The Argument From Queerness and the Normativity of Meaning

Ferenc Hörcher - Béla Mester - Zoltán Turgonyi: Is a Universal Morality Possible? Budapest, 2015.

John Mackie argued that objective moral values and principles are queer and that we should not believe in their existence. As opposed to some more simplistic readings, in my paper I off er an interpretation of the argument as one that appeals to parsimony. In this interpretation the argument says that by believing in objective morality we break the principle of parsimony, according to which one should not postulate unnecessarily many and unparalleled kinds and particulars. I argue against this view by pointing out that the rules of reasoning would lead to the same kind of problems Mackie suggests objective morality leads to. In the paper I try to deal with several possible nuances of the argument from queerness and answer important counter-objections.

Revista Kínesis (Vol. 7 (13)), 2015

I start by arguing that Mackie’s claim that there are no objective values is a nonsensical one. I do this by ‘assembling reminders’ of the correct use of the term ‘values’ and by examining the grammar of moral propositions à la Wittgenstein. I also examine Hare’s thought experiment which is used to demonstrate “that no real issue can be built around the objectivity or otherwise of moral values” before briefly looking at Mackie’s ‘argument from queerness’. In the final section I propose that Robert Arrington’s ‘conceptual relativism’, inspired by Wittgenstein, helps to make our use of moral language more perspicuous and avoids the problems faced by Mackie.

Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2014

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2005

This article suggests a Davidsonian argument for a unique and overlooked metanormative package:l the Davidsonian theory of meaning, we argue, strongly suggests that, although normative discourse is fully factual (i.e., normative claims are truth-apt) in one important sense of the term "realism," normative realism is false and the position we dub "Irrealism" is true. "Realism" is the view that a t least one of two conflicting conceptions of the good life is false. "Irrealism" (not to be identified with a denial of realism) is the claim that, if they are internally coherent, conflicting normative outlooks both are true. We shall deduce Irrealism from an attractive version of the Davidsonian theory of meaning.

2019

The Kripke-Wittgenstein (KW) sceptical argument, presented in Chapter 2 of Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982), concludes that there are no meaning facts. While realism has been denied for a great many subject matters, the meaning irrealism motivated by KW’s argument has particularly farreaching consequences. This thesis is an investigation into some of these consequences, in an effort to determine what is at stake in accepting the argument as sound. In Chapter 2, I summarise the argument, assume that it is sound, and consider the consequences for one particular body of talk: discourse about meaning itself. Three models for characterising that discourse are canvassed: error-theory, non-factualism, and mere minimalism. The latter characterisation is made available by adopting the framework for realism debates proposed by Crispin Wright in Truth and Objectivity (1992), of which I give an exposition in Chapter 1. I find in Chapter 2 that the three models of meani...

Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2005

This article suggests a Davidsonian argument for a unique and overlooked metanormative package:l the Davidsonian theory of meaning, we argue, strongly suggests that, although normative discourse is fully factual (i.e., normative claims are truth-apt) in one important sense of the term "realism," normative realism is false and the position we dub "Irrealism" is true. "Realism" is the view that a t least one of two conflicting conceptions of the good life is false. "Irrealism" (not to be identified with a denial of realism) is the claim that, if they are internally coherent, conflicting normative outlooks both are true. We shall deduce Irrealism from an attractive version of the Davidsonian theory of meaning.

Ratio, 2020

In the 1980s and early 1990s, the normativity of meaning was thought to be more-or-less 'incontestable.' But in the last 25 years, many philosophers of mind and language have contested it in several seemingly different ways. This, however, is somewhat illusory. There is an unappreciated commonality among most anti-normativist arguments, and this commonality, I argue, poses a problem for anti-normativism. The result, however, is not a wholesale rejection of anti-normativism. Rather, an insight from the anti-normativist position can be harnessed to reveal an unappreciated position in the normativity of meaning debate.

Philosophical Studies, 2014

If there is such a thing as objectively existing prescriptivity, as the moral realist claims, then we can also explain why-and we need not deny that-strong (conceptual) internalism is true. Strong conceptual internalism is true, not because of any belief in any magnetic force thought to be inherent in moral properties themselves, as Mackie argued, but because we do not allow that anyone has (in the practical sense) 'accepted' a normative claim, unless she is prepared to some extent to act on it (to see to it that it is satisfied).

Problems of Normativity, Rules, and Rule-Following, 2015

In the three decades since the publication of Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language the claim that the meaning of linguistic expressions should be explained in normative terms has been one of the most debated issues in the analytic philosophy of language. A line of arguing against this claim that has gained prominence in the recent years starts off with the assumption that the norms that are involved in linguistic meanings must be either constitutive or prescriptive.

In his recent book Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, Jonas Olson attempts to revive the argument from queerness originally made famous by J.L. Mackie. In this paper, we do three things. First, we eliminate four untenable formulations of the argument. Second, we argue that the most plausible formulation is one that depends crucially upon considerations of parsimony. Finally, we evaluate this formulation of the argument. We conclude that it is unproblematic for proponents of moral non-naturalism—the target of the argument from queerness.