How Does Epistemic Rationality Constrain Practical Rationality?

Many epistemologists equate the rational and the justied. Those who disagree have done little to explain the dierence, leading their opponents to suspect that the distinction is an ad hoc one designed to block counterexamples. The rst aim of this dissertationpursued in the rst three chaptersis to improve this situation by providing a detailed, independently motivated account of the distinction. The account is unusual in being inspired by no particular theoretical tradition in epistemology, but rather by ideas in the meta-ethical literature on reasons and rationality. The account is also unusual in proposing that the distinction between rationality and justication can be derived from a reasons-based account of justication. Historically, this is a striking claim. In epistemology, reasons-based accounts of justication are standardly treated as paradigmatically internalist accounts, but this dissertation argues that we should believe the reverse: given the best views about reasonsagain drawn from meta-ethicswe should expect reasons-based accounts of justication to be strongly externalist.

Discusiones Filosóficas

In this paper, I shall attempt a characterization of Smith’s concept of ‘rationality’ in the practical sphere. My goal is to show that Smith’s requirements of rationality (as inspired by Williams) cannot provide a good and workable account of what it means to be a fully rational agent. To this end, I shall examine Williams’ internalist requirement on reason and discuss the main shortcomings of such account of rationality. I shall try to show, also, that Smith’s and Williams’ views on rationality are too restrictive and thus cannot be applied to ordinary agents who deliberate in real life.

Social Action, 1985

2016

Drawing on insights from Imre Lakatos' seminal work on theories of rationality, Leslie Allan develops seven criteria for rational theory choice that surmount a major shortcoming of Lakatos' methodology. By articulating the various criteria of dependence and independence applying to evidence-statements, Allan shows how his axioms of rationality follow from the general demands of an objectivist epistemology. He thus avoids Lakatos' Achilles' heel; the presupposition that science is a rational enterprise. Allan concludes his essay with a consideration of two problems for his theory: the problem of logical incommensurability and of implicit rationality.

Over the past four decades, human reason and rationality has been among the most intensely investigated topics in psychology, cognitive science, and economics. At the heart of this debate is a view of human rationality, often associated with the Heuristics and Biases tradition, on which much of our reasoning and decision making is normatively problematic because it relies on heuristics and biases rather than rational principles. In this article we describe briefly some of the evidence that has been invoked in support of this contention and consider some of the more prominent critical responses, especially from evolutionary psychology and dual-process theorists.

The author argues that there are cases in which we should promote irrationality. In order to reach this conclusion, the author argues for the following claims: (1) that it is sometimes better to be in an irrational state of mind, and (2) that in some of those cases, we can (purposefully) influence our state of mind via our actions. The first claim is supported by presenting cases of irrational belief and by countering a common line of argument associated with William K. Clifford, who defended the idea that having an irrational belief is always worse than having a rational one. In support of the second claim, the author then explains how the control we have over our beliefs could look like. In conclusion, the author points out that the argument of this essay need not conflict with evidentialism, but does so when combined with another plausible claim about the meaning of doxastic ought statements. Furthermore, the author suggests that his argument is not restricted to the irrationality of beliefs, but can be applied to irrational states of mind in general (like desires, intentions, emotions or hopes).

2014

In contemporary philosophy and social science the features of rationality play a new significant role in the theory of mind, language, action, decision theory and in questions of cross cultural understanding. The approaches do not conceive of rationality as a subjective a priori principle of reasoning; they present a different attitude towards questions of conceptualizing rationality, and this is a first step towards contextualized understanding of rationality. We can only grasp what rationality means in this way. Rationality is not given but is rather a result of our conceptualizing and a matter of contextualization and this is also a question of rationalization of means for our personal and our collective goals. The reader presents an outline on contemporary orientations about the subject of understanding "rationality" along the main topics in philosophy, theory of language, and social science. Topics are radical interpretation, naturalized epistemology and normativity; intentions and the social aspects of rationality; and concepts of explanation, justification and reality.

Political Studies Review, 2018

Rationality is an enduring topic of interest across the disciplines and has become even more so, given the current crises that are unfolding in our society. The four books reviewed here, which are written by academics working in economics, political science, political theory and philosophy, provide an interdisciplinary engagement with the idea of rationality and the way it has shaped the institutional frameworks and global political economy of our time. Rational choice theory has certainly proved to be a useful analytic tool in certain contexts, and instrumental reason has been a key tenet of human progress in several periods of history, including the industrial revolution and the modernity that emerged in the nineteenth century. Given the complexity of our current challenges, however, is it time to ask whether this paradigm might be better complemented by more holistic and heterodox approaches? Hindmoor A and Taylor TY (2015) Rational Choice (Political Analysis), 2nd edn. London; N...

Rough draft. To appear in Knauff, M. and Spohn, W. (ed.), Handbook of Rationality, MIT Press.

This chapter addresses the question as to how (if at all) propositional (PL) and first-order logic (FOL) relate to epistemic rationality. Rationality, it is often held, demands that our attitudes cohere in particular ways. Logic is often invoked as a source of such coherence requirements when it comes to belief: An ideally rational agent's beliefs are consistent and closed under logical consequence. However, this traditional picture has been challenged from various quarters. We begin by briefly reviewing the key concepts involved in PL and FOL. We then critically examine two distinct approaches to justifying logic-based requirements of rationality. The first lays down a set of desiderata codifying our intuitions, and then seeks to formulate a principle articulating the link between logic and rational belief that satisfies them. The second starts by identifying our most fundamental epistemic aim and seeks to derive requirements of rationality based on their ability to promote this aim.