Theory and Methods in the Study of Distributive Politics

Comparative Political Studies, 2015

This paper examines how the partisanship of empowered subnational politicians can impact within-district benefit distribution. I present a theory of the role of subnational politicians in distributive politics, and then test this theory on a distributive Venezuelan land reform initiative by leveraging unique individual-level data on revealed voter preferences and the receipt of particularistic benefits. Using data from a list of millions of voters that signed petitions to recall former President Chávez, I match information on recent land grant applicants to petition signers to measure how political preferences impact the likelihood of applying for and receiving land, and how state governors condition this relationship. I find evidence for both strategic core voter targeting and blockage of benefits to opposition voters. These effects, however, are modified by the political affiliation of governors. The findings point to the importance of considering how intervening subnational politicians influence distributive politics, particularly under federal structures.

Perspectives on Politics, 2013

Papers in the burgeoning empirical literature on distributive politics often focus their analysis on the pattern of distribution of a single patronage good—for example, cash transfers, roads, education spending, electrification, or targeted grants. Yet because governments can favor constituencies through the targeting of multiple public and private goods, drawing general conclusions about distributive politics by investigating just one (or even a few) good(s) can be misleading. We demonstrate the severity of this problem by investigating a particular manifestation of distributive politics—ethnic favoritism—in a particular setting—Africa—and show that the conclusions one draws about who benefits from government allocation decisions can vary markedly depending on the outcome one happens to study. Our findings suggest the need for caution in making general claims about who benefits from distributive politics and raise questions about extant theoretical conclusions that are based on emp...

2010

Revista Ibero-Americana de Estudos Legislativos (RIEL), Vol. 4, No. 1, pp.17-32., 2015

What is the role of presidents in the politics of distribution in developing democracies? To what extent do other political actors, such as legislators and governors, influence federal distribution? This paper studies the main factors that affect distributive politics in Argentina and Brazil, two highly unequal presidential federations in Latin America. The focus is on funds with high redistributive impact and over which the central government has large discretion: those for public infrastructure. Using original data on federal infrastructure spending for the 24 provinces in Argentina and the 27 states in Brazil for the period 1999-2011, we show that the distribution of infrastructure funds is fundamentally determined by executive politics. Despite this, our empirical findings indicate there is large variation between the two cases in the relevance of the partisan links between presidents and governors and the influence of congress and its committees. Furthermore, we observe that elections are not relevant in explaining distribution in either of the two cases and that presidents are mostly motivated by political considerations and that programmatic factors, such as equity and efficiency criteria, play a secondary role, especially in Argentina. We discuss some possible reasons for these results and their implications for the broader comparative debate on distributive politics.

Although several papers in the political economy literature suggest a positive relationship between income inequality and redistribution, the data for Latin America does not support this claim. Countries with more income inequality also have less redistribution. This paper explores how the degree of imperfection in the political institutions influences equilibrium redistributive tax rates and income distributions. A citizen-candidate model is developed (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996 and Besley and Coate, 1997) in which candidates face a cost for representing other citizens in politics. Political-economic equilibria for diferent degrees of imperfection of the political system are derived and compared. In particular, two distinct cases are found. Countries where the cost of entry to politics is low can have higher redis tribution and lower inequality if the median run as a candidate or ,when there is a two candidate equilibria, redistribution and inequality could go either way. On the o...

Frontiers in Sociology, 2022

In a developing and highly unequal region like Latin America, it is crucial to understand the determinants that affect people’s support for redistribution of resources from the state. A series of theories focused on self-interest have continuously established a negative link between people’s income and their support for the reduction of inequalities through redistribution. Despite this, the evidence is scarce and sometimes contradictory while its study in Latin America is almost non-existent. Using data from the LAPOP Survey between 2008 and 2018, a longitudinal dimension is considered for the first time in the measurement of Latin American redistributive preferences, using hybrid multilevel regression models. In contrast to the evidence from studies conducted in other regions, the results reveal that in Latin America it is not possible to detect a clear association between income and redistributive preferences at specific times, but it is possible when changes occur in countries’ levels of inequality and economic development. Likewise, other elements that consistently affect preferences are evident, such as educational level, political ideology, and confidence in the political system. In light of this evidence, comparisons are made with previous research findings in industrialized countries, challenging rationalist theories of justice and solidarity.

2017

Si bien una considerable literatura afirma que las democracias tenderian a redistribuir el ingreso de ricos a pobres, incluso desde un punto de vista meramente procedimental, existe evidencia que apunta a senalar lo contrario: los regimenes democraticos pueden mantener e incluso acentuar la desigualdad, rasgo aun mas evidente en paises pobres o en vias de desarrollo. Esta tesis busca enfatizar un factor importante que interviene significativamente en la manera en que el ingreso se distribuye en contextos democraticos: el tipo de relaciones que las elites establecen. Esta investigacion tiene como objetivo explorar hasta que punto las relaciones de la elite afectan la redistribucion del ingreso en contextos democraticos y de alta concentracion de ingresos. Tres hipotesis guian el desarrollo de esta tesis. En primer lugar, si las elites establecen relaciones cohesivas con i) las elites politicas, por una parte, y ii) con las elites militares, por otra parte, menor sera la posibilidad d...

Inequality has been a long-standing feature of Latin America. This article is an examination of the redistributive and social policy struggles in two countries of the region: Mexico and Chile. While electoral democracy has propelled redistributive issues onto the policy agenda, redistributive struggles are intense and progress in policy to address inequality is slow to emerge. Attention has been focused on cash transfer programs because of their ability to garner approval from a cross-section of public opinion, particularly from the most powerful. While such programs have an important contribution to make to poverty reduction, societal redistributive compromises are essential to an efficacious strategy to reduce poverty and inequality over the long term.

Latin American Politics and Society, 2022

Support for redistribution in developing countries has been found to be weakly related to income, meaning the poor are not much likelier than the rich to support redistribution. If not economic self-interest, what explains support for redistribution? A multilevel regression analysis covering a decade of public opinion data from 18 Latin American countries finds support for explanations centered on social affinity. Specifically, people in more culturally divided countries are less supportive of redistribution. This relationship is strongest among lowincome individuals, who are more likely to support redistribution than richer people in countries with low levels of diversity, but no more likely and, by some measures, less likely to support redistribution where diversity is highest. Economic distance between groups also matters. Support for redistribution increases when middle-class incomes are closer to those of the poor than the rich. Support declines as the middle class pulls ahead of the poor.

2009

In this paper I present an empirical analysis of redistributive policies with particular attention to transfers. Theoretical considerations are compared with some empirical observations at three levels of analysis: supranational, national and sub-national. The main conclusion of my work is that, general speaking, redistributive policies do not follow normative criteria that predict they should be targeted to disadvantaged groups. Moreover, to some extent, a positive correlation between lobbies' power and some dynamics of transfers favourable to middle classes arises.