there definitely are possibilities that are worthy of further research and exploration.
Kybernetes, 2004
In 1974, Heinz von Foerster articulated the distinction between a first-and second-order cybernetics, as, respectively, the cybernetics of observed systems and the cybernetics of observing systems. Von Foerster's distinction, together with his own work on the epistemology of the observer, has been enormously influential on the work of a later generation of cyberneticians. It has provided an architecture for the discipline of cybernetics, one that, in true cybernetic spirit, provides order where previously there was variety and disorder. It has provided a foundation for the research programme that is second-order cybernetics. However, as von Foerster himself makes clear, the distinction he articulated was imminent right from the outset in the thinking of the early cyberneticians, before, even, the name of their discipline had been coined. In this paper, the author gives a brief account of the developments in cybernetics that lead to von Foerster's making his distinction. As is the way of such narratives, it is but one perspective on a complex series of events. Not only is this account a personal perspective, it also includes some recollections of events that were observed and participated in at first hand.
The traditional sciences have always had trouble with ambiguity. Through the imposition of “enabling constraints” -- making a set of assumptions and then declaring ceteris paribus -- science can bracket away ambiguity. These enabling constraints take the form of uncritically examined presuppositions or “uceps.” Second order science examines variations in values assumed for these uceps and looks at the resulting impacts on related scientific claims. After rendering explicit the role of uceps in scientific claims, the scientific method is used to question rarely challenged assertions. This article lays out initial foundations for second order science, its ontology, methodology, and implications.
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2013
Constructivist Foundations, 2014
Cybernetics and Human Knowing, 2011
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
Cybernetics & Human Knowing, 2015
Kybernetes, 2015
Useful and Critical-the Position of Research in Design …, 1999
Encyclopedia of Physical Science and Technology, 2003