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In this paper, I discuss Quine's views on language sharing and linguistic communities. It is sometimes explicitly and often implicitly taken for granted that Quine believes that speakers can form communities in which they share a language. The aim of the paper is to show that this is a misinterpretation and, on the contrary, Quine is closer to linguistic individualism – the view according to which there is no guarantee that speakers within a community share a language and the notion of idiolect is more fundamental than the notion of shared language.
The idea that natural languages are shared by speakers within linguistic communities is often taken for granted. Several philosophers even take the notion of shared language as fundamental and that allows them to use it in further explanations. However, to justify the claim that speakers share a language, it should be possible to demarcate the shared language somehow. In this paper, I discuss: A) the explanatory role which the notion of shared language can play, and B) a strategy for demarcating shared languages from within the linguistic production of speakers. The aim of this paper is to show that the indeterminate nature of meaning in natural languages problematizes the intuitive idea of natural languages as shared.
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Clinical sociolinguistics, 2005
Disinventing and reconstituting …, 2007
Identity and Dialect Performance, 2017
Babel, 2019
This paper seeks to re-engage the wider languages education community in discussion on community languages, through exploration of a set of 'cases' that expand on the contexts of language and cultural change in Australia through migration shifts, organisational support, and research and activities being conducted into community languages. It is anticipated
Pragmatics. Quarterly Publication of the International Pragmatics Association (IPrA), 1995
Logos & Episteme, 2023
Blackburn and Searle have argued that Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation results in a denial of the sort of first-person authority that we commonly concede we have over our mental and semantical content. For, the indeterminacy thesis implies that there is no determinate meaning to know at all. And, according to Quine, the indeterminacy holds at home too. For Blackburn, Quine must constrain the domain of indeterminacy to the case of translation only. Searle believes that Quine has no other choice but to give up on his behaviorism. Hylton, however, has attempted to defend Quine against these objections, by arguing that Quine’s naturalistic claim that speaking a language is nothing but possessing certain dispositions to act in specific ways would enable him to accommodate first-person authority. I will argue that the objections from Blackburn and Searle, as well as Hylton’s solution, are all problematic when seen from within Quine’s philosophy. I will introduce a sort of Strawsonian-Wittgensteinian conception of first-person authority and offer that it would be more than compatible with Quine’s naturalistic philosophy.
History and Philosophy of Logic, 1999
The Polish logicians' propositional calculi, which consist in a distinct synthesis of the Fregean and Boolean approaches to logic, in¯uencedW. V. Quine's early work in formal logic. This early formal work of Quine's, in turn, can be shown to serve as one of the sources of his holistic conception of natural language.
I argue that there are basic components of human language. These basic components might be considered deep structure or semantic rules. These components challenge Quine’s view on radical translation. This paper considers whether there are any necessary components of language that all languages must have in order to be languages. If there are necessary components, it would be reasonable to infer that they are translatable. This would be true even if there were no pre-existing comparable words in the lexicons. The functions are translatable; therefore an utterance can have a determinate sense. The paper examines Quine's assertion about 'inscrutability of reference'. Rival systems can lead to rival translations that are equally correct according to the the criteria of each system but can be patently contradictory. I argue that these limited system generating true contradictions does not imply that there are true contradictions and this does not justify the abandonment of the law of the excluded middle.
University of Toronto Law Journal, 2018
The concept of a ‘linguistic community’ plays a critical role in Canadian language rights law, appearing explicitly in both the Constitution and in statutory law as well as featuring prominently in the case law. Despite its ubiquity, however, this concept has never been explicitly defined, nor has it been subjected to sustained analysis by the courts or in legal scholarship. This is problematic, as the term can be interpreted in divergent ways, and the choice one makes in this respect has the potential to substantially alter the content of various constitutional and statutory provisions. Reduced to its simplest form, the problem is that the word ‘community’ can be interpreted in one of two ways: (a) as designating a collective entity of some kind or (b) as nothing more than a shorthand for labelling a certain class of individuals based on their linguistic competency and geographic location. This article examines which of these options ought to be preferred when construing references to a ‘linguistic community’ in constitutional or statutory provisions or in the relevant case law. Part ii of the article examines the concept of a community from a philosophical perspective and outlines a theoretical framework for distinguishing between cases where a collection of people should be viewed as a mere aggregate of individuals and those where it should be conceptualized as a collective entity with interests distinct from its individual members. Part iii then explores how this framework can be used to better understand the somewhat murky conceptual foundations of the leading language rights cases. I argue that these foundations can be explicated or completed by combining the concept of a ‘community’ developed in Part ii with ideas drawn from the social scientific research on the relationship between language, culture, and identity. Full article: https://www.utpjournals.press/eprint/yzSy2w5UKd6X7ymRVbpu/full
Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio , 2022
This paper examines how the idea that there are different languages is treated by approaches that employ the notion of «languaging», focusing on Love and Cowley. It seems that within their critical reconsideration of the traditional view of what «language» is the importance of languages (i.e., linguistic diversity) is downplayed. Against this view, this paper argues that languages are indeed a relevant factor in shaping people's actions, perception, thinking, etc. Arguments in support of thesis can be found in the most recent studies in linguistic relativity. They are focused on the interactional and situated features of human linguistic activity, just like «languaging» is concerned with embodied coordinated interactivity. However, points of theorical divergence remain. Moreover, the ontological tenets in languaging seem to get in the way of a reconciliation.
Disputatio, 2012
This special issue collects a selection of the papers presented at the International Colloquium Word and Object, 50 Years Later, which took place in Rome on May 28-29, 2010. In the fiftieth year since the publication of Word and Object, the conference aimed at celebrating one of the most famous and influential philosophers and mathematicians of the 20 th Century: Willard Van Orman Quine. The purpose of the conference, organised by the University of Rome 'La Sapienza' and the Research Group APhEx (Analytical and Philosophical Explanation), was to discuss and explore some of the major Quinean theses. This volume collects the contributions of , who were speakers at the conference. The papers are unified by a common thread that is represented by the Quinean philosophical heritage and take their stance within the different areas of the current philosophical debate on this issue.
Revista Filosofia Unisinos, 2021
The authors of *Linguistic Bodies* appeal to shared know-how to explain the social and participatory interactions upon which linguistic skills and agency rest. However, some issues lurk around the notion of shared know-how and require attention and clarification. In particular, one issue concerns the agent behind the shared know-how, a second one concerns whether shared know-how can be reducible to individual know-how or not. In this paper, I sustain that there is no single answer to the first issue; depending on the case, shared know-how can belong to the participants of a social activity or to the system the participants bring forth together. In relation to the second issue, I sustain, following the authors, a non-reductive account of shared know-how. I also suggest that responsiveness to others, which is a fundamental element of shared know-how, can be extended by perceptual learning.
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