Waking the Neighbour - Finland, NATO and Russia

Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, 2020

In recent years, Finland has closely cooperated with NATO and Finnish politicians emphasize that Finland may consider joining the Alliance at any point. However, this step is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Russia’s aggressive actions abroad disconcert Finland; as this article shows, even after Russia’s war with Georgia and the breakout of the crisis in Ukraine, the situation is not deemed serious enough by the Finns for them to risk a serious deterioration of relations with their eastern neighbor. Rather than crossing the interests of Moscow, whose perception of the world Finland has been able uniquely to understand thanks to its historical experience, the country opts for a more complex, yet also safer, path of balancing between ever-closer cooperation with NATO, and maintaining the status of a non-member country.

World Economy and International Relations, 2019

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland has commissioned this assessment of the effects of possible NATO membership, in connection with the preparation of the Government's Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy. This is the first assessment of its kind conducted at the request of the Finnish government since 2007: during the intervening decade, major strategic changes have occurred at the global, European and regional levels. We were not entrusted with voicing a preference for or against NATO membership. Nor were we requested to provide a pro-and-con balance-sheet type approach. Our task has been to provide an evaluation of the potential effects of membership, in the most clinical manner possible. This does not mean that all effects of membership would be equally straightforward: some, such as the treaty commitments integral to Atlantic Alliance membership, or the direct impact of belonging to NATO's command structure are comparatively easy to describe. Others, such as the possible reactions of Russia to Finland's entry into NATO or the consequences of possible Finnish membership for the corresponding debate in Sweden are necessarily more probabilistic in nature. The text of the assessment reflects these differences in the degrees of certainty. We have adhered to a strict interpretation of our mandate, with one substantive exception. In our work it became immediately apparent that the choices made by Finland and Sweden (or vice versa) to join or not to join NATO, separately or together, could lead to different effects for the security and defence of Finland. Thus, we have decided on our own initiative to extend our analysis to include a hypothesis whereby Sweden would join NATO but Finland would not, since this would change the regional strategic and military status quo for Finland.

2002

Finland maintains the idea that Russia and NATO are possible opponents, and this paper analyzes whether this security policy thinking is still adequate, since cooperation between the two is increasing. After providing some historical background, the author discusses possible changes for the Finnish policies and positions towards NATO and Russia.

The European Neutrals and NATO, 2017

Finland has decided to remain militarily non-aligned, although the country has been willing to develop defence cooperation inside the EU and a partnership with NATO. In fact, it is the only EU country bordering Russia that is not a member of NATO. The question of Finland's NATO membership has been discussed in public since the end of the Cold War, and the debates have intensified with the ongoing crisis in Ukraine and Russia's confrontation with the West. At the same time, Finland has been keen on deepening its partnership with NATO, engaging in an 'enhanced partnership' and signing a Host Nation Support agreement with the Atlantic Alliance. Despite the intensified discussion, it is nevertheless unlikely that there will be a swift decision to apply for full NATO membership. Finland's current relationship with NATO has evoked a great deal of international interest recently, in light of the increased tensions between the Alliance and Russia that have become palpable in the Baltic Sea

Sweden and Finland’s membership in NATO would significantly improve the level of security in the Baltic Sea region in the long-term by changing the politico-military imbalance that is currently in Russia’s favour. However, it is unlikely that Stockholm and Helsinki will change their non-alignment policy in the coming years. They will rather focus on enhancing politico-military co-operation with NATO. This has grown in importance to both countries in recent years in line with rising uncertainty in the region. The Swedish and Finnish wish for more substance in their military relations with NATO will however be met with increasing limitations as allied activity in the Baltic Sea region is focusing on collective defence and the two countries are not member states. Despite the positive effect Sweden and Finland’s cooperation with NATO exerts on the region’s security, it also has negative implications. It does not eliminate the uncertainty about the scope of the two countries’ co-operation with the alliance in the case of a military conflict. It offers Stockholm an illusory sense of security, slowing down the pace of investments in defence; and for Helsinki it is rather an element of its deterrence policy towards Russia than a genuinely considered alternative.

Finland’s official entry into NATO on 4 April 2023 marked the culmination of a meticulously orchestrated 11-month accession process, catalysed by the destabilising events surrounding the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While Finland’s accession to NATO may appear straightforward, it was expedited in light of the urgent security imperatives prompted by the invasion. Nevertheless, the transition to NATO membership calls for careful consideration of the multifaceted security dynamics between Finland and the alliance. In this context, this paper endeavours to cast a forward-looking perspective, examining the future trajectory of NATO-Finnish cooperation post-accession. Concretely, it will look at what the next steps are that NATO and Finland could and/or should take after the latter’s accession to the former. Central to this exploration is an assessment of the potential avenues for Finland to further integrate into NATO’s operational framework. Specifically, a detailed analysis will be undertaken to evaluate the feasibility and implications of expanding NATO’s presence within Finnish territory through initiatives such as the enhanced forward presence (eFP). Then, the paper will explore the prospects for enhanced collaboration within the Northern Group, leveraging Finland’s NATO membership to deepen regional defence cooperation. Furthermore, consideration will be given to the merits of Finland joining the Bucharest Nine (B9) group, elucidating the potential benefits and strategic imperatives associated with such a move.

Studia Europejskie-Studies in European Affairs, 2022

After Russia invaded Ukraine, Finland quickly applied for NATO membership. This step is not necessarily that drastic should Finland's security policy development in the long term be examined with one's focus set on a gradually-developed defence policy. It represents an important continuity in security policy, but also played a central role in advancing Finland's steps to becoming NATO members. On the basis of different studies and accounts, the following points seem to be critical in constructing a preliminary narrative about Finland's road to the Alliance. After the Second World War, Finland's western relations became dependent on its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. Finland was aware that it could not expect any support from the West as regards its security. Despite a security policy based on recognising facts, and the FCMA Treaty with the Soviet Union, the eastern neighbour was seen as the main, and, later on, the only military threat on the basis of history and Finland's vulnerable geopolitical position. The threat, however, was concealed by so-called "doubletalk" in security policy discourse until the 2010s. In this context, state defence was developed to be an independent and modern territorial defence, ultimately there to defend against a large-scale invasion. Finland's defence enjoyed high legitimacy and confi dence in society, especially from the 1970s. Security policy was raised above normal politics to be a kind of super-politics with a strong political consensus. When the Cold War ended and Finland joined the European Union, defence policy and the defence establishment got a leading role in working an approaching NATO. Finland's opportunities to conduct stabilisation policy in its close neighbourhood were seen as being limited, especially after Russia adopted a self-asserting foreign and security policy towards the

Politics, 2009

Acta de historia & politica: saeculum XXI, 2024

The purpose of this article is to analyze the influence of Finland on regional policy of NATO and the Russo-Ukrainian war. The article explores political, economic and military aspects of Finland and Ukraine in the light of the Russian aggression while considering their relationships and foreign policy goals on a regional level. The author draws attention to various aspects of Helsinki domestic and foreign policy that is directed to set a balance in the region and, at the same time, to support Kyiv militarily and economically in confrontation with Moscow. Finland's active policy of promoting stability can be described as a two-track policy, whereby EU membership and intensified military cooperation with Western partners provide a basis for the maintenance and development of relations with Russia. The author focused on energy resources and its importance for Finland that has a long history of energy trade with Russia. The trade is practically one-directional, as Finland lacks domestic fossil fuel reserves in comparison with its substantial demand for energy, whereas Russia has significant export volumes. Along with the above-mentioned issues, the author is observing aggressive Russian military activities in the Baltic Sea region. Despite peaceful relationships with Finland, Moscow does not mind to remind neighboring countries who calls the tune in the region. Pursuing this purpose, Russia increases military activity in the Baltic Sea region with relatively frequent airspace and territorial water violations. As a result, there is a risk that collisions or provocations might lead to a rapid and uncontrolled escalation. So, Finland finds its important to keep open channels for political dialogue and to seek ways to reactivate existing confidence-building measures. Finland-NATO relationships are taken into consideration as well. The author described the process of Finland's accession to the alliance. After almost 30 years of close partnership with NATO, Finland joined the Alliance on April 4, 2023. Its partnership with NATO was historically based on its policy of military non-alignment, which changed following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Following Russia's aggression, Ukraine has requested materiel assistance from the EU and NATO member countries. To date, Finland has donated 23 defence materiel packages to Ukraine. The combined value of all defence materiel packages submitted so far is now over EUR 2 billion.

Conflict and Civicness Research Group, London School of Economics, 2024

Following decades of peaceful coexistence in the region, some Nordic states (Finland and Sweden) have found themselves on a verge of a strategic choice. The direct result of the Russia-instigated war in Ukraine were the decisions made by Finland and Sweden to seek membership in NATO. Within a span of one year, both Finland (April 2023) and Sweden (March 2024) became members of NATO. This paper builds up on the explanatory power of the “frontline states” concept, as presented in the previous report, yet it focuses on the examination of the impact of Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO membership on the defence posture of the Alliance. As both of these states are becoming vital for the strengthening of other NATO’s frontline states, the author will assess the role of these newcomers in the Alliance’s defence and deterrence strategy. Additionally, the paper will highlight key implications of Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO accession for the Baltic Sea new security architecture in the light of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian War.