Inferentialism and the Reception of Testimony

Assertion, 2011

In this paper I argue that the norm of assertion can be used to give an account of two features of the testimonial exchange, pertaining to the epistemic entitlements and responsibilities of parties to such an exchange. Accounting for these features in terms of the norm of assertion has two selling points: in doing so we make do with claims we need anyway, independent of issues of testimony, and in this sense have an account that is simpler than its rivals; and we can be neutral with respect to the two topics standardly addressed in connection with the epistemology of testimony, and so have an account that is ideologically less costly than rival accounts (which are not neutral in this way). I will also be arguing that the rival accounts themselves face serious difficulties. It is thus time to put the norm of assertion to work.

2008

What does it make social epistemology “social”? What does it make social epistemology “epistemological”? What is testimony? In this paper, I propose to consider to what extent these questions are related, and how the answer to the third one could shed some light on the nature of social epistemology. As it is well known, much of our knowledge is obtained from others simply by attending to their actions and words. Certainly, the most part of this knowledge, I will claim, is acquired from instrumental grounds and not by testimony. For example, when I meet a tourist asking for the Prado Museum, I obtain the knowledge that she has some competence in Spanish without mediating a testimonial act. Nevertheless, part of the knowledge acquired from others issubstantively testimonial, as for example when, while foraging wild mushrooms, I inquire: “Is this a dangerous one?”, and receive the answer: “No, this is an Amanita Cesarea, you can eat it safely”. This is a case of non-instrumental testim...

Two models of assertion are described and their epistemological implications considered. The assurance model draws a parallel between the ethical norms surrounding promising and the epistemic norms which facilitate the transmission of testimonial knowledge. This model is rejected in favour of the view that assertion transmits knowledge by expressing belief. I go on to compare the epistemology of testimony with the epistemology of memory.

In his work on the epistemology of testimony, Peter Lipton developed an account of testimonial inference that aimed at descriptive adequacy as well as justificatory sophistication. According to ‘testimonial inference to the best explanation’ (TIBE), we accept what a speaker tells us because the truth of her claim figures in the best explanation of the fact that she made it. In the present paper, I argue for a modification of this picture. In particular, I argue that IBE plays a dual role in the management and justification of testimony. On the one hand, the coherence and success of our testimony-based projects provides general abductive support for a default stance of testimonial acceptance; on the other hand, we are justified in rejecting specific testimonial claims whenever the best explanation of the instances of testimony we encounter entails, or makes probable, the falsity or unreliability of the testimony in question.

History and Theory, 1994

I can, given the right conditions, transmit my knowledge to you by telling you some information. If I know the time, and if all goes well, I can bring it about that you know it too. If conditions are right, all I have to do is assert to you what time it is. Paradigmatically, speakers use assertions to transmit what they know to their hearers. Clearly, assertion and testimony are tightly connected. The nature of this connection, however, is not so clear. According to many accounts, assertion has an epistemic constitutive norm. This norm appears to be able to account for some important features of testimony: first, testimonial knowledge transmission, second, the reliability of testimony, and third, the epistemic rights exchanged in cases of testimony. In this paper, however, I argue against this apparent ability. The constitutive norm of assertion, I argue, plays no role in accounts of testimonial knowledge transmission, or of the epistemic rights that testimony confers. This is especially clear when we consider the general norms to which we're held. Epistemological accounts of testimony can and should, therefore, avoid the difficult debate over the constitutive norm of assertion.

The assumption that we largely lack reasons for accepting testimony has dominated its epistemology. Given the further assumption that whatever reasons we do have are insufficient to justify our testimonial beliefs, many conclude that any account of testimonial knowledge must allow credulity to be justified. In this paper I argue that both of these assumptions are false. Our responses to testimony are guided by our background beliefs as to the testimony as a type, the testimonial situation, the testifier's character and the truth of the proposition testified to. These beliefs provide reasons for our responses. Thus, we usually do have reasons, in the sense of propositions believed, for accepting testimony and these reasons can provide evidence for the testimonial beliefs we form.

2020

Many of our beliefs are say-so-based. That is, many of our beliefs are premised on the fact that someone said something. This is not controversial, not when we consider that for those of us who are not archeologists, what we believe to be historical facts are things we believe because we read something in a book, watched a documentary or paid attention in history-class. The same can be said for our beliefs about the meaning of words, and our understanding of concepts-which is, somewhat, inadequate though mostly sufficient for roughly grasping the essential aspects of the thing-even though we lack the required field-specific competence to truly understand. Not to mention, beliefs about social conventions: those dos and don'ts dictated by social norms (i.e., standards for appropriate behavior). Supposing, then, that it is uncontroversial that for many of our beliefs, we believe what we believe because, at some point, someone said so. What can be controversial, however, is how epistemologists suggest that we account for and defend the aptness of accepting the say-so of others. For instance, do we hold a basic right to accept what we are told in the absence of reasons not to do so, or does the aptness of accepting the say-so of others always hinge on whether or not we hold positive reasons sufficient for reasoning that the speaker is reliable? To put this more vividly, consider whether and why it is apt for Jill and Joe in the following anecdote to accept, on the basis of say-so, that Jenny's wedding has been postponed. JENNY'S WEDDING Jill and Joe had both responded that they were coming to Jenny's wedding. So, when none of them came, Jenny confronted them, each, the next day: JILL: On, no? I am so sorry! Joe told me (Jenny's brother) that you postponed the wedding. I just... since he's your brother and all, I mean. I guess I just expected him to be reliable about this sort of thing. JOE: What do you mean I didn't show up? The wedding was postponed, right? I swear I thought Greg said you postponed. You know Greg, the new clairvoyant guy that I go to. This guy is the real deal, Jenny. You wouldn't believe it, crystal ball and them cards and everything. Greg is as reliable as they come; guess I must have heard him wrong or misunderstood what he said. xvii There is no doubt that JENNY'S WEDDING motivates several interesting questions, though the question that JENNY'S WEDDING is meant to motivate is the research question for this dissertation, namely, How should we account for recipients' warrant to accept a speaker's say-so, such that warranted say-so-based acceptance makes for an apt basis for warranted belief? 1 For instance, given that Jill is warranted to accept Joe's say-so, and given that Joe is warranted to accept Greg's say-so, how should we, then, explain that the warrant to accept the plausibility of what they are told serves as an apt basis for Jill and Joe to believe that what they are told is true. Sure, one could say that since Jill and Joe are both responsible for the actions they may choose to premise on accepting the say-so of others. They are, likewise, responsible for what they ultimately choose to believe on the basis of accepting sayso. And so, regardless of whether we consult Greg the clairvoyant or an actual expert on the matter at hand, choosing to believe is eventually up to us. This, however, presupposes that all beliefs can be traced back to some moment of reflection when an attitude of accepting plausibly-p turns into a belief that-p. 2 To boldly assume this would simply beg the question. Maybe, neither Jill nor Joe is right to accept what they are told. In Jill's case, one could argue that intuition should have alerted her. That, either, she is close enough to Jenny to be aware of Joe's gullible nature or she is not close enough to Jenny to even know that she has a brother named Joe, and should, therefore, not accept whatever "Joe the-alleged-brother-of-the-bride" tells her. As for Joe, one could argue that since he accepts and believes on the basis that Greg is a clairvoyant, this speaks for itself, suggesting a malfunction in Joe's capacity for critical thinking. However, before we allow ourselves to be overly critical of Jill and Joe, we should at least take into consideration that, from the looks of it, Jill's acceptance was based 1 For clarification, the 'warrant to accept' a speaker's say-so should here be read as the 'right to commit to the plausibility of what is said', whereas, 'warranted belief' should be read as the 'right to commit to the truth of what is said'. This is, however, further explained below in Chapter I, §1.2.1. 2 One problem with this is the implication that, for any of our beliefs, we are committed to believing that the belief was, at some point, assessed and evaluated as belief-worthy. This would lead to an endless regress, since it implies that for any belief B, there is an additional belief B´ to ground the initial assessment of B as belief-worthy. 2 One problem with this is the implication that, for any of our beliefs, we are committed to believing that the belief was, at some point, assessed and evaluated as belief-worthy. This would lead to an endless regress, since it implies that for any belief B, there is an additional belief B´ to ground the initial assessment of B as belief-worthy. xviii on sincere say-so, whereas Joe's acceptance was based on insincere say-so. 3 Later in this dissertation we see, 4 by appeal to studies on the accuracy of deception detection, that the average rate at which recipients' accurately assess a speaker for sincerity is only slightly above 50% (Bond and DePaulo 2006: 230). This suggests that our chances of accurately assessing whether speakers are sincere with respect to their sayso are very similar to our chances of guessing whether the toss of a coin ends as heads or tails. This is not to say that because our disposition to assess for de facto speakersincerity is about as good as chance, we should therefore be excused for accepting insincere say-so. Instead, it suggests that we should that we should be responsive to other signs of speaker-reliability than merely perceived speaker-sincerity. For instance, we should take into account whether, as is illustrated in JENNY'S WEDDING , there are reasons to think that the speaker is clueless as to what he is talking about. This is an important factor, since the reason for much of what we accept on the basis of say-so is that we lack the competence ourselves to figure it out. Since we cannot all be experts on everything, our competence as individuals is limited to those a few areas of interest or expertise. 6 Hence, even if we presuppose that the responsibility for accepting what we are told is ultimately on ourselves, we are still, due to our limited capacities as individuals, extremely reliant on the competence of others, which in turn makes us inescapably reliant on their say-so as well. Though we cannot help but to be reliant on the say-so of others, what we can help is how we choose to account for and defend the aptness of accepting the say-so of others in such a way that this makes for an apt basis for warranted belief. In this dissertation I discuss the question of how this should be done and present an argument against a disjunction inherited from the Scottish Enlightenment, viz. that say-so-based warrant is, either, grounded in rational-or non-rational acceptance. 3 Given, of course, that we presuppose that Greg the clairvoyant does not actually believe himself to be a clairvoyant.

Nous, 2008

South African Journal of Philosophy, 2009