Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020

2010

The publication of Russia’s National Security Strategy in May 2009 provoked a discussion regarding the security challenges that Moscow is facing. This article reviews, firstly, the security context that defined the Putin era and then relates the analysis of the latest national security strategy to the broader dilemmas that Russia will encounter in the next decade. The purpose is to identify the priorities and threat perceptions that are outlined in the latest national security strategy and to question whether Russia will become a great power in the near future.

e-International Relations, 2010

The long-awaited publication of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, signed by President Dmitry Medvedev on 5 February 2010, was the result of years of debate within the Russian military and political establishment. The new Russian strategic perspective was expected with anxiety due to the great changes in the international arena since the last edition of the Military Doctrine of the country, in 2000, including: the resurgence of Russian power; the September 11 attacks and the international terrorism; the wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003); NATO’s expansion toward Russia’s borders (2004); and the August War against Georgia (2008).

Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2012

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The ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, with its complexities and implications, has significantly impacted the global geopolitical dynamics. As the war continues to be a focal point of discussions and analysis on the world stage, this article delves into the evolution of Russia's national security strategy, tracing its trajectory from the Soviet era to the contemporary policies shaped under President Vladimir Putin. It discusses the militaristic approach during the Cold War, the subsequent transformative security policies during Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership in the mid-1980s. This was a departure from traditional approaches through integration of political reforms with security considerations, and the re-evaluation of the policies aftermath the Soviet collapse as Russia sought to rebuild its image as a powerful state in the global theatre of world politics. The article sketches the post-Soviet strategy of Russia in shaping an effective security policy, especially under Putin as Moscow tries to tackle dilemmas stemming not only from the complex dynamics of a multipolar world order but also from the home front. Despite the historic shifts, one finds a stark continuity in the Russian security policy, shaped by ideological factors, domestic conditions, sovereignty, and aspirations for power.

Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine highlighted NATO as a military danger to the Russian Federation. NATO was listed explicitly in first place among these dangers - specifically the “striving to ascribe global functions to the force capability of NATO, implemented in breach of international law, and bringing the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by means of enlarging the bloc”. Significantly for our interpretation of Russian statements, NATO is listed as a military danger not as a military threat. The distinction in Russian doctrinal lexicon is important – a “danger” is a situation with the potential “under certain conditions” to develop into an immediate military threat, rather than a threat per se. Clear definitions for both military threat and military danger are included in the Doctrine, as well as the distinction between military conflict and armed conflict. Previously to be found in other doctrinal statements, these definitions are essential for a precise understanding of the threat picture as expressed by official Russia. Other military dangers include deployment of foreign forces on territory adjacent to Russia and its allies, not only on land but also at sea; the creation of strategic missile defence forces; and the development of strategic non-nuclear precision weapons systems. Development of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) is a fundamental task in deterring and preventing armed conflict, alongside cooperation with other international organisations including, interestingly, NATO. Russia will also contribute forces to the CSTO’s rapid reaction group and for deployment as CSTO peacekeepers. Furthermore, the CSTO’s collective defence provision, similar to but more binding than NATO’s Article 5, is now explicitly included in Russian doctrine. Despite widespread reporting that the new Doctrine would display increased readiness for first use of nuclear weapons, this provision is if anything subtly rolled back from the 2000 version of the Military Doctrine – instead of first use “in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation”, the criterion is now “when the very existence of the State is under threat”. The related provision promising no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states acting alone has been dropped. But Russia’s precise stance on nuclear use is detailed in a classified addendum to the Doctrine, so remains unclear. The provision for use of Russian forces overseas “to defend the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens, and to protect international peace and security” is included. Operations overseas to remove threats or suppress aggression can also be undertaken at the instigation of the UN “or other bodies”. Preparation for mobilisation receives substantial attention, with several sections retained verbatim from the 2000 Doctrine and others new or re-drafted. These provisions concern both the economy and the military, with no regard to the substantial reorganisation of the military during 2009 towards permanent readiness and away from a mobilisation army. Information warfare (a concept which largely overlaps with what we might term cyber operations) is largely ignored in the Doctrine, except as a military danger and for the stipulation that the means to prosecute it must be developed. Meanwhile, the largely outdated Information Security Doctrine of 2000 remains in force.

2021

The opinions expressed in this Policy Brief are those of the author(s) alone, and they do not necessarily reflect the views of the Egmont Institute. Founded in 1947, EGMONT-Royal Institute for International Relations is an independent and non-profit Brussels-based think tank dedicated to interdisciplinary research.

Actual Problems of International Relations, 2021

On 2 July 2021 Russian President Vladimir Putin adopted the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation. This is one of the most important strategic security document of the state, which presents the key threats and challenges for Russia in changing socio-political realities. The document is also a part of Russian external as well as internal strategic communication. This article seeks to analyze the new NSS in the context of the state's strategic culture and its narratives. Russian strategic culture makes a large impact on the state's identity, which is also affecting Russia's foreign and security policies. New NSS is an informative source of knowledge about the current Russian security culture, which helps to predict the Russian future policy direction.