Speech Act Theory -An Overview

Philosophical Studies, 1975

Austin held that performative utterances "do not 'describe' or 'report' or constate anything at all, are not 'true or false'. ''1 Rather, they are, or are part of, the doing of an action. Because the sentence uttered in a performative is grammatically declarative, Austin's doctrine once seemed paradoxical. But it has since lost its air of paradox, as now philosophers are more cognizant of the distinction between sentences and statements and realize, thanks to Austin, that not all sentences are used to make statements. Nevertheless, I wish to argue that the negative side of Austin's doctrine-that performative utterances do not constate, are not true or false-is mistaken. Since I accept the positive side-that they are, or are part of, the doing of an action-my position is that performative utterances (other than conventionalized ones) are both doings and statings. In Austin's later terms, they comprise two simultaneous illocutionary acts. Uttering a performative sentence is to do what one is stating one is doing; indeed, that is what makes the statement true. An (explicit) performative is the utterance of a sentence with main verb in the first person singular, simple present indicative active,2 this verb being the name of the kind of illocutionary act one would ordinarily be :performing in uttering that sentence (call such a verb a 'performative verb'). For example, under normal circumstances of utterance, 3 'I order you to leave', 'I promise you a job', and 'I apologize for the delay', are an order, a promise, and an apology, respectively. Such utterances appear to be of the form ordinarily, i.e., with non-performative verbs, used to make true or false statements, statements to the effect that the speaker is doing something or is in the state named by the verb, e.g., 'I see the light' or 'I hate spinach'. 4 Indeed, in the case of a sentence with a performative verb not in the first person singular, simple present indicative active, the use of it would ordinarily be to make a true or false statement, e.g., 'I ordered him to leave', '(By signing this) I am promising you a job', and

Tokyo University Linguistic Papers (TULIP) 41, 2019

This paper will show that differences between constative (or descriptive) and performative uses of a sentence arise from differences in construal regarding the relation in which the utterance stands to the world. Austin (1962) claims that the sentence 'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth' may have a performative use, in which it does not describe or report anything at all, hence is neither true nor false, and to utter it is just to perform the illocutionary act of naming. The sentence may also have a constative use, in which it is either true or false, as has been traditionally assumed for declarative sentences in general. In the two uses, the utterer performs different illocutionary acts, while performing the same locutionary act. In the performative (in the narrow sense), the utterer names a ship, whereas in the constative, she makes an assertion. The performative is construed, in a projective manner in Recanati's (2000) sense, as one of the symbolic acts constituting the ritual, from which it obtains its illocutionary force. The assertion, on the other hand, is construed, in a reflective manner, as an act intended to describe the ritual from outside, which is successfully performed if uptake is secured. This analysis is in line with Ducrot's (1972, 1977/1991, 1980) and Fauconnier' (1979) views on the origin of performativity, and enables us to account for the fact, pointed out by Strawson (1964), that, unlike performatives, assertions are tied to no fixed set of felicity conditions.

Augustinian: A Journal for Humanities, Social Sciences, Business, and Education., Vol. 19, Issue #1, pp. 35-45, 2018

The speech act theory is one of the rigorous attempts to systematically explain the workings of language. It is not only widely influential in the philosophy of language, but in the areas of linguistics and communication as well. This essay traces the development of this theory from J. L. Austin's first formulation of the theory to John Searle's further systematization and grounding of it. The essay first situates the theory in the general approaches to the philosophy of language. After which, it explicates the main features of the theory as initially articulated by Austin and further improved by Searle. Among the innovations introduced by Searle, the essay highlights the following: the distinction between the utterance and propositional acts, the distinction between the effects of illocutionary acts and those of perlocutionary acts, a consistent set of criteria for classifying speech acts, and the grounding of speech acts in terms of rules and facts.

Journal of Linguistics, 1996

Journal of Pragmatics, 2019

Forthcoming in Oxford Bibliographies Online

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 2000

Frege introduced the notion of pragmatic force as what distinguishes statements from questions. This distinction was elaborated by Wittgenstein in his later works, and systematised as an account of different kinds of speech acts in formal dialogue theory by Hamblin. It lies at the heart of the inferential semantics more recently developed by Brandom. The present paper attempts to sketch some of the relations between these developments.

The Fregean notion of a proposition as a mind-independent abstract object that has truth conditions essentially is a central notion both in linguistic semantics and in contemporary philosophy of language. Recently, a number of philosophers of language have put forward serious criticisms against this notion, however, and have proposed instead act-based conceptions of propositional content, tying the representational status of propositions to the intentionality of agents (Jubien, Hanks, Soames, among others). The course will discuss the motivations and the different developments of the act-based approach to propositional content with their actual and potential semantic applications. It will most importantly present a particular version of the act-based approach based on the notion of a (nonenduring) product of an act, an agent-and mind-dependent 'abstract artifact' (Thomasson). It will develop various novel formal semantic applications of that approach, in particular to the semantics of different sorts of clausal complements and the semantics of quotation.

Ichkalat, 2022

One of the most important theories in early Pragmatics is that of Austin's Speech Act Theory. In How to do things with words (1962), which was published posthumously, Austin uncovers the power of language in getting things done. Calling this power the FORCE of a speech act, Austin situates language within a larger enterprise of human actions. Speech Act Theory is the level of analysis that goes beyond naming entities or judging linguistic structures. By focusing on the nonliteral meaning that arises in language in use, Speech Act Theory fosters a third level of analysis to language in use. This article attempts to trace the main claims of Austin' Speech Act Theory, with much focus on the difference between constatives and performatives. A major distinction states that while the former are either true or false, the latter are either happy or unhappy.

Language and Dialogue, 2013

Socreal 2010 Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Philosophy and Ethics of Social Reality, 2010

Theoria, Beograd, 2019

In this paper, I defend Austin′s thesis that performatives are not state ments by definition. Austin claimed that if promises are statements, we would not talk about promises anymore, but rather about statements. He also relativized the distinc tion between performatives and constatives. I assess whether such a relativization corroborates the claim that performatives are statements. I also criticize Kent Bach′s thesis that explicit performatives are statements. Nevertheless, I endorse a view that some performatives are statements (so-called performative statements). Another the sis I am going to reject is that performatives should primarily be considered as state ments, and secondarily as promises, pieces of advice, and so on.

Sbisa on Speech as Action, 2022

In articles such as 'Speech Acts without Propositions?' (2006), Marina Sbisà advocates a "strong" conception of speech acts as means by which speakers modify states of affairs in the world, primarily those pertaining to speakers' deontic statuses relative to one another including their rights, obligations and commitments. In this light she challenges an influential approach to speech acts as typically if not universally possessing propositional contents. Sbisà argues that such an approach leads to viewing speech acts as primarily aimed at communicating propositional attitudes rather than carrying out socially and normatively significant action. For this reason she advocates eschewing propositions from speech act theory's conceptual toolkit; she also proposes a liberalization of the distinction between illocutionary force and semantic content, which are widely thought to be mutually exclusive. In this essay we examine Sbisà's reasoning and argue that while it does justify denying propositional attitudes a central role in communication, it does not justify dispensing with propositions or other contents in our theorizing about speech acts. In addition, we endorse Sbisà's proposal for liberalizing the force/content distinction, and show a variety of ways in which force indicators may also possess semantic content.