Julia Jorati's Leibniz on Causation and Agency

2007

This work presents Leibniz’s subtle approach to possibility and explores some of its consequential repercussions in his metaphysics. Ohad Nachtomy presents Leibniz’s approach to possibility by exposing his early suppositions, arguing that he held a combinatorial conception of possibility. He considers the transition from possibility to actuality through the notion of agency; the role divine agency plays in actualization; moral agency and human freedom of action and the relation between agency and necessity in comparison to Spinoza. Nachtomy analyzes Leibniz’s notion of nested, organic individuals and their peculiar unity, in distinction from his notion of aggregates. Nachtomy suggests that Leibniz defined possible individuals through combinatorial rules that generate unique and maximally consistent structures of predicates in God’s understanding and that such rules may be viewed as programs for action. He uses this definition to clarify Leibniz’s notions of individuation, relations and his distinction between individual substances and aggregates as well as the notion of organic individuals, which have a nested structure to infinity. Nachtomy concludes that Leibniz’s definition of a possible individual as a program of action helps clarifying the unity and simplicity of nested individuals. The book thus reveals a thread that runs through Leibniz’s metaphysics: from his logical notion of possible individuals to his notion of actual, nested ones.

2012

G. W. Leibniz professes a commitment to historical Christian theism, but the depth and orthodoxy of his commitment has been questioned throughout the past three centuries. In this project I defend both the cogency and the orthodoxy of Leibniz’s philosophical theology and, by extension, its application to the Christian task of theodicy. At the heart of this defense is the central claim of this project, namely, that Leibniz’s philosophical theology represents a traditional brand of Augustinianism. In short, I argue that Leibniz’s theodicy is not his own, but is the tacit claim of a longstanding theological tradition made explicit and brought to bear on the problem of evil as articulated in Leibniz’s day. Accompanying this central claim are a number of subordinate claims, the most significant of which center on how we read Leibniz on providence and on free choice. Regarding the former, I argue that Leibniz’s understanding of providence has precedence in and is a recapitulation of older Augustinian views of the God-world relationship. As for free choice, I maintain that the Augustinian tradition is not only incompatiblist, or libertarian, but was recognized as such in Leibniz’s day. Hence in adhering to this tradition, Leibniz is knowingly adhering to a libertarian theology. I show that his adherence to this tradition and its views of freedom has significant textual support. My method of defense is both historical and constructive. On the historical side I focus primarily on contextual and textual analysis. However, insofar as this defense includes the viability of Leibniz’s theodicy for Christian theology and theodicy today, constructive engagement with Leibniz’s contemporary objectors and the current literature on the problem of evil is also required. Therefore, I devote the latter part of this defense to lingering objections and interlocution with current approaches to the problem of evil. In the end I conclude that Leibniz’s theodicy, when read in the light of the Augustinian tradition, is not only orthodox, cogent, and defensible, but is perhaps the most viable response to the problem of evil for traditional Christian theology, if not the inevitable response for a traditional Augustinian.

Phainomena XXII/84-85 (June 2013)

The moral and/or juridical arguments for abolishing the death penalty as it now stands succeed to some degree because the moral and/or juridical arguments for the death penalty are weak. Such arguments only have to show that the currently cited grounds for upholding the death penalty fail to meet the rationales and criteria that their adherents advance. However, arguments for or against the death penalty appeal to moral principles which are not neutral with regard to metaphysical issues; moral assertions come with ontological and epistemic commitments. No argument about equity or fairness or justice can be made without premises which express what kinds of things there are, what one can be said to know, and what an agent is free to do. This paper explores a different approach to the merits of the death penalty based on Leibniz’s metaphysical principles: monads’ phenomenal expression, pre-established harmony, super-essentialism, individuals’ inner programs, and moral agents’ freedom to act like “little gods”. This paper presents Leibniz’s picture of an individual who freely chooses to contribute to the moral pessimum (the worst compossible state-of-affairs) and the compensatory scheme that requires an effort by a community of rational agents to redress the overall balance of moral good. On this view, there is a positive requirement for the benefit of a community of minds to invoke the death penalty for a murderer whose individual concept contributes to the pessimum, and whose continued life retards efforts to achieve an optimum state where moral good outweighs moral evil.

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2008

To what and/or whom do we causally owe our action? Renaissance and early modern theists offered three very different answers to this question: occasionalism, mere conservationism, and concurrentism. Nicolas Malebranche, among others, defended occasionalism, the view that God is the only causal agent in nature. We do not causally contribute to our own action. Durandus de Saint–Pourçain defended mere conservationism, the view that God’s causal contribution, at least in the ordinary development of nature, consists “merely” in the creation and conservation of created substances along with their causal capacities and powers. And it is we who bring about or produce changes of states in ourselves. Leibniz himself defended concurrentism, the view that both God and created substances are causally responsible for changes in the states of created substances. Interpretive problems, however, arise in determining just what causal role each plays. Some recent work greatly downplays the causal role played by created substances—arguing instead that according to Leibniz only God has productive causal power. Though bearing some causal responsibility for changes in their perceptual states, created substances are not efficient causes of such changes. This paper argues against such a view; not only was Leibniz a consistent advocate of concurrentism (at least in his "mature" years), but also his account of concurrentism involves both God and created substances as efficient causes of the changes in the states of created substances.

In Kant über Freiheit als Autonomie, Gerold Prauss suggests that in the middle of the 1760’s beside Rousseau’s influence on the concept of freedom in Kant’s moral writings, it is possible to find also the Aristotelian notion of spontaneity. The aim of the paper is to contextualize by means of the methodology of the Quellengeschichte Kant’s concept of spontaneity within the tradition of Aristotelian ethics. In the first part of the paper I analyze Aristotle’s concept of spontaneity and in the second its reception from Renaissance to Kantian philosophy. The third and fourth parts deal with spontaneity in Kant’s moral writings with the exemption of the Kritik der Urteilskraft, which involves and implies a much larger set of considerations on teleology and metaphysics. The conclusion is a critical assessment of Kant’s appropriation of Aristotle’s spontaneity.

Journal of Religion, 2015

This article explores the later Schleiermacher’s metaphysics of substance and what it entails concerning the question of transcendental freedom. I show that in espousing a metaphysics of substance, Schleiermacher also abandoned an understanding of nature as a mere mechanism, a view implying what I call a “state-state view of causation” (“SSV” for short). Adoption of the view of the self as substance was motivated by the primacy of practical and religious concerns in Schleiermacher’s later work: in Christian Faith, an analysis of self-consciousness from a first person point of view grounds this understanding of the self. In fact, in Christian Faith, ontology, and thereby theology, is only possible through such a first person analysis. The development of Schleiermacher’s views over time, and the reasons accompanying this development, can be fully understood only the in the context of his engagement with the work of Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant. In what follows I trace this development through an analysis of the philosophical problems and influences shaping Schleiermacher’s mature view, and shed light on his understanding of self-consciousness and its relation to God. My own account should also serve to correct some recent misunderstandings that have made their way into the secondary literature.

Oxford Bibliographies, 2017

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) was a universal genius, making original contributions to law, mathematics, philosophy, politics, languages, and many areas of science, including what we would now call physics, biology, chemistry, and geology. By profession he was a court counselor, librarian and historian, and thus much of his intellectual activity had to be fit around his professional duties. Leibniz’s fame and reputation among his contemporaries rested largely on his innovations in the field of mathematics, in particular his discovery of the calculus in 1675. Another of his enduring mathematical contributions was his invention of binary arithmetic, though the significance of this was not recognized until the twentieth century. These days, a good proportion of scholarly interest in Leibniz is focused on his philosophy. Among his signature philosophical doctrines are the pre-established harmony, the theory of monads, and the claim that ours is the best of all possible worlds, which forms the central plank of his theodicy. For Leibniz, philosophy was not the discovery of deep truths of interest only to other philosophers, but a practical discipline with the means to increase happiness and well-being. Philosophical truths, he believed, revealed the beauty and rational order of the universe, and the justice and wisdom of its creator, and accordingly could inspire contentment and peace of mind. Leibniz’s other intellectual projects were likewise geared towards the improvement of the human condition. He lobbied tirelessly for the establishment of scientific societies, devised measures to improve public health, and was actively engaged in projects to unite the churches and so end the religious strife that marred the Europe of his day. He was also engaged in politics for much of his career, and often took on a diplomatic role, sometimes officially and other times not. In the political sphere, Leibniz did not wield true power but was a man with influence, obtained in no small part by his cultivation of relationships with leaders and sovereigns both inside and outside Germany. The sheer range of Leibniz’s interests, projects and activities can make him a difficult figure to study, and the vast quantity of his writings only compounds the problem (around 50,000 of his writings survive). Nevertheless, even a sampling of Leibniz’s work is enough to get a sense of his vision, originality and intellectual depth, and good secondary literature will only enhance this. The items in this bibliography were chosen with this in mind.

In this paper, we shall deal with Leibniz’s life history in brief, influences on his philosophy and his major works. His theory of monads will be analysed and his theory of truth (Logic) will lead us to a critique of the practicality of freedom in such a world. Here, we shall make reference to Aristotle While referring to Morden Philosophy, one might side-step Leibniz for a “fairy tale philosopher” but would encounter him later in Voltaire’s ‘Candide’. Nevertheless, if not in Voltaire, then possibly in critiques or letters written to rival his notion of “the best possible world.” However, in treating of Leibniz’s philosophy, we shall emphasise his theory of monads and how it influences his linguistic/philosophical analysis of language (subject and predicate) and logic. This analysis cannot avoid to lead us to the concept of freedom. In a world of immanent, self-contained atom like entities and a God who pre- orders reality to a definite final cause. Is freedom possible

Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2016

Recent scholarship is nearly unanimous in attributing some form of egoism to Leibniz’s moral philosophy. I argue that there are substantive reasons to reject this status quo, given that psychological egoism is inconsistent with more fundamental Leibnizian doctrines. In particular, I argue that psychological egoism is incompatible with Leibniz’s metaphysical perfectionism, his conception of the will as a power aimed at the universally known good, and his theory of justice.

The mature Leibniz often describes monads as having two types of modifications: perceptions and appetites. But why would monads need appetites? One possible response to the question why monads need appetites is the following. Appetites, according to Leibniz, are monadic tendencies to transition to new perceptions. Perhaps without such tendencies, no change would occur in a monad. On this interpretation, a full explanation of monadic change needs to invoke tendencies, and those in turn are (or include) appetites. I think that this response is partially correct, as I will argue later. Yet, it does not fully explain the function of appetites. How precisely are appetites (viewed as tendencies) supposed to figure into the explanation—do they function as causes of change, and if so, what kinds of causes? Are they efficient, final, or formal causes, or perhaps causes of yet another type? Or might they figure into the explanation in some non-causal way? This paper explores six possible answers to the question what role appetites play in the lives of monads: (1) appetites are superfluous; there is no sense in which they explain or cause monadic change; (2) appetites are formal causes; (3) appetites are final causes; (4) appetites are efficient causes; (5) appetites are ultimately the same as perceptions (or aspects of perceptions), and perceptions in turn cause or explain monadic change; and (6) appetites are not causally involved in monadic change, but they are explanatory in a loose, derivative sense. I will argue for a version of the last option. The resulting picture of monadic change is admittedly radical and strange but there are excellent reasons to embrace it.

Theodicy and Reason. Logic, Metaphysics and Theology in Leibniz's Essais de Théodicée (1710), 2016

This paper analyses the paragraphs 381-404 of Leibniz’s Theodicy, i. e. one of the more systematic discussions on creatures’ action sketched by Leibniz. Even rejecting ex professo only Bayle’s radical view that creatures are not truly efficient causes of their states (since to Bayle only God is), these paragraphs evidently have a wider polemical object, namely the “new Cartesians” as Malebranche and, still more generally, Cartesian metaphysics.

Leibniz portrays the most fundamental entities in his mature ontology in at least three different ways. In some places, he describes them as mind-like, immaterial substances that perceive and strive. Elsewhere, he presents them as hylomorphic compounds. In yet other passages, he characterizes them in terms of primitive and derivative forces. Interpreters often assume that the first description is the most accurate. In contrast, I will argue that the third characterization is more accurate than the other two. If that is correct, Leibniz’s monadological metaphysics is even more radical than it initially seems: his ontology is best understood not as a substance-mode ontology but as a force ontology. At the metaphysical ground floor, we do not find substances that possess force; instead, we just find forces. Interpreting Leibniz as a force ontologist has far-reaching consequences. For instance, it requires us to reconsider the status of time in Leibniz’s system and to revise our understanding of appetitions and perceptions.

Julia von Bodelschwingh

Leibniz holds that creatures require divine concurrence for all their actions, and that this concurrence is ‘special,’ that is, directed at the particular qualities of each action. This gives rise to two potential problems. The first is the problem of explaining why special concurrence does not make God a co-author of creaturely actions. Second, divine concurrence may seem incompatible with the central Leibnizian doctrine that substances must act spontaneously, or independently of other substances. Concurrence, in other words, may appear to jeopardize creaturely substancehood. I argue that Leibniz can solve both of these problems by invoking final and formal causation. The creature is the sole author of its actions because it alone contributes the formal and final cause to these actions. Similarly, because it contributes the formal and final cause, the creature possesses what I call explanatory spontaneity. Leibniz, I contend, considers this type of spontaneity sufficient for substancehood.

cle.unicamp.br

In his article, Kant’s Ethics as a part of Metaphysics: a possible Newtonian Suggestion? With Some Comments on Kant’s “Dream of a Seer”, Giorgio Tonelli suggests a possible relation between Isaac Newton’s conception of attraction and the metaphysical foundation of morals in the light of some considerations on Träume eines Geistersehers erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik. In this paper, I argue that Immanuel Kant’s notion of Ethics as a part of metaphysics does not simply derive from Newton and his followers, it is also a philosophical necessity triggered by the development of Kant’s system and his thought on spontaneity. I focus the attention especially on Kant’s early writings of ethics, in which it is evident the breach with the tradition and the formation of the system. The fist part of the paper sketches the placement of ethics in Kant’s pre-critical works and its status as science. The second part develops the systematic justification of Kant’s insertion of ethics within metaphysics. The third part deals with the historical debate on soul-body’s relationship. The fourth and fifth parts account for the history of spontaneity and its reception in Kant’s early writings. The last two, finally, deal with Kant’s notion of ethics as part of metaphysics from 1770 to critical period.