Una tradizione plurisecolare ha quasi sempre perduto di vista che, in realtà, le forme linguistiche non hanno alcuna intrinseca capacità semantica: esse sono strumenti, espedienti, più o meno ingegnosi, senza vita e valore fuori delle mani dell'uomo, delle comunità storiche che ne facciano uso (De Mauro 1965). Abstract In this paper I offer my reflections on the relationship between semantics and pragmatics. I argue that semantics – the relatively stable and context-invariant meanings of the language – is necessarily amplified by pragmatics, which is a way of transcending the possibilities of semantics. Pragmatic layers, especially if they meet the cognitive needs of language users and represent culturally salient concepts, tend to become semanticized. The situation is complicated by the postulation of explicatures, which I argue are not cancellable and mimic the semantic resources of the language (very often I have claimed that explicatures are mainly cases in which a pragmatic inference does some work in rescuing a statement from otherwise insuperable logical problems). Like entailments they are not cancellable, but they share the features of all pragmatic inferences in that they are calculable. I propose that explicatures are loci of the tension between semantics and pragmatics, and given lack of cancellability they are strong candidates for inferences that become semanticized. In this paper, I see the tension between pragmatics and semantics exemplified by situations where an excessive weight is placed on the semantics (legal documents, such as laws) and situations where an excessive burden is placed on the pragmatics (pidgins like Tok Pisin). In this paper, I also argue that I would like to give thanks to Tullio De Mauro, who made me think of this topic by his stimulating considerations. I would also like to thank principles of language use tend to become semanticised in the form of discourse rules and I consider the praxis of language games and argue that discourse rules, unlike principles, have the advantage of being teachable and also of favoring the involvement of speakers in the communicative praxis (Lo Piparo F, Gramsci and Wittgenstein. An intriguing connection. In: Capone A (ed) Perspectives on language use and pragmatics. Lincom, Muenchen, pp 285–320, 2010).